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Abstract 
 
 Since at least the publication of Lois Gibbs’s 1982 memoir about the toxic waste disaster 
in New York’s Love Canal community, anti-toxics social movements have relied on personal 
narrative as a crucial vehicle through which to advance their political agendas. As a result, acts 
of personal witness have been central to the body of knowledge ecocritics call “toxic discourse,” 
which names a set of recognizable topoi through which fears about toxic proliferation are 
represented in narrative. This dissertation asks how people exposed to environmental chemicals 
wield personal narrative to constitute themselves as poisoned subjects seeking recognition and 
redress for toxic injury. As they witness to the harms of toxic exposures, poisoned subjects 
confront gendered and ableist challenges to their authority as witnesses to embodied experiences 
of illness and disability. Confronting such testimonial injustice, poisoned subjects navigate 
unsteady relationships to normative forms of being and embodiment.  
 “Poisoned Subjects” examines life narratives emerging from three anti-toxics embodied 
health movements: diethylstilbestrol narratives DES Daughter, Daughters at Risk, and DES 
Stories in chapter 1; multiple chemical sensitivity testimony collections The Dispossessed and 
Amputated Lives in chapter 2; and alternative food exposés The Omnivore’s Dilemma and 
Tomatoland in chapter 3. Across these successive chapters, the dissertation tracks an “ur” 
narrative of environmental chemical exposure in which autobiographical narrators draw on 
familiar tropes and story structures to make legible claims as subjects of toxic harm. The final 
chapter reads the digital art piece Male Pregnancy Project as a toxic life narrative in order to 
 
 
 vii 
interrogate toxic discourse’s implicit messages about disability, reproduction, and justice. 
Reading Male Pregnancy Project’s interest in hormone-induced bodily changes back onto 
environmentalist concerns about endocrine-disrupting chemicals reveals toxic discourse as an 
inheritor of a long tradition of eugenic environmentalisms. Toxic discourse is invested in 
concepts of fitness and better breeding that negatively impact efforts toward testimonial and 
embodied justice for marginalized ecological others. 
 “Poisoned Subjects” intervenes in the study of toxic discourse to consider relationships 
between tropes of toxicity and autobiographical forms. Drawing attention to the deep connection 
between environmental and testimonial justice, this dissertation demonstrates that personal 
witness is central to the ways environmental movements and subjects are imagined. In so doing, 
it challenges prevailing approaches to toxic discourse as congruent with environmental justice. 
While toxic discourse is a strategy that has helped some subjects achieve recognition and win 
political gains, personal narratives of environmental chemical exposure reinscribe interlocking 
norms of gender and ability.
 
 
 1 
Introduction 
Poisoned Subjects in the Risk Society 
 
By writing stories about environmental change, we divide the causal relationships of an 
ecosystem with a rhetorical razor that defines included and excluded, relevant and irrelevant, 
empowered and disempowered. In the act of separating story from non-story, we wield the most 
powerful yet dangerous tool of the narrative form. It is a commonplace of modern literary theory 
that the very authority with which narrative presents its vision of reality is achieved by obscuring 
large portions of that reality. Narrative succeeds to the extent that it hides the discontinuities, 
ellipses, and contradictory experiences that would undermine the intended meaning of its story. 
Whatever its overt purpose, it cannot avoid a covert exercise of power: it inevitably sanctions 
some voices while silencing others. A powerful narrative reconstructs common sense to make the 
contingent seem determined and the artificial seem natural. 
  -William Cronon1 
   
The Love Canal story is about a thousand families who lived near the site of an abandoned toxic 
chemical waste dump. More important, it is a warning of what could happen in any American 
community…Love Canal is the story of how government tends to approach a problem, and of 
how we, ordinary citizens of the United States, can take control of our own lives by insisting that 
we be heard.  
   -Lois Gibbs2 
 
 This is a story about stories. The stories people tell about lives shaped by chemicals in the 
environment; the repeated telling of those stories in the context of health social movements; and 
the stories that emerge as literary and cultural critics, social scientists, and historians make sense 
of those narratives across the shifting terrains of environmental activism and late capitalism. This 
is a story about a kind of subjecthood that emerged in the last third of the twentieth century. A 
subjecthood constituted alongside the mass infusion of human-made chemicals into “natural” 
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and built environments. A subjecthood organized around growing anxieties about the physical 
effects and cultural meanings of this toxic proliferation. 
 “Poisoned Subjects: Testimonial Justice in Toxic Life Narrative” is a study of 
autobiographical representations in late twentieth- and early twenty-first-century embodied 
health movements in the United States. Personal testimony, offered through a wide variety of 
forms of life narrative, illuminates how toxic anxieties and materialities help produce collective 
political identities and cultural understandings of the meaning of a life under late capitalism. I 
ask how people exposed to environmental chemicals wield forms of personal narrative to 
constitute themselves as poisoned subjects seeking recognition and redress for toxic illness or 
injury. Together, the chapters that follow probe relationships between ideologies of biological 
reproduction and economic productivity as they operate within environmentalist movements, 
literatures, and criticisms.  
 It begins with a story:  In the late 1970s, residents of a Niagara Falls neighborhood made 
headlines for their struggle against government and industry officials indifferent to the plight of a 
community living atop a toxic waste dump site. In her 1982 memoir, neighborhood resident Lois 
Gibbs testifies to her successful fight against scientists and senators who believed that a 
housewife could not understand the complexities of epidemiology. Amidst accusations of 
“hysteria,” Gibbs and her neighbors remained convinced that toxic waste was responsible for the 
high rates of cancer, miscarriage, and other health problems in Love Canal.3  
 Since then, anti-toxics social movements have relied on personal narrative as a crucial 
vehicle through which to advance their political agendas. If the incident itself shaped future 
community-based anti-toxics action, Gibbs’s narrative helped to establish the role of personal 
witness in shaping the body of knowledge ecocritics call toxic discourse—expressions of broad-
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based public anxieties about the perceived threat of chemicals in the environment. In Love 
Canal: My Story,4 Gibbs frames her pre-toxic self as a “square” housewife (67), a political naïf 
who is forced into an activist role in the name of her children’s and neighbors’ safety. The 
narrator tells the story of awakening both to the risks confronting her family and to political 
activism as she takes on the state and its agents to ensure the survival of her lower middle class 
and working class community. Love Canal interrogates gendered and classed assumptions about 
institutional authority, asking whose bodies and experiences can produce expertise about 
environmental toxicity. 
 Such challenges to top-down formulations of scientific knowledge production are part of 
what make Love Canal an exemplary text of contemporary toxic discourse. The literary ecocritic 
Lawrence Buell, who established the framework of toxic discourse as a recurring set of 
representational strategies, identifies four major topoi through which subjects of late modernity 
express fears about and theorize toxic risk.5 First is the shock of awakened perception. Toxic 
discourse recounts a coming-to-knowledge that one’s environment is not a pristine, ‘natural’ 
space but has been polluted by synthetic chemicals. Often this pastoral disillusionment is sparked 
by personal illness. As they become aware of pervasive toxic risk, previously apolitical 
individuals or communities are motivated to speak out against a world without refuge. Although 
toxic awareness may be initiated in response to a specific chemical or contaminated community, 
toxic discourse recognizes that there is no safe place out of the way of toxic threats. Galvanized 
by these realizations, the subject at the center of toxic discourse pits her knowledge—which may 
be produced through community epidemiology or other forms of lay diagnosis6—against an 
institutionally-sanctioned narrative that minimizes the risks posed by toxins. Competing 
narratives about toxic risk assessment produce a moral drama on a David versus Goliath scale. 
 
 
 4 
Finally, the drama is presented as lurid or grotesque through techniques of gothification (L. Buell 
35–45). Buell and others have shown how this interlocking set of topoi, each of which draws on 
earlier literary traditions like Virgilian pastoral and the urban reform narrative, coalesced in the 
latter half of the twentieth century under the particular influence of the environmentalist 
touchstone Silent Spring. So emerged a widely recognizable structure for telling stories about 
toxic threats that contributed to the circulation of such narratives and the anxieties that they both 
name and produce.  
 In designating pervasive fears about toxic proliferation and its aftermaths “anxiety,” I am 
adopting Buell’s language. It is the fundamental instability of evidentiary truths about toxic risk 
that leads Buell to characterize the collective social affect about toxicity in this way. Buell 
himself follows in the tradition of theorists of contemporary modernity like Anthony Giddens, 
Ulrich Beck, and Frederic Jameson in using language that is freighted with connotations of 
mental disease or disorder. Certainly, there is a powerful disability studies critique to be made 
against the use of the term “anxiety” to denote concerns about toxicity for this very reason. 
Instead, we might look again to Beck and Giddens for alternate terminologies: fear, angst, dread. 
Yet, Beck makes the argument—which I find both persuasive and useful—that, in the 
contemporary period, social inequalities are masked by the individualization of social problems. 
“The result,” he writes, “is that social problems are increasingly perceived in terms of 
psychological dispositions: as personal inadequacies, guilt feelings, anxieties, conflicts, and 
neuroses. There emerges…a direct relation between crisis and sickness” (100, emphasis in 
original). A core concern of this dissertation is to explore representational relationships between 
crisis and disability in contemporary narratives of toxic proliferation.  
 More recently, Heather Houser has treated anxiety as a characteristic affect of 
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contemporary US fiction that links environment and soma. I concur with her assertion that 
environmental “anxiety bends toward the future…aris[ing] from a totalizing image of the now 
that anticipates further degeneration of the present in a foreseeable future” (Houser 204). This 
understanding accords with the toxic trope of the “world without refuge.” I disagree, however, 
that anxiety is necessarily paralyzing to environmental resistance (ibid. 30). By unpacking 
conditions of testimonial injustice faced by witnesses to toxic harm, I will show that part of what 
makes fears about toxic threats disabling are the ways that testimony, recognition, and redress 
are forestalled by the refusal to take seriously such fears, which are so often rooted in embodied 
and community-based knowledges. In this context, to the extent that fears about toxic exposure 
are represented by, but more often to, subjects of toxic harm as hyperbolic, neurotic, obsessive, 
or disordered, I hope that my readings of toxic life narratives in this dissertation will demonstrate 
that the term “anxiety” has the potential to critique, even as it conjures, ableism.  
 Buell’s crucial intervention into the humanistic study of environmental harms has proven 
to be the recognition that cultural understandings of what constitutes environmental health and 
environmental risk are the product of enduring narratives. Subjects negotiate the threat of 
environmental chemicals through environmental rhetorics, through which “some stories acquire 
the power to represent risk in terms that we understand as realistic” (Heise 139). These 
representations may (or may not) be rooted in scientific evidence about material phenomena. 
Nonetheless, individual and collective affect are funneled through existing narrative structures to 
produce a shared sense of what toxicity is, where it can be found, and what it might mean. 
Authors and activists hoping to capture the public imagination mobilize existing tropes and 
forms to put forward a moral-scientific case that can be read as authentic.  
 Thinking about toxicity as a discourse has significant political implications. Buell links 
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the emergence of contemporary toxic discourse to the growing mainstream prominence of 
previously marginalized environmental justice activism in the 1990s (31–33). The predominant 
tropes of toxicity draw on the pastoral ideal of a natural world unsullied by human intervention, 
even as they cede the role of human social relations in shaping environmental encounters. For 
Buell, toxic discourse thus holds the potential to dismantle the binaries of nature/culture, 
country/city, and—crucially—environmental conservation/environmental justice through its 
series of affectively powerful rhetorical moves. In this framework, although “[t]oxic discourse 
may repress, fail to fulfill, or swerve away from itself,” it is at base a liberatory project (L. Buell 
51). Its structures help to spur marginalized communities to environmentalist action and lend 
“psychological and rhetorical cogency” to testimony about toxic risk (ibid. 37–38). Toxic 
discourse derives its cogency through the repetition of narratives that then come to be seen as 
representative. In doing so, its structures also determine the limits of toxic testimony. Some 
stories, and some subjects, do not fit the representative model and so cannot be represented 
within the schema of toxic discourse. 
 “Poisoned Subjects” engages new materialisms alongside critiques of health-
environmental movements as disciplinary technologies to explore the intersection of gender and 
disability as a nodal point of contemporary toxic anxieties in the United States. Toxic discourse’s 
moral and affective force are generated not only by its backward gaze toward an idyllic natural 
environment, a gaze that is admittedly always already forestalled. Just as important is its longing 
for an idealized, whole body, in contrast to the sexually and physically disabled bodies whose 
injuries toxic discourse both represents and adjudicates. This tension, between competing desires 
for the recognition of one’s body as both normative and chemically injured, constitutes the 
poisoned subjecthood at the heart of toxic discourse’s autobiographical productions, which I 
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term toxic life narratives. 
 If “toxic discourse” names a set of representational strategies for negotiating the 
interwoven moral, affective, and material domains of contemporary toxic anxieties, life writing 
is a primary site at which subjects adjudicate contested questions of identity and authenticity. Yet 
surprisingly little attention has been paid to the field of life writing studies as ecocritics have 
enthusiastically taken up the idea of a toxic discourse.7 This despite the fact that life narratives 
are some of toxic discourse’s exemplary texts. Scholars have taken up Buell’s schema to 
consider Gibbs’s Love Canal, Terry Tempest Williams’s Refuge, Sandra Steingraber’s Living 
Downstream and Having Faith, Susanne Antonetta’s Body Toxic, and Audre Lorde’s Cancer 
Journals, largely without attending to the specificities of these texts as autobiography.8 More 
generally, critics have been more interested in the narrative forms of toxicity than in its subjects.9 
This makes a certain kind of sense, given Buell’s own interest in mapping a toxic taxonomy that 
organizes texts across genres and forms. But without significant critical interest, the poisoned 
subject at the center of toxic discourse has been left to languish, along with the kinds of 
organizing questions, critical rubrics, and ethical commitments that autobiographical subjecthood 
brings to the table. The initial impulse for this project came from a recognition of this significant 
gap within literary environmental criticism. In focusing on toxic life narratives, I aim to insert 
the poisoned subject, as an autobiographical subject, back into toxic discourse.  
 Proposing a more capacious understanding of toxic discourse and its uses as the field of  
ecocriticism increasingly orients itself toward environmental justice, “Poisoned Subjects” 
ultimately calls for an intersectional, coalitional environmental justice literary criticism. How do 
autobiographical subjects tell stories of environmental toxic exposure? By what metrics are such 
stories judged to be authentic or inauthentic? How do subjects of toxic harm use personal 
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narrative to claim rights and recognition? How do those claims impact the legibility of future 
subjects and their narratives of toxic harm? Another way to put this is to ask who—to borrow 
from ecocritic Sarah Jaquette Ray—are toxic life narrative’s “ecological others?”  
 In the chapters that follow, I explore the ways that autobiographical subjects of toxic life 
narratives claim politicized identities around toxic exposures, arguing that poisoned subjecthood 
is characterized by the careful pathologization of otherwise normative bodies and selves. A 
poisoned subject may be sick but not deviant, infertile but still womanly, disabled and 
economically productive. I consider how such unstable claims to normativity practice an identity 
politics of exclusion that positions some people and some bodies as simply out of bounds, too 
impaired to fulfill the neoliberal citizen-subject’s interlocking imperatives to biological 
reproduction and economic productivity. 
 The work of this dissertation is to trace an “ur”-narrative of poisoned subjecthood that 
solidifies as the tropes of toxic discourse are repeated and reconstituted through personal 
narratives about environmental chemical exposure. These autobiographical narrators offer 
testimony about living in toxified bodies as they seek recognition and redress for the illnesses 
and injuries they believe to have been caused by chemicals in their environments. The contours 
of autobiographical engagement of toxic discourse shift in accordance with the historical and 
political context out of which such narratives emerge. We can nevertheless identify a shared 
story structure that mobilizes and exceeds Buell’s toxic topoi to generate a figure that is 
affectively and rhetorically legible across contemporary toxic life narratives in the United States: 
the poisoned subject.   
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Poisoned Subjects and Testimonial Injustice 
 The poisoned subject of toxic life narrative emerges out of toxic discourse’s 
contemporary formation. Although these toxic topoi draw heavily from earlier literary traditions, 
critics have argued that expressions of toxic concern began to take on new valences as the felt 
urgency of the threat of environmental chemical exposures surged in the wake of a series of 
highly-publicized, global events in the mid to late twentieth century: the atomic legacies of 
WWII and the Cold War, Three Mile Island, Bhopal, and Chernobyl. Within the US context, the 
publication of Rachel Carson’s Silent Spring in 1962 and contamination in the Love Canal 
community in New York state in the late 1970s served as “signal events” that propelled 
significant public interest in pesticide use and toxic waste disposal, respectively (Edelstein 6). 
Carson’s book helped to establish a pattern of motifs for representing toxic proliferation that 
would reappear in the discourse surrounding the Love Canal disaster. The two events are often 
linked in accounts of US environmental history, with critics noting the similarities between 
Carson’s alternately pastoral and apocalyptic representations and the media attention to Love 
Canal as a contaminated suburban community. The influence of Silent Spring is also visible in 
Gibbs’s Love Canal memoir. Gibbs echoes Carson in depicting an idyllic community 
contaminated through corporate and government negligence, as well as in invoking a nuclear 
discourse that would have resonated with Cold War-era audiences.10 
 Love Canal is in many ways the effective beginning of toxic life narrative, and Buell 
relies heavily on Gibbs’s narrative in elaborating not only the lineage of toxic discourse, but also 
its metrics for gauging truth and proof. Gibbs’s story of pioneering strategies for community 
epidemiology and resisting officials who dismissed her findings as “useless housewife data” 
exemplifies toxic discourse’s moral dynamic (Gibbs 167): individuals or communities challenge 
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institutional authority to make determinations about toxic risk and harm. The narrative 
demonstrates Buell’s claim that toxic discourse operates at the level of “allegation or insinuation, 
rather than of proof. Its very moralism and intensity reflect an awareness that the case has not yet 
been proven, at least to the satisfaction of the relevant authorities” (48). In this, toxic discourse 
captures the tensions between expertise and public trust that characterize a formation of late 
capitalism known as the “risk society.”   
 German sociologist Ulrich Beck theorized risk society as corresponding to an emerging 
“reflexive” modernity. If “simple” or “classical” modernization represented the development of 
an industrial society out of pre-modern feudal society—a process of social-economic 
advancement characterized by the production of material goods and the extension of rights—
reflexive modernization demystifies and undermines the organizing principles of industrial 
modernity. Modernization turns in on itself, as expertise is directed not toward the advancement 
of new ideas and technologies but to complicating and adapting the advancements that 
characterized industrial modernization. Producing unstable conditions of risk, security, and 
expertise, advanced modernity is, in Beck’s view, a “shadow kingdom” of invisible but ever-
present hazards to human and environmental health (72). The social theorist Anthony Giddens, 
whose work on reflexive modernity closely parallels Beck’s, observes a new “risk profile” 
characterized by tension between trust and risk, security and danger. Under reflexive modernity, 
expert systems designed to mitigate natural dangers create new environmental hazards produced 
through the very act of technological intervention. Risk management becomes self-reflexive, as 
technological fixes produce increasingly technological risks. Under these conditions, trust in 
expert systems “is a double-edged phenomenon” (Giddens 7), one that forms the very structure 
of modern life. 
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 Toxicity is a foundational element of this new modernity, its technologies, and its 
organization of knowledge. Noting the toxic contamination of consumer goods, Beck illustrates 
the “double shock” associated with risks that are both produced and managed by highly 
specialized techno-scientific experts. “The threat itself is joined by the loss of sovereignty over 
assessing the dangers,” he writes.  
The whole bureaucracy of knowledge opens up, with its long corridors, waiting benches, 
 responsible, semi-responsible, and incomprehensible shoulder-shruggers and poseurs. 
 There are front entrances, side entrances, secret exits, tips and  
(counter-)information…All of that would not be so dramatic and could be easily ignored 
 if only one were not dealing with very real and personal hazards. (Beck 54–55)  
 
The perception of obfuscation and secrecy surrounding felt dangers generates anxieties amongst 
non-experts that circulate throughout the public sphere. For this reason, Michael Edelstein argues 
that toxicity functions in the public imagination as a plague that entails “uncertainty over time, 
loss of personal control, anger and anxiety and distrust, negative changes to the environment, 
loss of trust in technology, and a new way of seeing the world” (22). These are the characteristics 
of the risk society, in which heightened risk awareness creates new relationships between 
modern subjects and their physical and social worlds.  
 Emerging in the same period as the women’s health movement and evincing a kind of 
second-wave feminist political consciousness, Love Canal cannily mobilizes the figure of the 
housewife-cum-epidemiologist to point up the disproportionate effects of Beck’s “double shock” 
for some groups. If the new risk society means confronting not only the fact of widespread toxic 
threats but also the “loss of sovereignty” to weigh those threats (Beck 54), the rejection of 
Gibbs’s and other Love Canal residents’ epidemiological findings as “useless housewife data” 
indicates that such sovereignty has been and remains unevenly distributed. Residents found their 
community epidemiology efforts rejected by scientists and government officials not only because 
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they lacked expertise but because they were not identifiable as the kind of people who might 
possess expertise.11 That is, because they were housewives. It is not merely Gibbs’s “case” that 
must be “proven;” it is her very authority to make it. Gibbs’s testimony suggests that she did not, 
or did not only, experience a loss of sovereignty over risk assessment in the face of increasingly 
rarified techno-scientific knowledge. Rather, her identity as a 27-year-old working class 
housewife rendered illegible her assessment of the toxic hazard to her community.  
 In response, Love Canal’s narrator plays the character of the housewife to her advantage, 
emphasizing her youth and apparent political naïvité to diffuse suspicions of radicalism and 
heighten audiences’ sense of moral outrage. After all, “it was the realization that [her] own child 
was in danger” that “pushed” the young Lois into the role of activist and agitator (Gibbs 2). The 
words “housewife” and “mother” each appear more than a dozen times throughout the narrative, 
with Gibbs shrewdly juxtaposing—when it suits her—women’s intimate knowledge and 
nurturing roles against the esotericism of experts and the agitation of activists. In one scene, the 
narrator recounts an exchange at a public meeting where an engineer was explaining to residents 
a proposed remediation of the toxic waste seepage at Love Canal. Sensing that officials were 
using dense technical terms to give residents the run-around, Lois interjects: “‘Excuse me’…‘I’m 
just a dumb housewife. I’m not an expert. You’re the expert. I’m just going to use a little 
common sense’” (50). In another passage, she opines, “Radicals and students carry signs, not 
housewives. Housewives have to care for their children and their homes. But here I was, giving 
press interviews, doing radio programs, and chasing a congressman, a governor, and the 
president with signs saying I supported him or that he was doing something wrong” (115). In 
these and other episodes in her memoir, Gibbs mobilizes a deceptive identity politics that plays 
on cultural stereotypes about women’s limited sphere of influence to redefine the housewife as a 
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public figure who uses her lay expertise to care for her children and to serve her community and 
her nation.  
 As Gibbs’s Love Canal aptly demonstrates, a defining feature of toxic discourse is that 
authority and expertise are always up for grabs. The central narrative action in a toxic life 
narrative is a struggle between an individual or community that has become aware of toxic risk 
and a hegemonic institution (whether state, corporate, or scientific) that denies the reality of that 
risk or its responsibility for accurately assessing and managing risk. It is fundamentally a contest 
over risk assessment as a form of knowledge production. If the register of toxic discourse is 
“allegation or insinuation, rather than…proof” (L. Buell 48), in toxic life narratives personal 
testimony is offered as refutable evidence of risk, harm, and expertise. This truth effect occurs on 
two levels: within the narrative, as narrators tell of their encounters with institutional opposition 
to their risk assessments, and in the exchange between autobiographical narrators and the readers 
“whom they want to persuade of their version of experience” (Smith and Watson, Reading 7).12 
When Gibbs recalls Love Canal residents’ community epidemiology efforts being dismissed as 
“useless housewife data,” she not only recounts a past challenge to her authority but engages a 
rhetorical strategy that does important testimonial work in the narrative present. The same 
questions of authority, expertise, and credibility that operate within toxic discourse’s narratives 
also extend beyond the page. Like scientific and governmental authorities, readers of toxic life 
narratives are called upon to adjudicate the case for toxic risk.  
 When the allegations of toxic discourse are leveled through personal narrative, 
autobiographical subjectivity itself becomes a site of contest. Love Canal evinces an acute 
awareness that who one is has the potential to determine how one’s testimony is heard. This type 
of awareness is fundamental to toxic life narratives, whose poisoned subjects attempt to manage 
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what the feminist philosopher Miranda Fricker has called “testimonial injustice.” Put simply, 
testimonial injustice occurs when testimony given by a speaker is not afforded as much credence 
as would be granted the same testimony given by a different speaker—when “prejudice on the 
hearer’s part” causes him to doubt a speaker “as a giver of knowledge, as an informant” (Fricker 
4–5). Testimonial injustice takes several forms, but a key component is identity prejudice. 
Fricker’s standard example is of police refusing to believe a witness’s account because he is 
black. In this case, the witness experiences an identity-credibility deficit, in which his perceived 
social identity limits his perceived credibility as a speaker. This deficit occurs regardless of 
whether the content of the witness’s given testimony is itself credible to his police-hearers. 
 Understanding the stakes of testimonial injustice requires attention to the ethics of 
listening rather than the truthfulness of speaking. This distinction will become especially 
important in chapter 2, which concerns the contested environmental illness known as multiple 
chemical sensitivity. My task is not to weigh in on whether people who identify as chemically 
sensitive are “telling the truth” when they theorize the relationships between their bodies and the 
chemicals in their everyday environments. As a literary critic, my goal is instead to understand 
how MCS testimony is shaped by the ethical and narrative conditions of witness. I attempt to sort 
out how and why MCSers, as they are sometimes called, are so often perceived as in-credible 
witnesses, as well as how and why their narratives are shaped by credibility deficit.  
 Attending to testimony is not to dismiss what many chemically sensitive people, MCS-
affirming health professionals, and medical skeptics agree are still-open questions about the 
etiology of this illness. The MCS anthologies I consider in chapter 2 suggest that testimony has 
everything to do with disease causation. MCS testimony demonstrates that the ethico-narrative 
environment in which witnessing occurs has the potential to shape the physical environments 
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MCSers inhabit, as well as the meanings environmental illness carries. For example, Victoria 
Savini juxtaposes her experience working for an employer who seems to suspect her of 
malingering against the accommodations she was able to secure at her new job. Because her new 
employer “believed me when I said I had a problem with certain chemical exposures,” she says, 
“I am able to keep working” and “be extremely productive” (in Johnson 147). Victoria’s story 
attests to the material consequences of in/credible witnessing, theorizing the role of testimony in 
negotiating relationships between bodies and environments as both material and cultural 
phenomena.  
 Understanding questions of ethics as entangled with but nonidentical to questions of 
truth-telling helps to elucidate the types of harm caused by testimonial injustice. Testimonial 
injustice is part of a broader category of epistemic injustice, which concerns the ethics of 
knowing. Epistemic injustice produces on the one hand purely epistemic harms, in which 
knowledge fails to be transmitted or is completely lost because of identity prejudice. Fricker 
describes this type of harm as “an epistemic disadvantage to the individual hearer, and a moment 
of dysfunction in the overall epistemic practice” (43). A second and more urgent kind of harm is 
that incurred by the would-be witness whose testimony is not received. He or she is harmed “as a 
giver of knowledge” and is therefore “symbolically degraded qua human” (ibid. 44). Because 
testimonial injustice tends to operate systemically, alienating certain classes of people from their 
full capacity as subjects of knowledge, it constitutes a form of oppression (ibid. 59). 
 Since testimonial injustice is a fundamental condition compelling toxic discourse, it is 
easy to see why critics have tended to read toxic discourse as a counter-hegemonic or liberatory 
practice. In the case of toxic life narrative, people who experience illness or injury as a result of 
environmental chemical exposure use personal narrative as a vehicle to make a case for 
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themselves as subjects of knowledge and subjects of rights in the face of challenges to their 
authority as givers of knowledge. Giving knowledge is a capacity which is “essential to human 
value” (Fricker 5). Fricker’s reasoned analysis on this point reveals the deep contradictions 
produced by conditions of testimonial injustice. Testimonial injustice exerts a powerful 
dehumanizing force, because it is “an essential attribute of personhood to be able to participate in 
the spread of knowledge by testimony” (ibid. 58). Testimonial injustice reinforces the social 
belief that certain classes of people do not possess the full capacities of human personhood; and, 
in denying people the exercise of those capacities, it actually diminishes the expression and full 
realization of their personhood. Under these conditions, asserting oneself as a subject of such an 
epistemic harm and claiming the right to have one’s testimony heard is actually quite a tricky 
business. It involves establishing oneself as both dehumanized (and so a subject of harm) and 
fully human (and so a subject of rights). It involves the exercise of a capacity the exclusion from 
which constitutes the very harm one is attempting to adjudicate. These contradictions present 
significant epistemological and narrative challenges with which subjects of testimonial injustice 
contend.  
 For the autobiographical subjects of toxic life narrative, testimonial injustice is intimately 
linked to and may be compounded by the difficulties of witnessing to trauma. Trauma itself 
arises, as Dori Laub explains, from incomprehensible historical events, and psychological trauma 
may preclude integrated, narrative memories of the traumatic event. As such, trauma creates a 
“collapse of witnessing” and creates “impossible” witnesses with unreliable memories (“Truth 
and Testimony” 64). Moreover, the repeated telling of stories of trauma in late twentieth-century 
culture produces “a common story…out of the accumulation of voices telling stories that 
conform to a similar structure, thematically organized to invoke similar histories of abuse, 
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violence, or degradation, and utilizing similar modes of address that make an emotive appeal” 
(Schaffer and Smith 45). Stories of trauma that depart from accepted structures may be called 
into question or dismissed as “inauthentic.” Of course, all life narrative is constructed, but the 
fracturing of traumatic memory makes authenticity a particular problem for stories of trauma.  
 A pertinent example of these challenges can be seen in the emergence of childhood 
sexual abuse as the overarching narrative for understanding women’s trauma and the rise of the 
counter-narrative of “false memory syndrome” in the 1980s and 1990s. In clinical settings and in 
life writing, stories by women (and some men) of sexual abuse and incest proliferated during this 
period. Sylvia Fraser’s My Father’s House (1987), Elly Danica’s Don’t: A Woman’s Word 
(1988), Michael Ryan’s Secret Life (1995), Kathryne Harrison’s The Kiss (1998), and Linda 
Catherine Cutting’s Memory Slips (1998) are a sampling of such memoirs. Some of these 
narratives are predicated on the recovery of memories fractured by or previously lost to trauma. 
Clinical therapists developed tools for drawing out and making sense of repressed memories of 
abuse, eliciting outraged responses from parents and some professionals that irresponsible 
clinicians were implanting false memories in their patients’ minds. Feminist activism had created 
the conditions for speaking about sexual abuse as a common source of trauma among women, 
and in turn abuse became central to feminist discourse about trauma. Even scholars who do not 
give credence to allegations of widespread false memory, like Leigh Gilmore and Janice Haaken, 
suggest that the dominance of incest as a paradigm for women’s trauma allowed childhood abuse 
to serve as an acceptable metaphor that “may resonate with a less definable experience of 
boundary violation” (Gilmore, Limits 26). Activism around sexual trauma created support 
systems for survivors and made childhood sexual abuse one of the few legible stories women 
could tell about traumatic memories and experiences. Rather than asking whether memories of 
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abuse are “true” or “false,” Gilmore recognizes trauma as testing the limits of both memory and 
narrative. When it comes to trauma, the question should not be “Does she tell the truth?” but 
“How does she tell a truth?” 
 Toxicity shares hallmarks of other traumatic historical events: it may be experienced both 
as devastating, spectacular event (think Love Canal, Chernobyl, Deepwater Horizon) and as 
pervasive anxiety, such that toxicity echoes across time in the public sphere and individual 
psyches. Many life narrators represent toxic exposures as producing traumatic conditions and 
post-traumatic reverberations. Poisoned subjects also make use of discourses of trauma to gain 
recognition as legitimate witnesses to harmful toxic exposures. Each of the chapters comprising 
the main body of the dissertation probes a different formulation of trauma as witnesses respond 
to changing conditions of toxicity and testimonial injustice. In chapter 1, diethylstilbestrol 
narratives make use of the familiar 1980s narrative of sexual post-trauma to represent the harms 
of reproductive cancers and seek monetary compensation through the legal system. In chapter 2, 
anthologies of multiple chemical sensitivity testimony generate an ur narrative of environmental 
illness as a national crisis. The alternative food movement addressed in chapter 3 represents 
trauma as culturally diffuse, drawing consumers and low-wage agricultural workers together 
under the umbrella of toxic pesticide risk.  
 My understanding of how trauma functions within and through these social movements is 
informed by calls for greater exchange between trauma studies and disability studies. Trauma 
studies emerged principally through scholarship about the Holocaust, and this interdisciplinary 
field has been particularly engaged with historical and psychological or psychoanalytical 
approaches, with less attention to personal experiences of embodiment. By the same token, 
disability activists and scholars have rightly been wary of interpretive frameworks that may 
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reinforce the familiar model of disability as a problem located within a pathologized individual 
body. As such, “the capacity to be wounded, injured, or traumatized is not always considered a 
feature of disability,” writes disability studies scholar Tobin Siebers, “but it should be” 
(Disability Aesthetics 102). I take seriously autobiographical narrators’ testimony about the 
traumas associated with toxic illness, injury, and impairment. I also track and interrogate the 
ways that trauma as a rhetorical strategy extends beyond a single narrative or movement to shape 
the meanings of toxicity and disability in complex and sometimes troubling ways.  
 The centrality of both trauma and testimonial injustice to toxic life narrative reveals the 
essential characteristic of what I am calling poisoned subjecthood: a simultaneous, embodied 
performance of both inclusion and exclusion. As noted earlier, toxic discourse derives its force 
from a kind of prelapsarian ideation; environments and bodies can only be represented as 
chemically injured as measured against their supposed natural state of health and wholeness. But 
the poisoned subject is also always constituted against an abjectly disabled or fragmented body. 
Toxic discourse’s poisoned subjects must negotiate these competing poles, performing 
disablement in order to achieve recognition as living with chemically injured bodies while also 
claiming the position of rights-bearing subjects whose completeness and representativeness 
allows them to make claims and seek various forms of compensation through the law and the 
state. The central project of this dissertation is to explore the narrative mechanisms and social 
meanings of such unstable claims to normativity within the context of ongoing and future toxic 
struggles.  
 At the site of toxic discourse, testimonial justice intersects with conceptions of 
environmental justice. The question of who can be heard as a legitimate authority on matters of 
toxic exposure is limited not only by the kind of identity prejudice Miranda Fricker describes but 
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also by deep-seated ideas about what environment is and for whose benefits it exists, can be 
exploited, or should be preserved. Buell and others recognize toxic discourse as allied with 
projects of environmental justice (EJ), which addresses “the interconnections between human 
justice and environmental degradation” (Ray 19). In contrast to environmental conservationist or 
preservationist philosophies, which value the preservation of “wild” or “natural” spaces as a 
fundamental good, EJ recognizes the imbrication of the social and natural worlds. EJ refuses to 
protect “nature” at the expense of human social justice and integrates environmental concerns 
into structural analyses of race, class, colonial, and gender oppression. 
 Recognizing the entanglement of human social and environmental concerns is necessary 
but not sufficient for environmental justice. A recurring issue that crops up throughout my 
exploration of anti-toxics movements is the distinction between rights-based and justice-oriented 
critiques. While articulations of EJ may include assertions of specific human rights, the two 
frameworks are fundamentally distinct in that environmental rights are the property of 
(individual or collective) subjects, while environmental justice represents an ethical stance. An 
analysis from a position of rights allows a community to demand access to information about 
toxic waste disposal in the region, but only an analysis from a position of justice can demand “a 
more equitable distribution of environmental goods and bads” across communities, regions, or 
geopolitical boundaries (Shrader-Frechette 6). Yet not all conceptions of justice held by 
environmentally-concerned social movements adequately address structural inequalities based on 
class or race. The alternative food movement, for example, “deliberately invokes a 
communitarian conception of justice” that conflates localism with just social-environmental 
relations. Communitarianism serves to cover over and even “reproduce, rather than confront, 
white privilege and other forms of inequality” (J. Harrison, Pesticide Drift 163–164).  
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 In contrast to preservationism, environmental rights, and libertarian-communitarian 
conceptions of justice, EJ in its ideal form is historical, intersectional, and systemic in its 
analysis. At the 1991 First National People of Color Environmental Leadership Summit in 
Washington, DC, delegates outlined seventeen Principles of Environmental Justice that continue 
to define and guide EJ movements. In its Preamble, “Principles” situates environmental justice in 
relation to “500 years of colonization and oppression, resulting in the poisoning of our 
communities and land and the genocide of our peoples” (299).13 The document affirms “the 
sacredness of Mother Earth” and demands “mutual respect and justice for all peoples,” including 
the “fundamental right to political, economic, cultural and environmental self-determination” 
(ibid. 300). EJ is broad in its scope, encompassing all areas of social and political life as they are 
implicated in the ways that individuals and communities interact with the environment. It affirms 
political rights as it articulates a philosophy of human-environmental ethics that is grounded in 
historical, systemic analysis.  
 As literary critics, we can read for EJ (or not) in the rhetorics and politics of 
environmental literatures. But EJ is also an analytic that ecocritics can and should adopt, taking 
an intersectional, systemic approach in our thinking, scholarship, and teaching about 
environments and environmentalisms. Thus, while I am primarily concerned with how the 
discourse of toxic life narratives intervenes or participates in conditions of testimonial and 
environmental injustice, I also look to environmental criticism to consider how scholarship about 
toxic proliferation and toxic discourse can sometimes betray a dangerous ignorance of these 
conditions. Taking up issues of testimony and environment that address ability, gender, and 
labor, “Poisoned Subjects” demonstrates the need for an intersectional environmental justice 
criticism as the rule in literary environmental studies.  
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Poisoned Subjects and Embodied Health Movements 
 “Poisoned Subjects” considers toxic life narratives emerging from social movements that 
respond to different forms of environmental toxic proliferation. These embodied health 
movements (EHMs) place the material body and the embodied experience of illness at the center 
of social analysis and action. In EHMs, the personal is political. Indeed, as sociologist Susan Bell 
rightly notes, activist work around embodied health is often driven by an individual’s own illness 
experience. But their work moves beyond the personal to provide a structural analysis of 
environmental risk. As Bell explains, EHMs 
are distinguished by framing their organizing efforts and critiques of the system through 
 personal awareness and understanding of individuals’ experiences and by challenging 
 science—from forming alliances with scientists to secure funding and legislation to 
 collaborating in the ‘doing’ of science...The politicized collective work of embodied 
 health movements transforms illness experiences, critiques medicine’s treatment of 
 patients, and turns attention away from individual bodies as sites of risk to the risky 
 environments in which the patients live. (4–5) 
 
While maintaining a focus on the individual experience of embodied illness or disability,14 
EHMs situate those experiences within the framework of the various social institutions that 
shape what it means to be ill or impaired.15 It is through such a structural analysis that they can 
organize to attain prevention measures, treatment, research, government funding, or medical 
recognition of their embodied experiences.  
 As Bell’s analysis suggests, the political work of EHMs is driven by the collective illness 
identities they help to produce. A collective illness identity emerges when “the individual sense 
of oneself [is] shaped by the physical constraints of illness and by others’ social reactions to that 
illness” and that sense of self develops through an imagined or experienced connection to a 
greater illness community (Brown et al. 60). Illness identities become politicized when they 
employ “a broader social critique that views structural inequalities and the uneven distribution of 
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social power as responsible for the causes and/or triggers of the disease…In short, a politicised 
collective illness identity begins the process of transforming a personal trouble into a social 
problem” (ibid. 60–61). EHMs challenge scientific practice as a central agent in determining the 
social experience of living with an ill or disabled body and build collaborative relationships with 
medical and scientific communities to reshape the meanings and experiences of illness and 
disability.  
 With its central chapters framed around embodied health movements, “Poisoned 
Subjects” brings a feminist disability studies lens to the study of toxic discourse and its 
autobiographical subjects. Disability studies describes “theory, research and practice that are 
antagonistic to the popular view that disability equates with personal tragedy” (Goodley xii). 
Disability studies shifts the frame around disability from a “personal predicament to disability as 
social pathology” (ibid.). In its broadest reaches, this shift is one “from the ideology of 
normalcy…to a vision of the body as changeable, unperfectable, unruly, and untidy” (L. Davis, 
Bending 39). Disability studies have emerged in the academy over the past 40 or more years, 
with exponential growth since in the mid-to-late 1990s. Feminist disability studies, more than an 
additive approach combining feminism and disability, takes an intersectional stance that is 
informed by the methods and concerns of both fields to reimagine both disability and gender.16 
This dissertation joins other recent work in environmental studies that insists on the necessity of 
bringing disability studies perspectives into the mainstream of ecocriticism to better understand 
how environmental politics, literatures, and criticisms have been invested in defining and 
policing normative forms of embodiment. 
 The rise of disability studies within the academy has followed the growth of disability 
rights movements around the world. The proliferation of identity-based social movements such 
 
 
 24 
as those focused on race, gender, and sexuality contributed to the radicalization of disabled 
people in the 1960s (Goodley 2–3). The 1970s and 1980s saw the rise of embodied health 
movements centered around AIDS and breast cancer, and spillover between these movements 
and the disability rights movement helped to foster awareness of illness and disability as loci of 
identity and sites of injustice (Brown et al.). In the US context with which this dissertation is 
concerned, the 1990 Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) was intended to prohibit 
discrimination against disabled people in employment, public accommodations, and government 
services.  
 The United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities defines 
disability as “an evolving concept” that “results from the interaction between a person’s 
impairment and obstacles such as physical barriers and prevailing attitudes that prevent their 
participation in society” (United Nations Enable np). The Convention, along with its 
predecessors, the 1982 World Programme of Action on Disabled Persons and the 1994 Standard 
Rules of Equalization of Opportunities for Persons with Disabilities, has influenced disability 
legislation in the United States and around the world.17 The understanding of disability 
represented in the United Nations’ definition distinguishes between embodiment—“long-term 
physical, mental, intellectual, or sensory impairments such as blindness, deafness, impaired 
mobility, and developmental impairments”—and disabling environments (ibid.). This distinction 
between the body as the site of impairment and the physical or social environment as the site of 
obstacles that produce disability is sometimes called the impairment-disability system. This 
distinction has been central to, if long complicated by, disability studies.18   
 “Poisoned Subjects” considers how illness and disability are represented within embodied 
health movements and through autobiographical forms in ways that are both recognizable and 
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have the potential to create change for individuals and communities with differently abled 
bodies. In keeping with this dissertation’s core interest in repeated cultural narratives, I return 
throughout the chapters to the familiar representational strategies that G. Thomas Couser calls 
the “rhetorics of disability,” which include narratives of triumph over adversity, spiritual 
compensation, and emancipation (Couser, Signifying Bodies 34–45; see also Dolmage). 
Lingering in the background of my readings is also the question, raised by scholars like Couser, 
David Mitchell, Lennard Davis, and Susannah Mintz, of to what extent autobiographical 
representation by people with disabilities tends to individualize disability experiences and 
reinforce the idea that disability resides in a dysfunctional body, thereby “limit[ing] the 
counterhegemonic potential” of these narratives (Couser, Signifying Bodies 47). Many of the 
texts I consider in the following pages pit different forms of physical, mental, or sexual 
impairment against one another in order to claim a pathologized—but not deviant—poisoned 
subjecthood.  
 Embodied health movements can and often do function as normative projects. Because 
“the norm pins down that majority of the population that falls under the arch of the standard bell-
shaped curve,” Davis explains that “the concept of the norm comes [with] the concept of 
deviations or extremes. When we think of bodies, in a society where the concept of the norm is 
operative, then people with disabilities will be thought of as deviants” (“Normality, Power, and 
Culture” 3). The toxic life narratives represented in the following chapters work to bring their 
members into the safety of the normative arch that Davis describes. They thus suggest that, in 
seeking to compensate for testimonial injustice, toxic discourse may shift the margins of 
normality in such a way as to create further conditions of epistemic injustice for specific groups, 
including those already coping with toxic exposure.  
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Interrogating Toxic Discourse in Personal Witnessing 
 In each of the three core chapters of this dissertation, I take up the autobiographical 
literature of an embodied health movement organized in response, at least in part, to toxic 
proliferation: the diethylstilbestrol (DES) action movement, the multiple chemical sensitivity 
(MCS) movement, and the alternative food movement. The dissertation is loosely organized 
along the axes of Buell’s major topoi of toxic discourse. Life narratives in each of these 
movements emphasize a different motif of toxic discourse—DES narratives depict a David 
versus Goliath moral drama, MCS narratives emphasize a world without refuge, and the 
alternative food movement trades particularly on the shock of awakened perception. Without 
pigeon-holing or overly simplifying these complex social movements and their life narratives, I 
consider each EHM’s discourse as exemplary of one topos in order to foreground the specific 
and often fraught issues at play within each set of narratives with respect to embodiment and 
environment in the risk society. Probing each motif intersectionally with respect to bodies, 
economies, and ecologies reveals how embodied health movements, as they mobilize toxic 
discourse to make health-environmental claims, privilege certain kinds of bodies as subject to 
environmental harm and as proper subjects of environmental rights.  
  In order to explore these claims, the chapters take anti-toxics embodied health 
movements chronologically, beginning with the diethylstilbestrol movement. A drug that had 
been prescribed to pregnant women in the United States since the late 1930s, DES was 
discovered in 1971 to cause an exceedingly rare form of vaginal and cervical cancer. Chapter 1, 
“Narratives of Diethylstilbestrol Exposure,” begins with a reading of two single-subject 
narratives about DES exposure. Both autobiographical narratives represent civil lawsuits against 
major pharmaceutical companies, and both were published in 1981—within one year of Lois 
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Gibbs’s Love Canal. I read this first pair of narratives with and against one another as literatures 
of litigation that follow the classic David versus Goliath moral drama of toxic discourse. I then 
turn to an edited collection of narratives of witnessing featuring DES-exposed people and their 
families, which moves away from the individualistic model of struggle represented through legal 
avenues of recourse and instead toward a more coalitional anti-toxics politics. Surveying DES 
narratives over time, I argue that the movement has been heavily invested in reproductivity and 
relationality in seeking redress for toxic harms to women’s bodies, relying on and reinscribing 
the norm of reproductive bodies within heterosexual marriages in order to make claims on and 
through the state. The trauma of DES becomes the trauma of this violated heteronorm. Through 
my readings, I begin to line up a series of linkages between representations of reproduction, 
disability, and trauma that characterize toxic life narratives under contemporary conditions of 
neoliberal capitalism.  
 In chapter 2, “Frames of Disability in Multiple Chemical Sensitivity Testimony,” 
witnesses draw on shifting discourses of disability to theorize bodies and environments in the 
face of an extreme version of the world without refuge. Rhonda Zwillinger’s and Alison 
Johnson’s edited collections of testimony by people experiencing multiple chemical sensitivity 
use repetition as a strategy to build political identification and create recognition for this 
contested illness. They also position readers as potential victims of everyday toxins through the 
prevalent image of the canary in the coalmine, which suggests that the chemically sensitive are 
harbingers of a massive public health crisis to come. MCS witnesses strategically medicalize the 
environmentally ill body while also universalizing environmental disability as they make bids for 
recognition under state-sanctioned apparatuses like the ADA. This chapter picks up on the 
normative function of linkages between disability, trauma, and the law established in chapter 1, 
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tying this to David Mitchell and Sharon Snyder’s observation of a rising ablenationalism that 
attempts to bring some disabled bodies into the normative reach of neoliberal subjecthood.  
 Chapter 3 in many ways represents the limit case of the project’s central concerns. In 
“Toxic Life Narrative in the Alternative Food Movement,” my primary texts are two journalistic 
exposés characteristic of the new “alternative food movement”—really a loosely-related body of 
movements advocating organic agricultural practices, workers rights, and food sovereignty, 
among other causes and vocabularies. I read these texts as autobiographical narratives that test 
the boundaries of alternative food as an embodied health movement. Although the alternative 
food movement invokes bodies to promote political identification, the bodies most at risk 
(agricultural laborers, mostly migrant Latina/os, many undocumented) are not placed at the 
center of the movement’s claims toward bodily crisis. Instead, the food movement mobilizes a 
discourse of cultural trauma, in which one group’s toxic exposure produces a kind of contact 
trauma for the middle class consumer for whom both the text and the food is produced. The 
specter of endocrine-disrupting and teratogenic pesticides— prompting gruesome accounts of 
eyeless, limbless, and severely impaired babies born to migrant farmworkers—haunts these 
narratives as a warning to consumers, and health-environmental harms are frequently tied to 
moral-aesthetic ones. I consider how the logic of “alternatives” that drives the movement for 
organic and other non-traditional food production continues to advance market-driven solutions 
to industrial food production through flexible, ethical consumerism. Together, class-based 
aesthetic appeals and moral outrage over toxic threats to reproductive and working bodies are 
used to discipline consumer choice as a driver of corporate responsibility. 
 The final chapter breaks from the primary organizing principles that structure the first 
three chapters. Rather than focusing on multiple texts emerging from a single embodied health 
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movement, “Rethinking Environmental Chemicals Through Speculative Auto/biography” uses a 
single autobiographical project to interrogate toxic discourse’s implicit messages about 
disability, reproduction, and justice. Lee Mingwei and Virgil Wong’s digital art piece Male 
Pregnancy Project disrupts received ideas about a class of environmentally-distributed chemicals 
known as endocrine disruptors (EDCs). Reading the project’s interest in hormone-induced bodily 
changes back onto environmentalist concerns about EDCs, I show how toxic discourse’s policing 
of bodily difference that I track throughout earlier chapters impacts efforts toward epistemic and 
reproductive justice for gender non-conforming and racialized subjects. Far from offering Male 
Pregnancy Project as some sort of solution to the problems raised by the texts in my previous 
chapters, I use the project to open up further questions about the intersections between embodied 
health, testimonial justice, and autobiographical form. 
 In each chapter, claims to recognition and redress for toxic harms are attached to claims 
about biological reproductivity and/or economic productivity. DES daughters and their families 
seek compensation for damage to their reproductive capacities caused by a drug whose intended 
purpose was to facilitate successful pregnancies. Chemically sensitive people constitute 
themselves through personal testimony as disabled subjects claiming economic and labor rights. 
Alternative food narratives use representations of physically impaired babies born to low-wage 
agricultural laborers to generate anxiety around consumer health. Chapters 3 and 4 excavate US 
environmentalism’s eugenic legacies in order to show how representations of both reproduction 
and labor have historically been governed by racialized and gendered ideas about degeneracy, 
fitness, and the nation. Together, the four chapters probe relationships between “the terrains of 
production, reproduction, and imagination” that Julie Sze names as the site of contest around the 
overlapping domains of the ‘natural’ and the technological (135). One of the main through lines 
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of the project is to track these relationships as they coalesce under the contemporary form of 
capitalism we call neoliberalism.19 
 Neoliberalism describes “a new relationship between government and knowledge” that 
depoliticizes acts of government as technical rather than as ideological (Ong 3). This shift is 
rationalized economically as well as ethically, through appeals to personal responsibility (ibid. 
11). While neoliberalism’s economic components are quite clearly articulated, scholars across 
the humanities and social sciences have also argued powerfully that neoliberal ideology has 
significant consequences for the formation of late twentieth-century subjecthood. One important 
consequence for subject-formation has been the command for neoliberal subjects “to live as if 
making a project of themselves” (Rose 149, emphasis in original), revivifying the “discredited 
‘pull yourself up by your bootstraps’ immigrant motto” (Puar, “Cost” 179). In life writing about 
disability, this personal development plot takes the form of the “Supercrip” story, in which the 
disabled person triumphs over the physical adversity and psychic trauma of living with an 
impaired body.20 This common script “removes the stigma of disability from the author but 
leaves it in place for other individuals with the condition in question. In effect, the narrator 
removes him- or herself from the category of the disabled” (Couser, Signifying Bodies 34). The 
repetition of this ameliorative narrative covers over the structural disenfranchisement of disabled 
people. Indeed, neoliberalism minimizes the importance of differences based on race, class, 
gender, sexuality, and ability by interpolating subjects as citizen-producers. It privatizes and 
monetizes social, reproductive, and subject-making activities (Guthman, Weighing In 55). 
 One of the ways this is achieved is through the prioritization of flexibility over the 
stigmatization of difference. Under neoliberal social-economic regimes, flexibility is “cherished 
and cultivated…an object of desire for nearly everyone’s personality, body, and organization” 
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(Martin xvii). While some have suggested that this heralds a post-racial, post-feminist future, the 
politics of flexible bodies merely shifts the grounds of power relations. With the rise of 
neoliberalism as the dominant ideology of economic and social life, human rights are no longer 
“understood as the responsibility of a benevolent state; rather, rights are earned through 
individuals’ actively demonstrating their worth” (Irving 157, emphasis in original). That is, what 
were once framed as human or civil rights become individual responsibilities. This shift can be 
seen quite clearly in the domain of healthcare, as an ethic of care for citizens’ bodies is replaced 
with a moralizing imperative to personal maintenance that can be characterized as public 
healthism (Pitts-Taylor 639–640).21  
 One of the ways that neoliberal subjects demonstrate their value is by “perform[ing] 
wholeness through each recurring crisis” (McRuer 17). But some bodies and some subjects are 
already presumed to be more whole than others, just as some bodies and some subjects are 
presumed to be more flexible than others. The ideology of self-care, or the self-as-project, 
demands that persons with illnesses or disabilities exercise flexible management of their bodies 
to “improve” their situations, even as illness or disability is understood to signify already the 
failure of self-care (Pitts-Taylor 646; Galvin 112). The domain of health demonstrates how 
flexibility and therefore rights become “stratified” along axes of embodied social difference 
(Pitts 197). The injunction to flexibility thus has a direct impact on understandings of disability 
and trauma in our contemporary lifeworld.22 “Poisoned Subjects” works through the implications 
of the neoliberal culture of flexibility for norms of being and embodiment as they are refracted 
through issues of re/production.  
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Poisoned Subjectivity and Ecocritical Futures 
 The array of life narrative forms represented in the following chapters—among them 
legal testimony, medical records, speeches, interviews, digital performance art, photography, 
testimonio, anthology, and auto/biography—demonstrate the centrality of personal testimony to 
embodied health and environmental movements. As Gillian Whitlock explains, “autobiography 
is fundamental to the struggle for recognition among individuals and groups, to the constant 
creation of what it means to be human and the rights that fall from that, and to the ongoing 
negotiation of imaginary boundaries between ourselves and others. Life narrative plays a vital 
role in the public sphere as it deals in and through private lives” (10). Yet I share with Ann 
Jurecic a sense that “the pervasive awareness of risk in the contemporary world has…altered the 
cultural work of life narratives” (20). What does it mean to be human in a world without refuge 
from the specter of toxicity? Who has the right to assess and assert toxic risk to private lives or 
public health? Where do environmental and testimonial justice intersect?   
 “Poisoned Subjects” contributes to what I hope will be a growing conversation between 
life writing studies and the ecocritical study of toxic discourse as a component of the risk society. 
Life writing studies offers crucial insights into the formation of autobiographical subjectivity in 
toxic life narratives. I draw together issues of witnessing, testimony, and trauma that have not 
previously been foregrounded in the growing conversation within the environmental humanities 
about toxicity with concerns about embodiment and normativity central to feminist disability 
studies. As such, I join a growing push for ecocriticism’s greater critical engagement with 
literary-theoretical lenses that take a systems approach to understanding and critiquing the 
marginalization of certain kinds of bodies and subjects. The fields of disability, queer, 
transgender, critical race, and fat studies are vital to many of the central issues animating 
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ecocriticism today: posthumanisms, new materialisms, urban space, food systems, oceans, and of 
course environmental justice. Attending to personal testimony and testimonial justice heightens 
toxic discourse’s unstable “social and ethical import” (Buell 48; see also Alaimo 89). It requires 
ecocritics to reconsider vocabularies of purity and pollution, normality and ability that have long 
held sway in environmental writing and criticism, forging links between conceptions of 
environmental, disability, and testimonial justice. 
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Notes to Introduction: 
 
1 “A Place for Stories,” 1349-1350.  
2 Love Canal: The Story Continues…, 19.  
3 The Love Canal community was developed atop a former chemical and toxic waste disposal 
site of a subsidiary company of Occidental Petroleum. Residents experienced what they believed 
were unusually high levels of miscarriage, asthma, cancer, and other illnesses, and they 
collaborated with epidemiologists in a community-based effort to substantiate their observations. 
After documenting geographical patterns of illness that matched local groundwater flows, Love 
Canal residents agitated for both toxic remediation and monetary compensation for their 
decimated property values. President Jimmy Carter declared Love Canal in a state of emergency 
in 1978 and ordered federal disaster assistance for the remediation of the disposal site. However, 
when neither state nor federal officials would take responsibility for buying them out of their 
mortgages and relocating them to uncontaminated areas, residents briefly held two EPA officials 
hostage at the headquarters of the Love Canal Homeowners Association in May of 1980. 
Ultimately, the Love Canal disaster led to the passage in December 1980 of the Comprehensive 
Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act, commonly known as the Superfund 
Act.  
4 Love Canal was reissued in 1998 with the subtitle “The Story Continues…” and in 2011 as 
Love Canal: and the Birth of the Environmental Movement. Citations in this dissertation refer to 
the pagination of the 1998 edition. 
5 Karim H. Karim defines topos as the “referential basis of interpretation” that “is essential in 
making a textual account seem coherent within a particular culture’s norms” (153). Betsy 
Hartmann and colleagues argue that the “reservoir of core ideas” that a topos represents “often 
serve[s] to naturalize discourses of exclusion, making them seem commonsense and apolitical” 
(13). 
6 Phil Brown defines community, or popular, epidemiology as “the process by which laypersons 
gather scientific data and other information, and also direct and marshal the knowledge and 
resources of experts in order to understand the epidemiology of disease. In some of its actions, 
popular epidemiology parallels scientific epidemiology, such as when laypeople conduct 
community health surveys. Yet popular epidemiology is more than public participation in 
traditional epidemiology, since it emphasizes social structural factors as part of the causal disease 
chain. Further, it involves social movements, utilizes political and judicial approaches to 
remedies, and challenges basic assumptions of traditional epidemiology, risk assessment, and 
public health regulation” (“Popular Epidemiology” 366). 
7 While neither directly references Buell’s work, literature scholars Michael Bryson and Ann 
Jurecic both address the role of risk in autobiographies of toxic exposure. Bryson considers 
ecologist Sandra Steingraber’s autobiographical exploration of environmental cancer Living 
Downstream, while Jurecic reads Susanne Antonetta’s memoir of illness and environment Body 
Toxic as what she calls a “risk narrative.” In these life narratives that combine the life story with 
ecology, Bryson sees a heightened “tension between the subjectivity of autobiography and the 
ostensibly objective description of scientific processes and analysis of experimental data,” 
depicting science as a process of creative inquiry (171). Jurecic likewise considers Antonetta’s 
“experiments with layered and spiraling narrative” as an attempt to represent what Anthony 
Giddens would call the ontological insecurity of life in the risk society (23). In their readings of 
 
 
 35 
                                                                                                                                                       
these risk narratives, neither Jurecic nor Bryson marshals the full depth of autobiography studies. 
The only sustained attempt to bring life writing studies and toxic discourse into conversation 
remains the chapter on “material memoirs” in literary critic Stacy Alaimo’s 2010 Bodily 
Natures: Science, Environment, and the Material Self. Material memoirs, which foreground the 
embodied subject of autobiography, “forge new ways of knowing about our bodies and our 
selves;” they interrogate divisions between lay and expert knowledge, “offering up personal 
experiences as ‘data,’ as the author examines her own life story through a scientific lens” (87). 
8 Love Canal is discussed by Ursula Heise and Lawrence Buell; Refuge by Buell and Greg 
Garrard; Living Downstream and Having Faith by Buell, Garrard, Heise, Stacy Alaimo, Michael 
Bryson, Giovanna Di Chiro, and Bernice Hausman; Body Toxic by Alaimo, Heise, and Ann 
Jurecic; and Cancer Journals by Alaimo.  
9 The exception that proves the rule in this case is Stacy Alaimo.  
10 Beginning in the first chapter of Silent Spring, Carson uses her audience’s familiarity with the 
ongoing threat of nuclear disaster in Cold War America to warn against the dangers of World 
War II’s chemical legacy:  
Strontium 90, released through nuclear explosions into the air, comes to earth in rain or 
 drifts down as fallout, lodges in soil, enters into the grass or corn or wheat grown there, 
 and in time takes up its abode in the bones of a human being, there to remain until his 
 death. Similarly, chemicals sprayed on croplands or forests or gardens lie long in soil, 
 entering into living organisms, passing from one to another in a chain of poisoning and 
 death…As Albert Schweitzer has said, “Man can hardly even recognize the devils of his 
 own creation.” (6) 
Nobel Peace Prize Laureate Albert Schweitzer, whose widely circulated 1954 Nobel lecture 
addressed the need for stable peace after two world wars, is often credited with helping to spark 
the anti-nuclear activism of the late 1950s and 1960s. His 1957 Call to Conscience influenced 
The Saturday Review editor Norman Cousins to co-found The Committee for a SANE Nuclear 
Policy, now Peace Action. In Love Canal, Gibbs repeatedly deploys the bomb as a metaphor for 
toxic risk and for the community’s response. “[T]he Love Canal chemical time bomb was ticking 
away,” Gibbs narrates. “Hooker’s time bomb was ticking away. You couldn’t see the chemicals 
and you couldn’t touch them” (109).  
11 Love Canal residents did collaborate with a cancer researcher from the University at Buffalo, 
Beverly Paigen, to collect and analyze their data. 
12 Smith and Watson distinguish between four types of “autobiographical ‘I’s”: the historical “I,” 
the narrating “I,” the narrated “I,” and the ideological “I” (Reading 71–79). In the production of 
poisoned subjecthood, we might say that both the narrated “I” (the subject whose experiences are 
remembered and recounted in the life narrative) and the narrating “I” (the narrational character 
who does that remembering) manage challenges to their expertise or credibility as assessors of 
toxic risk.  
13 I am referencing the text of “Principles of Environmental Justice” reprinted as Appendix A to 
Robert Bullard’s 2005 edited collection The Quest for Environmental Justice.  
14 I recognize significant overlap between the categories of illness and disability, for reasons that 
should become clearer as I unpack questions of embodiment, testimony, and justice throughout 
the dissertation. I will often link these terms together, even when the literature I am citing uses 
only one term or the other. When writing about personal accounts of illness or disability, I try to 
reflect the subject’s own language.  
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15 Following standard practices within some disability studies circles, I use “impairment” to refer 
to forms of embodiment or enmindment that are considered and named by medical practice as 
non-normative or aberrant, while I use “disability” to refer to the social meanings constructed 
around bodily and mental difference. See note 18 below.  
16 For historical background on the emergence of the interdiscipline of disability studies, see Dan 
Goodley; Lennard Davis, “Normality, Power, and Culture,” among others. On feminist disability 
studies, see Kim Hall; Jenny Morris; Alexa Schriempf; Rosemarie Garland Thomson, 
“Integrating Disability;” Susan Wendell, Rejected Body. 
17 The United States signed the UN CRDP in 2009 but has yet to ratify. Conservatives have 
fought ratification on the grounds that Convention provisions affirming the right to reproductive 
health care and the right to education threaten efforts to restrict abortion and to protect 
educational sovereignty (particularly homeschooling), respectively. In July 2014, the Senate 
Foreign Relations Committee voted the treaty out of committee in a vote of 12-6, but ratification 
was not brought to a floor vote.  
18 The idea of an impairment-disability system responds to conventional understandings that 
disability is located in a pathologized or deviant body. Disability studies explicitly critique the 
medical model of disability, which “defines disability as an individual defect lodged in the 
person, a defect that must be cured or eliminated if the person is to achieve full capacity as a 
human being” (Siebers, Disability Theory 3). Related to the medical model is the symbolic 
paradigm of disability, which interprets impairment as a sign of moral deviance or sinfulness. 
Together, the medical and symbolic models shape popular understandings of disability as a 
personal obstacle, arousing pity or, when overcome by exceptional individuals, admiration for 
the disabled person’s perseverance and moral fortitude.  
 By contrast, the social model locates disability outside the body in inhospitable 
environments. Disentangling impairment and disability, with “impairment as the medically 
defined condition of a person's body/mind, and disability as the socially constructed 
disadvantage based upon impairment” (Wendell, “Unhealthy Disabled” 164), the social model 
offers a structural critique wherein the label of dysfunction adheres to disabling institutions and 
infrastructure rather than individuals with impairments. The social model offers the promise of 
relocating stigma away from disabled individuals, but scholars like Tobin Siebers have criticized 
this paradigm as “unidirectional” (Disability Theory 25). As it rightly shifts the responsibility for 
disability away from individuals onto socio-political conditions, a strictly social model leaves 
little room for thinking through the ways that bodies also shape environments. Disability studies 
scholars have long critiqued the social model as a blunt instrument that does not adequately 
account for the complex interaction of bodies and environments, impairments and disabilities 
(eg. Hughes and Paterson; Mintz; Siebers, Disability Theory; Donaldson). “One paradoxical 
consequence of its strict divide between impairment and disability,” according to Susannah 
Mintz, “is that the social model ends up constructing the body in much the same terms as those 
of the medical model it hopes to resist. The separation between body and culture tends to 
reinstate a problematic mind/body binary and renders the body of the social model ‘an 
ahistorical, pre-social, purely natural object’” (qting Hughes and Paterson 3).  
19 Increasingly, scholars have cautioned against applying the undifferentiated label of 
“neoliberalism” to the point of meaninglessness. Neoliberalism can—and in fact, many would 
argue, should—be taken to encompass nearly all aspects of contemporary existence in many 
parts of the globe. In no way does this surfeit of meaning render “neoliberalism” an empty 
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signifier. Instead, the task is to show clearly how “[n]eoliberalism always articulates with 
particular social-environmental contexts” (J. Harrison, “Abandoned Bodies” 1200). In this 
dissertation, I am chiefly concerned with the value placed on flexibility in the late capitalist 
lifeworld. Each chapter teases out how and of whom flexibility is demanded (or to whom it is 
denied) as part of a systems approach to understanding the landscape of toxic risk and testimony.   
20 Joseph Shapiro coined the term “Supercrip” in his 1993 No Pity. On Supercrip as a core 
rhetoric in contemporary representations of disability, see Jay Dolmage’s Disability Rhetoric and 
G. Thomas Couser’s Signifying Bodies. 
21 Robert Crawford defines healthism “as the preoccupation with personal health as a primary—
often the primary—focus for the definition and achievement of well-being; a goal which is to be 
attained primarily through the modification of life styles” (368). See chapter 3 for a more 
detailed discussion of healthism. 
22 Note the difference between flexibility as an ideology used to control bodies as a form of 
neoliberal subject-making and flexibility as it is deployed in Universal Design (UD). UD is a 
design phenomenon and epistemology that seeks to reconfigure design practices to cater to users 
with a wide array of bodies and abilities, rather than a disembodied ideal user. UD as a design 
phenomenon is organized around seven foundational principles: equitable use; flexibility in use; 
simple and intuitive use; perceptible information; tolerance for error; low physical effort; and 
size and space for approach and use (Center for Excellence in Universal Design np). Here, 
flexibility is a feature of design, not subjects. Flexible designs accommodate a range of users by 
providing adaptability to different methods of use, to right- or left-handed access, to different 
paces of use, and by facilitating accuracy and precision for different users (ibid.). This is not to 
set up a false binary of “good” versus “bad” kinds of flexibility. As Aimi Hamraie shows, UD 
has historical roots in biological determinism, scientific racism, and eugenics through its 
connection to anthropometry. Unearthing these connections, Hamraie shows how UD intervenes 
in its own history to forge new ethical relationships of knowledge production in design fields. 
Flexible design attempts to subvert the normate by recognizing and facilitating different methods 
of interaction between bodies and environments, while the injunction to bodily flexibility makes 
interaction a problem of the individual body. Some scholars have also critiqued the language and 
logic of accommodation in which UD participates; see Mitchell and Snyder. 
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Chapter 1 
Narratives of Diethylstilbestrol Exposure 
 
 When thousands of doctors began prescribing a drug intended to improve pregnancy 
outcomes to as many as 5 million patients in the 1940s, most medical professionals believed they 
were conforming to the highest standards of care. Few patients, one imagines, questioned the 
wisdom of the gynecologists and family practitioners who told them that this little white pill 
would “save” their babies (Langston 58; Fenichell and Charfoos 66). By the mid 1970s, 
however, the situation looked drastically different. That little white pill, diethylstilbestrol, had 
been proven to cause a rare cervical cancer in young women exposed as fetuses to the drug their 
mothers had taken, and studies continued to demonstrate additional health risks. 
Diethylstilbestrol, known as DES, has since been called “the American thalidomide” (LuEllen 
Blum in Braun 40).1 One woman who developed cervical cancer as a result of exposure 
compared her experience to that of a young man returning from war without a limb—she was a 
casualty of “the DES Wars” (Braun xiv). In the 1940s, doctors had been saving babies; by the 
1970s, 1980s, and beyond, women who took the drug, and their children, came to see themselves 
as “exposed” to what turned out to be a toxic chemical. They were victims poisoned by a 
pharmaceutical industry that cared more about profits than patients. They sought to get the word 
out about DES, to make their stories heard, and to gain compensation from the industry they 
blamed for their injuries. 
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 Like all people who seek recognition as having been exposed to toxic chemicals, women 
and men affected by DES had to “make a case” for themselves as poisoned subjects. Personal 
testimony has played a significant role in shaping the cultural script around DES, whether 
offered through legal testimony, news media, documentaries, or autobiographical writing. The 
discourse of DES has focused almost exclusively on the figure of the DES daughter—women 
exposed in utero who sued pharmaceutical companies, founded action networks, and lobbied for 
research funds, speaking out about how the drug (and the medical model that supported it) had 
impacted their lives. Sociologist and DES researcher Susan Bell explains that “DES daughters’ 
stories have the potential for forging links between DES daughters and providing support to each 
other as well as connecting the personal experiences of individuals to public issues of social 
structure” (11). These connections comprise the heart of the work of the embodied health 
movements whose life narratives are the subject of this dissertation.  
 The DES embodied health movement, like the multiple chemical sensitivity and 
alternative food movements I discuss in chapters 2 and 3, connects individual stories to wider 
social structures by drawing on the toxic discourse that took hold in the second half of the 
twentieth century. Situating a dangerous drug within burgeoning environmental and consumer 
protection rhetorics, the narrative structures of toxic discourse allowed DES daughters to move 
beyond a critique of the medical-scientific establishment by claiming a shared identity as 
poisoned subjects. Although a prescription medication may not immediately resonate with Cold 
War-based anxieties about the nuclear threat or the images of superfund sites that dominated the 
toxic imaginary in the wake of Love Canal, DES narratives employ all the familiar motifs of 
toxic discourse. DES-exposed people’s stories recount the difficult realization that a loving 
mother’s actions unwittingly resulted in injury, pain, or death of her child (Buell’s “shock of 
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awakened perception”). Many express a newfound suspicion of the medical establishment or 
widespread distrust of chemicals—from food additives to pesticides to pharmaceuticals—as 
narrators begin to suspect that there can be no guarantee of safety when exposed to putatively 
benign chemicals. These themes are often gothified, accentuated with lurid descriptions of 
injured bodies and the uncaring or simply misguided medical professionals who treat them. In 
one memorable account, upon viewing a DES daughter’s cancerous vagina for the first time, a 
doctor shouts, “You look like chopped meat in there!” (Bichler 26).  
 Most important, early DES narratives in particular stage a moral drama on a David versus 
Goliath scale, a strategy for framing toxic struggles that would have been familiar to reading 
publics in the late 1970s and early 1980s during widespread media coverage of the Love Canal 
disaster. This image of an individual struggling against a mighty corporate structure is central to 
the collective illness identity DES daughter. As DES-exposed women and their allies challenged 
the medical establishment to develop new models of patient care attentive to embodied 
knowledges and fought for compensation from pharmaceutical companies in court, they pitted 
their own illness experiences against the knowledge and testimony of mostly male experts. One 
DES daughter recalls “a doctor who testified [during her civil suit] that DES does not cause clear 
cell cancer. Later someone told me that the doctor had provided ‘expert testimony’ for 30 other 
DES cases. I was told he earned about $8,000 every time he testified” (Margaret Perrotte in 
Braun 32). In the face of exceptional corporate money and power, DES daughters cast 
themselves as heroic individuals telling “a true story of tragedy and triumph,” as is emblazoned 
on the cover of one DES autobiography.  
 Rhetorics of toxicity and their moral stakes powerfully shape the kinds of stories 
available to poisoned subjects as they make a case for and make sense of their experiences with 
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toxicity, illness, and disability. The figure of the DES daughter, the heroic plot of a David versus 
Goliath drama, the potent narratives of trauma and post-traumatic stress that gained momentum 
in the 1980s all contribute to a dominant narrative of what it means to be DES-exposed. Even as 
this narrative has emerged out of the stories of people affected by diethylstilbestrol, it becomes a 
paradigm for future stories, shaping the DES embodied health movement and its associated 
illness identities. In many ways this has contributed to the movement’s successes. Yet, as we 
shall see, the predominant DES narrative also functions as a norming project that privileges some 
stories—and some bodies—over others. This chapter and this dissertation ask: What are the 
stakes of claiming a politicized identity around an illness experience? Which stories and which 
people are excluded when stories of illness, toxicity, and trauma become familiar? The DES 
movement has been heavily invested in narratives of threatened reproductivity and relationality, 
which uphold traditional models of the family and women’s place within it, even while they 
issue challenges to the medical and corporate communities that are rooted in feminist practice.   
 
Legacies of DES 
 In 1938, the British biochemist Sir Edward Charles Dodds and his team synthesized 
diethylstilbestrol, the first drug to be marketed as a synthetic estrogen supplement. Estrogen 
injections had become popular during the 1920s as a treatment for the symptoms of menopause, 
which was viewed as a curable feminine disease that caused nervousness, irritability, 
irrationality, and general troublesomeness. Prior to Dodds’s innovation, “natural” estrogen 
sources (mainly animal urine) were scarce and their preparations complex, making the cost of 
such treatments prohibitively high for all but the very wealthy. The discovery of a synthetic 
alternative, which appeared to be substantially the same as the natural hormone in its chemical 
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structure and in its effects, was welcomed by many in the medical community both because of its 
lower cost and its easy-to-administer pill form.2  
 For a number of possible reasons—including that Britain’s Medical Research Council, 
which funded Dodds’s research, prohibited patenting the products of publicly-funded drug 
discovery projects—Dodds did not patent his new estrogen. Thus, less than a year after the 
journal Nature published news of the discovery, pharmaceutical companies in the United States 
had submitted New Drug Applications petitioning the dozen-year-old Food and Drug 
Administration to approve diethylstilbestrol as a treatment for menopause symptoms.3 After two 
years of opposition and deliberation, the FDA approved the drug in 1941, although they took the 
then-rare precaution of making it available by prescription only. Prior to 1938, the FDA had had 
no authority to regulate new drugs based on safety, and DES was an early test case for their new 
mandate. “Regulators had good reason to be cautious,” explains DES researcher and historian 
Nancy Langston, “because little consensus existed concerning the right of the federal 
government to regulate industry in the name of public health” (32). In retrospect, it seems clear 
that the FDA was not cautious enough, since scientific consensus at the time recognized 
estrogens in general, and DES in particular, as a potential human carcinogen. In 1940, during the 
period when the FDA was reviewing New Drug Applications for DES, the Journal of the 
American Medical Association “warned against the indiscriminate and prolonged use of 
estrogens and…emphasized the possible occurrence of mammary carcinoma in patients” (qtd in 
Fenichell and Charfoos 32). Dodds himself issued similar warnings about long-term use of 
diethylstilbestrol.4 
 Yet the drug was approved, and it would be marketed for expanded human use after 
World War II. Some 200 manufacturers produced the hormone under more than 300 trade names 
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in 30 countries to stunt the growth of tall girls, suppress lactation, provide emergency 
contraception, and treat anorexia, acne, and menopausal syndrome. Most important, DES became 
widely used as a prophylactic against miscarriage for so-called “habitual aborters” and other 
women considered to be at risk for miscarriage. Some studies, especially those conducted by the 
influential Harvard researchers George and Olive Smith, appeared to suggest that DES could 
help some women at risk for miscarriage to complete their pregnancies. These claims were being 
vigorously challenged in the medical community by the early 1950s, as paper after paper 
questioned the Smiths’ methods.5 Nevertheless, drug manufacturers were soon advertising the 
drug as a panacea that could “make a normal pregnancy more normal,” despite evidence that 
DES exposure might actually increase the chances of miscarriage (Langston 56). Scientist and 
former pharmacist Theo Colborn has written that the prevailing attitude was that it was 
“medically correct, even stylish, to take DES just to have big, fat babies” (ix). Women prescribed 
the drug were sometimes told that it was a vitamin.6 
 At the same time that the Journal of Obstetrics and Gynecology was running 
advertisements claiming that DES produced “bigger and stronger babies,” farmers were 
beginning to treat livestock with synthetic estrogens in order to produce bigger, beefier cows and 
chickens.7 Since World War II, diethylstilbestrol had been used to treat veterinary conditions in 
livestock whose meat would not be used for human consumption. In 1947, the FDA expanded its 
approval to cover pellet injections used for plumping and chemically caponizing chickens. By 
1954, DES was approved as a cattle feed additive, with promises that it would increase growth 
up to 35 percent. Amidst post-war economic growth and technological development, DES 
seemed to hold the promise of a more re/productive—a bigger, stronger, and therefore better—
nation.   
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 Ultimately, the drug prescribed to ensure women’s successful reproduction actually 
precluded many of those women’s daughters from becoming pregnant and carrying fetuses to 
term. Today, the medical community recognizes DES as a carcinogen—the first carcinogen 
proven to pass through what had once been thought of as an impermeable placental barrier, 
meaning that both pregnant patients and their unborn children were put at risk (Fenichell and 
Charfoos 90). It is also a known teratogen. Literally meaning “monster-making,” teratogens 
cause malformations in developing embryos. DES daughters—women who were exposed in 
utero when their mothers took the drug—are at increased risk for reproductive tract 
abnormalities (especially T-shaped or three-horned uteri), vaginal and cervical clear cell 
adenocarcinoma, breast cancer, endometriosis, miscarriage, ectopic pregnancy, and infertility. 
Less research has been done on DES sons, who may face increased risk of structural 
abnormalities, including undescended testes and microphallus, and testicular cancer. Pregnant 
women who took DES (known as DES mothers) have also experienced increased rates of breast 
cancer. Animal research and longitudinal cohort studies suggest that DES exposure carries third-
generation health impacts; DES grandchildren may be at increased risk for hypospadias, delayed 
menstrual regularity, and higher rates of tumor growth.8  
 These health impacts were first brought to public attention in 1971, when the New 
England Journal of Medicine published a paper linking DES to a puzzling cluster of clear cell 
adenocarcinoma of the vagina in women under the age of twenty-two in the Boston area. 
Previously, only women over fifty were considered at risk for this form of cancer so rare that 
only seven cases had been documented in medical literature (Fenichell and Charfoos 85). Arthur 
Herbst, who coauthored the 1971 paper with fellow Massachusetts General gynecologist Howard 
Ulfelder and epidemiologist David Poskanzer, began to collect data in a registry of clear cell 
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adenocarcinoma, which is often called the Herbst Registry after its founder. Data gathered 
through the registry suggests that DES daughters have a 1 in 1000 chance of developing clear 
cell adenocarcinoma of the cervix (unexposed women are considered at no risk). After the 
publication of Herbst’s study, the FDA issued an alert in 1971 that DES was contraindicated for 
use during pregnancy, but it did not withdraw approval for human use until 2000. However, 
diethylstilbestrol has been banned for use in chickens and lambs since 1959 and as a cattle feed 
additive since 1979.9  
 Throughout the 1970s, many women and some men affected by DES began to share their 
stories with one another and with the media, to create action networks, and to pursue legal cases 
against the pharmaceutical companies that produced and distributed the drug. The first DES suit 
was filed in 1974. In 1979, Joyce Bichler became the first DES daughter to win monetary 
damages from a drug company, Eli Lilly, for their role in manufacturing and promoting the 
diethylstilbestrol that caused her to develop clear cell adenocarcinoma of the vagina and cervix. 
Other exposed women continued to bring suit against pharmaceutical companies throughout the 
1980s, testing legal theories of liability and class action. In the 1990s, groups like DES Action 
and DES Cancer Network lobbied for federal funding of further research into the long-term 
effects of DES exposure. As a result of these efforts, President George Bush signed the DES 
Education and Research Amendment into law in 1992. In 1998, President Clinton signed the 
DES Reauthorization bill. These pieces of legislation provided federal funding for DES research 
and education to be carried out by the National Cancer Institute and the Centers for Disease 
Control. The National Cancer Institute’s cohort studies continue to research the long-term effects 
of diethylstilbestrol exposure on DES mothers, daughters, sons, and grandchildren. 
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Embodied Health, Political Identity  
 One way to tell the story of DES is through the medical-scientific data that projects like 
the Herbst registry and the National Cancer Institute cohort studies provide. But DES-exposed 
people have insisted on the importance of telling their own stories, which simultaneously make 
use of and resist scientific data and ways of knowing. This emphasis on personal storytelling is 
characteristic of embodied health movements. The DES embodied health movement has centered 
around the collective illness identity of the DES daughter, which “names and thus provides the 
possibility of understanding the effects” of women’s in utero DES exposure (Bell 31). Other 
illness identities have developed around DES exposure, including DES son, DES mother, and 
DES grandchild. But the identity DES daughter has been the focus of the DES movement and 
has inflected its multiform strategies, from forming activist organizations to publishing 
newsletters to political lobbying and letter-writing campaigns in support of research funding. In 
an EHM, in which activists collaborate with the scientific community to shape research and 
medical practice, collective illness identities have the potential to direct prevention, treatment, 
and research strategies that may result from these collaborations. This is in part because the 
contours of a politicized collective illness identity determine the kinds of stories that can be told 
about what it means to be ill as an individual and as a part of a particular illness community.  
 The centrality of DES daughters has had two important consequences for the stories of 
the DES embodied health movement. First, it privileges the illness experiences of people 
exposed to DES in utero as the focus of embodied politics. DES entered bodies and economies 
through multiple routes, and some of the health consequences of these other types of exposures 
have been documented. For instance, Fenichell and Charfoos note that workers involved in the 
drug’s initial manufacture experienced impotence and gynomastia—the development of female 
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characteristics, including breast growth, in men—after coming into contact with DES dust (19). 
Male workers exposed to DES-enhanced livestock feed experienced similar bodily changes. 
Studies in Puerto Rico and Italy suggest that consuming DES residues in meat may have 
triggered early puberty in girls and breast growth in young boys (Langston 119). Novelist Ruth 
Ozeki dramatized human exposure to diethylstilbestrol through cattle feed and beef in My Year 
of Meats, a novel that links the pharmaceutical industry to agribusiness and places both in 
context with the transnational migration of commodities, narratives, and people. But the 
dominant narrative of DES has not included people exposed to the hormone through 
consumption or through their roles in processes of production, focusing instead almost 
exclusively on reproduction.  
 Second, and relatedly, the collective illness identity DES daughter locates both illness 
and women relationally within the family. The less common “DES cancer daughter” further 
identifies women with illness and illness with the parent-child relationship. These phrases serve 
to distinguish women exposed as fetuses from women who took the pill as adults (DES mothers), 
who face a different kind of health risk. They also constitute a particular kind of rhetorical appeal 
for protection. It is a gesture toward what cultural theorist Lauren Berlant calls fantasies of 
“infantile citizenship,” which are often “condensed” into the figure of the little girl who is 
somebody’s daughter. “It is in her name as future citizen that state and federal governments have 
long policed morality around sex and other transgressive representation,” Berlant argues (Queen 
of America 58). The feminine, infantile citizen is defined in opposition to, and in need of 
protection from, adult male (sexual) immorality. For Berlant, appeals to protect the little girl as 
future citizen are misogynistic fetishes used to police adult women’s and minority sexualities.  
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 If the identity DES daughter invokes fantasies of infantile citizenship, this is an 
interesting tactic for an embodied health movement driven by women on behalf of women, one 
with ties to the second wave feminist movement. The rhetorical value of this kind of appeal is 
best understood by placing “DES daughter” within the context of the toxic discourse emerging in 
the late 1970s and early 1980s in the United States, as the DES embodied health movement was 
taking form. As described by Lawrence Buell, one of the primary motifs of toxic discourse is 
“moral passion cast in a David versus Goliath scenario.” Buell traces this topos to late 
nineteenth- and early twentieth-century muckraking and other urban workplace reform 
initiatives, which traded on the potent “threat of hegemonic oppression” posed by industry (40–
41). Situated within this tradition, we can see that the moniker “DES daughter” positions women 
exposed to the hormone in utero as both morally righteous and under threat by a pharmaceutical 
industry that put them at unnecessary risk. It is a position strategically employed in DES 
narratives to portray women who developed cancer as a result of DES exposure as poisoned 
subjects who need—and, importantly, who deserve—protection under the law.  
 As we shall see, then, DES life narratives focus on themes of gender, relationality, and 
reproduction, and these central topics do complex work for embodied health politics. These are 
not static terms within the DES embodied health movement but shift depending on who is 
deploying them, when, and in what contexts. Looking at multiple DES narratives thus reveals 
heterogeneity and change over time within the movement. The readings that follow situate 
personal testimony about DES exposure as toxic life narratives within the DES movement and 
the broader anti-toxics political work that gained momentum throughout the second half of the 
twentieth century. I introduce the concept of alternate jurisdictions—different sites of 
autobiographical witnessing that respond to different experiences of trauma and raise important 
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questions about ethics and justice in testimony—as a means of reading DES narratives, 
especially those that explicitly engage the law as a strategy for DES activism. Embodied health 
movements seek ways for people to work through and around challenges to their embodied 
knowledges and experiential ways of knowing. Autobiographical testimony is one site of this 
contest. 
 
Early DES Narratives: DES Daughter and Daughters at Risk 
 In 1981, ten years after Herbst and his colleagues published their paper in The New 
England Journal of Medicine establishing the link between diethylstilbestrol and clear cell 
cancer, two book-length life narratives of DES exposure were published. Joyce Bichler’s and 
Stephen Fenichell and Lawrence Charfoos’s early DES daughter life narratives each offer a 
heroic plot promising victory for the passionate underdog who takes the pharmaceutical industry 
to court to hold them accountable for the toxic legacy of DES. With the aid of the legal system, 
DES daughters like Joyce Bichler can tell “a true story of tragedy and triumph,” in which a moral 
victory helps to compensate for their physical and psychological injuries. What is the 
relationship between law and literature? How do subjects tell their stories in these different 
jurisdictions? How do witnesses perform justice through the production of testimony? These are 
central questions for embodied health movements as life writing extends, reworks, and subverts 
juridical forms of testimony and adjudication. 
 DES Daughter: The Joyce Bichler Story (1981) recounts the first successful lawsuit 
against a major manufacturer of diethylstilbestrol. It is a first-person autobiographical narrative 
of Joyce Bichler, a young woman who developed clear cell adenocarcinoma of the vagina and 
cervix as a result of the DES her mother took while pregnant. Doctors decide that the best course 
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of treatment for Joyce, as for many DES cancer daughters, is a full hysterectomy and a 
vaginectomy. After recovering from her surgeries, Joyce brings a civil suit against Eli Lilly 
under a legal theory known as joint liability: even though she cannot prove that her mother took 
Lilly-brand DES, Joyce successfully argues that major pharmaceutical companies, including Eli 
Lilly, acted in concert by pooling their research and resources in their quest for FDA approval of 
DES. She is thus able to sue the company as a representative of the pharmaceutical industry on 
the grounds that each company that collaborated in seeking approval for the drug is equally 
liable for its effects. Bichler v. Eli Lilly & Co. was an important test of this theory that would 
prove effective in future DES suits and would shape the narrative of the DES movement by 
helping establish a clear us-versus-them dynamic, pitting individual DES daughters against not 
just specific drug manufacturers but all of “big pharma.”10  
 DES Daughter is divided into two parts. Part I describes Joyce’s medical condition and 
treatment within the context of her journey into womanhood: it begins with Joyce’s first 
menstrual period and concludes just after her marriage. This section of the book foregrounds 
Joyce’s personal suffering and its impact on her family; it is about “all that [she’s] been through” 
(84). This includes not only the pain of the cancer but also the indignities of being a patient and 
the trauma associated with the removal of her uterus and vagina. Part II focuses on the legal trial. 
In this section of the narrative we see Joyce’s perspective shift away from her personal 
experience with illness toward a collective identification with other DES daughters. When the 
New York Post writes a story about her suit, Joyce is initially uncomfortable with the publicity 
that “on one level…seemed like an invasion” (108). However, thinking about “all the other DES 
daughters in New York that might be reading the same article” ultimately strengthens her resolve 
to win her trial and publicize the DES issue (ibid.). This imagined community is made real as the 
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trial prompts Joyce to contact the organization DES Action, through which she develops a 
support network of exposed women and their families. Many of these people show up in court to 
listen to Joyce’s testimony, and she comes to see her lawsuit as a symbolic act on behalf of this 
broader community. “I knew we had to win the case,” Joyce narrates, “as much for them and all 
the other DES daughters in America as for myself. I knew I had a duty to win” (ibid.). Through 
the public act of complaint an act which is both accusatory and testimonial—Joyce comes to 
recognize her cancer and resulting reproductive injury as “not an individual issue” but “a DES 
issue, a women’s health issue” (98).11 It is here that the moral dynamics of the DES daughter-as-
poisoned-subject narrative emerge. 
 As I have suggested, the dominant DES narrative plays out an epic moral drama. In early 
DES life writing like Bichler’s, one of the primary sites of this drama is a legal trial. In DES 
Daughter, the trial is explicitly figured as a “battle” between “little Joyce Bichler” and the 
representatives of a powerful and mercenary corporation (155, 97). During his closing 
arguments, Joyce’s lawyer instructs the jury that the courtroom “is a battlefield. And this battle is 
one that truly pits the individual against the mighty” (167). Joyce, too, narrates her suit in the 
morally-laden terms of the ordinary individual fighting the behemoth:  
Just because Eli Lilly & Co. was bigger, stronger, and more powerful than we were, we 
 reasoned, and had lots of money, there was no reason why they should be able to walk 
 away from the DES issue without being held in the slightest degree accountable and 
 responsible for what they had done to so many people in this country…Win or lose, we 
 were going to take on Eli Lilly & Co., in effect the entire pharmaceutical industry, and 
 fight them for as long as we could. (121–124)  
 
The reader, of course, is not at pains to wonder how the fight will play out. Like Joyce’s lawyer, 
we expect that in narrative, if not necessarily in court, “truth and justice always won” (124). As 
Anne Hunsaker Hawkins argues, many autobiographical accounts of illness are in fact 
“variations on a long-standing heroic paradigm of the struggle of brave individuals confronting 
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what appear to be insurmountable forces” (1–2). We can see that Joyce’s narrative does indeed 
follow this heroic plot: cancer and the loss of her reproductive capacity lead Joyce to take on a 
vilified pharmaceutical industry, but through determination—and with truth and justice on her 
side—she overcomes these obstacles not only for herself but also for the politicized illness 
community of DES daughters. 
 Joyce’s heroic narrative and her illness identity are structured on every level by gender. 
In the heroic plot of autobiography, “a hero/heroine alienated from family or home or birthright 
sets forth on a mission to achieve elsewhere an integration of self that is impossible within the 
constraints (political, sexual, emotional, economic) imposed in a repressive world and to return 
triumphant” (Smith and Watson, Reading 91). Joyce’s encounter with DES has left her alienated 
from her birthright as a woman; it is the changes to her sexual and reproductive life resulting 
from her hysterectomy and vaginectomy that Joyce identifies as “the core of what DES had done 
to me” (148). Her hero’s mission is to defeat the pharmaceutical industry in a court of law. The 
narrative achieves a comic resolution: Joyce, surrounded by her husband and family, and with 
the promise of wealth from her legal victory, concludes, “I had survived” (181).12  
 This conclusion suggests that the subject’s fractured sense of self has indeed been 
reintegrated after the trauma of her illness. The trial, while grueling, has allowed Joyce to 
reframe her personal trouble as a social ill and given political meaning to her experience. “If 
nothing else,” she thinks, “win or lose, we had an invaluable opportunity to let the American 
public know…The public had to know—had to be aware that this had happened and could 
happen again” (122). The legal trial functions within the narrative as what Jasbir Puar has 
described as “a recapacitation of a debilitated body” that is characteristic in narratives of 
neoliberal subject formation (“Cost” 179). Joyce’s trial has given her illness a greater purpose; 
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successfully completing her mission to inform the public and hold Eli Lilly accountable lends 
political, ethical, and narrative value to her illness and to her identity as “DES daughter.” 
 In order to achieve this recapacitation and narrate a heroic triumph over adversity 
achieved through legal action, Joyce must carefully navigate gender norms to portray herself as 
both a victim and a warrior, as feminine yet feminist. Joyce’s development as a character 
parallels her shifting understanding of DES from an individual to a political issue. Joyce is 
initially portrayed as innocent. She is sexually naïve and uses cloying euphemisms like “get into 
my pants” (14). She has never undergone a pelvic examination, and she worries about a doctor 
“poking around in [her]” (18). When she learns of her cancer she describes herself as “crying 
hysterically” (27). She is, in short, girlish.13  
 She is also politically inexperienced. Joyce’s feminist political consciousness only 
emerges in the second part of the narrative, which takes place after her marriage to husband 
Michael. It is through the ordeal of the trial that she comes to understand her illness as “a broader 
feminist issue that directly concerned the well-being of all women” and criticizes the women on 
Eli Lilly’s defense team for “working against their sisters” (149; 126). This narrative of character 
development allows Joyce to inhabit the positions of both feminine victim and feminist crusader: 
both her sexual and political awakenings are ensconced within a heterosexual relationship that, 
as characters in the narrative repeatedly suggest, would have been reproductive if it weren’t for 
DES. It is thus Eli Lilly’s negligence, not Joyce’s sexuality or her feminist politics, that 
undermines her ability to participate in normative femininity. This is a crucial distinction on 
which DES Daughter’s heroic plot turns.  
 The gendered dimensions of DES’s dominant heroic narrative are thrown into relief by 
another early life narrative focused on a groundbreaking legal case. Daughters at Risk (1981) is 
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characterized as “a personal DES history.” It tells the story of DES alongside a personal narrative 
of DES daughter Anne Needham, whose exposure led to clear cell adenocarcinoma and the 
surgical removal of both her uterus and vagina. Anne’s narrative is told in the third person, and 
the book is authored not by Needham herself but by two men connected to her legal case against 
White Laboratories, a manufacturer of DES. The authors are Lawrence Charfoos, Anne 
Needham’s lawyer, and Stephen Fenichell, a journalist who covered Needham v. White 
Laboratories and has since made a career out of writing about business ethics and corporate 
negligence. Daughters at Risk thus represents several life stories rolled into one: Anne 
Needham’s, whose “personal history” is referenced in the book’s title; that of Charfoos, who 
appears as a substantial character in the narrative and whose legal practice focused on medical 
malpractice; and diethylstilbestrol itself. The book is divided into three parts: Part I discusses 
Anne’s medical case. Part II relates Anne’s recovery, during which she decides to sue White 
Laboratories; it thus functions as a fulcrum between the medical case represented in Part I and 
Anne’s legal case, which is the subject of Part III. Interspersed throughout Anne’s narrative are 
chapters detailing the history of DES, including early scientific studies questioning its safety and 
efficacy, congressional hearings, and other legal cases against manufacturers of the drug. The 
narrative also offers extensive quotations from the court record of Anne’s trial.  
 It is through these excerpts of the court record that Anne’s own voice enters the narrative 
repeatedly. It’s not clear whether or to what extent Anne Needham might have participated in 
shaping the book, or whether she had given the authors permission to write her narrative. We can 
safely assume that the representation of Anne’s life is shaped by conversations with her attorney 
Lawrence Charfoos and by her legal testimony. Daughters at Risk is thus an example of what G. 
Thomas Couser calls “auto/biography”: a narrative that mobilizes both biographical and 
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autobiographical perspectives and “focuses on the relation between the writer and a significant 
other” (Vulnerable Subjects ix). Auto/biographical relationships are often personal, but these life 
narratives may also emerge from professional relationships such as those between doctor and 
patient or, as in Daughters at Risk, lawyer and client. Whatever the occasion of life writing, 
relationality in narrative makes subjects vulnerable. Some subjects enter auto/biographical 
relationships more vulnerable than others. Conditions such as extreme age or youth, illness and 
impairments, or other power imbalances between writer and subject may diminish a subject’s 
“capacity to take part in, examine, respond to, or resist” a writer’s representation (ibid. x). 
Writers of auto/biography speak for and about their subjects, and it may not be clear how much 
those subjects have participated in shaping either the narrative’s representation of the life or its 
politics.  
 This is a central issue in Daughters at Risk, where Charfoos’s professional ties to Anne 
Needham gave him particularly intimate access to her life story. Following Couser, I want to 
distance myself from the role of adjudicator of these ethical dilemmas. Rather, I ask how 
Charfoos’s (and, to a lesser extent, Fenichell’s) professional roles and commitments might shape 
the representation of Anne’s life, particularly as it relates to the gendered politics of the DES 
embodied health movement.14 As we would expect in toxic discourse, the narrative of Daughters 
at Risk centers on a moral contest fought on uneven grounds. Like Bichler’s narrative, published 
the same year, this drama plays out through the scene of the legal trial. The trial is figured as a 
“fight” not only against White Laboratories but against all corporations whose negligence 
threatens public well-being (292). When Anne visits her lawyers’ Chicago office, “as she walked 
between the giant buildings in the Loop, all housing major corporations, she felt as if she were 
taking on all of them” (141). Yet, in this David versus Goliath plot, Anne is not an active 
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protagonist as in Joyce in Bichler’s DES Daughter. The legal case is presented as “a question 
really of public concern, not of private interest…But Anne as the victim, sitting silently in her 
plaintiff’s chair, would remain the focus of the trial, even if she was only able to watch” (200). 
As in the construction of the text itself, Anne’s role in the trial is presented as passive. She is 
silent; it is up to her lawyers to tell her DES story.  
 This begins before the trial, when one of Anne’s lawyers calls her to a meeting to “create 
what he considered a viable plaintiff” (173), to shape Anne and her narrative into the kind of 
complaining subject likely to win compensation in a civil suit. Testimony given during the trial 
itself demonstrates how a viable plaintiff—like a viable auto/biographical subject—is always 
gendered. Anne’s mother, an expert psychiatrist, and Mr. Charfoos all emphasize the trauma 
associated with the removal of Anne’s reproductive organs at the trial. They testify that “she 
would have been the mother” of a family but for the surgery that “affected her ability to enter 
into normal relationships” (272, emphasis mine). Charfoos explains to the jury that Anne’s 
hysterectomy “interferes with a normal relationship…and the next stage that is normal and God-
given…to every woman in history: She will want children…She will not have her children. She 
will not have his children” (276, ellipses in original). Later, he characterizes “the removal of the 
children, the removal of the grandchildren” as a “disability”—one that warrants, in his 
estimation, $40,000 in damages (277). As presented by Fenichell and Charfoos, Anne’s 
reproductive organs were only ever a proxy for family they might have produced. Without them, 
Anne suffers a debilitating loss of womanhood. 
 In spite of this, Anne is consistently presented as normatively feminine in her appearance 
and behavior. The narrator describes her as “modest” and “delicate” (73; 4). She has “never been 
a feminist” (141). Her hairstyle and clothing are frequently described in detail, including on each 
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day of the trial. Anne herself is represented as always conscious of these things; before the 
surgery to remove her cancer, she begs the doctors not to leave a scar above her bikini line (122). 
Thus, Anne must be presented as simultaneously attractive and scarred, as maternal but not a 
mother, as a good girl who “won’t be a woman anymore” after her surgeries (80). The narrative 
reveals Anne’s legal claim to compensation as dependent on a specific calculus of femininity: 
Anne must be feminine enough to warrant sympathy for the irreparable damage to her identity as 
a woman.  
 Throughout the course of the narrative, Anne develops a politicized collective illness 
identity that links her to other DES daughters. When she reads an article “by a woman who 
called herself a DES daughter,” she is impressed by “the life of this parallel woman,” by their 
shared experiences and feelings of resentment (122–123).15 If Anne is at first only minimally 
involved in her legal case, during the trial she comes to see DES as “her issue,” one she shares 
with “hundreds of other women like her all around the country” (141; 292). Her fight is their 
fight—“There are a lot of girls out there with the same disease as me,” she tells a reporter (283). 
Moreover, the narrative puts DES in a broader political context by linking it to other 
environmental toxins, noting that Anne’s trial helps set a precedent for other consumer protection 
suits “in an age of toxic chemicals, air and water pollution from multiple sources, acid rain, and 
dangerous drugs” (288). This is an early move to situate DES within an emerging toxic discourse 
(Lois Gibbs’s Love Canal will be published within the year) that would play a significant role as 
the DES movement developed in the 1990s and into the 2000s.  
 While the DES movement can be characterized as feminist in its politics and strategies, 
Daughters at Risk carefully avoids a feminist analysis, portraying Anne as a heroic but apolitical 
woman. Politics, we are told, “seemed so abstract.” In fact, “Anne had never had much in the 
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way of political ideals or convictions. She had never been a feminist. She had been against the 
Vietnam War when that had been fashionable, but she really had just been following the lead of 
other people” (141). After her illness and her trial, Anne wants to go back to being “the average 
American girl” (291). But if she cannot realize her previous goals of becoming a mother and 
working as a nurse on a maternity ward, neither can she join other young people “casually 
rejecting the suburban ideal. Other young women, for a wide range of reasons, were electing to 
defer marriage and children. But unlike so many of her contemporaries of that time who didn’t 
want to settle down and have children in towns like Park Forest, Anne had no real choice” (291). 
But Fenichell and Charfoos offer no critique of either compulsory reproductivity or feminist 
choice rhetoric.  
 The vision of a DES embodied health movement presented here is thus more 
conservative than, even as it echoes, Bichler’s narrative. Fenichell and Charfoos seem more 
concerned with the specific details of a legal model of redress, rather than in offering the law as 
one tool for social action among many that the DES movement would employ. With its detailed 
review of DES medical literature, excerpted Congressional testimony, and accounts of other 
cases against manufacturers of diethylstilbestrol, the book reads like an instruction manual for 
future DES trials. Although the book concludes with Anne losing her case against White 
Laboratories on appeal, she vows to continue her fight, and readers are left anticipating the same 
comic resolution offered in DES Daughter. 
 In its narrative of triumph over adversity, Daughters at Risk narrativizes neoliberal 
ideologies of personal development that were consolidating at the same time as the DES 
embodied health movement.16 In life writing about disability, this personal development plot 
often takes the form of the “Supercrip” story. Daughters at Risk offers a version of this script—
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in which physical impairment is resituated as a moral challenge over which the strong (read: 
worthy) will ultimately prevail—centered around the removal of the uterus as the site of 
victimization and the adversity over which subjects like Anne and Joyce must triumph. The 
heroic plot of the legal drama redeems the DES daughter of her debilitated body and brings her 
back within the fold of productive womanhood, even without the promise of reproductivity.  
 Yet the privileging of reproductive bodies is unstable in this auto/biographical narrative. 
Fenichell and Charfoos describe Anne’s fear that she “won’t be a woman anymore” after her 
hysterectomy, that “any man she married might eventually draw away because she couldn’t have 
a child” (80; 102). During the trial, witnesses testify to the trauma Anne must experience because 
she is unable to bear children. But Anne Needham is represented primarily through the words of 
others. Excerpts of Anne’s own testimony during her deposition and the trial do not mention a 
desire for children. Instead, she witnesses to the physical pain of her skin graft, the difficulty of 
wearing the mold that shapes her new vagina, the embarrassment of incontinence, and the 
“emotional drain” of knowing she has had cancer (267–270). This is not to say that the historical 
person Anne Needham did not experience the loss of her reproductive capacity through the 
removal of her uterus as traumatic.17 Only that her own narration of the story—still mediated by 
Fenichell and Charfoos—does not corroborate the heroic plot centered on the lost womb offered 
by the larger narrative of Daughters at Risk.  
 Given this slight gap, we should turn our attention to the circumstances of 
auto/biographical representation. If Charfoos and the rest of Anne’s legal team attempted to 
shape her into a “viable plaintiff,” in what ways have Fenichell and Charfoos shaped the 
character Anne Needham into a viable autobiographical subject? This question becomes all the 
more urgent when we compare the role of gender within the DES movement as represented in 
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the two early DES narratives I have considered here. In particular, we can see the way the 
neoliberal mandate of flexibility functions as a double-edged sword for woman-identified 
subjects. Emily Martin warns of “one of the bleakest potential consequences of these new 
models of the ideal flexible body—that, yet again, certain categories of people (women, people 
of color) will be found wanting” (xvii). The ideal of flexibility helps to explain why Daughters 
at Risk seems to have carefully excised the feminist politics undergirding the DES movement in 
order to better position Anne Needham and other plaintiffs as deserving subjects of redress under 
the law.18 Joyce Bichler, leveling charges of misogyny against doctors and lawyers, threatens to 
“perform—or act out—inflexibility” because she does not “adapt and perform as if the crisis had 
never happened” (McRuer 17). If Joyce’s outspoken feminism risks rendering her inflexible, it is 
precisely Anne Needham’s relative silence that makes her a flexible subject of Fenichell and 
Charfoos’s narrative.   
 As these issues surrounding auto/biographical representation suggest, gender and 
testimony are central concerns of the DES embodied health movement. Together, DES Daughter 
and Daughters at Risk raise potent questions about the relationship between two concepts in 
feminist philosophies of testimony: testimonial justice and autobiographical jurisdictions. In 
challenging medicine-as-usual, the DES movement responds to testimonial injustice. Marking a 
transition from an era in which medical expertise was often considered virtually infallible and in 
which the vast majority of medical practitioners were men, DES daughters resisted what they felt 
was the dismissal of their embodied knowledges by both researches and practitioners. Efforts by 
DES advocacy organizations to initiate and conduct their own research were intended to 
ameliorate what they identified as “a gap between their intimate, firsthand knowledge of their 
bodies” and the knowledge validated by the medical establishment (Bell 23).  
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 Joyce Bichler’s experiences seeking medical attention for the condition that would 
eventually be diagnosed as clear cell cancer illustrate how the gender and relative youth of DES 
daughters undermined their credibility with some medical experts. One doctor assumes she is 
there to be fitted for a diaphragm and gives her a lecture about birth control, despite her 
protestations. Another is convinced that Joyce’s bleeding has been caused by a botched abortion 
and “it was several minutes before [she] finally convinced Dr. Collier that [she] had not had any 
abortion” (27). Another doctor, who identifies Joyce’s symptoms as those of cancer, “asked [her] 
a lot of personal questions about [her] personal life that made them sound like accusations” (33). 
In each of these encounters, Joyce’s own bodily experiences are disregarded in favor of the 
doctors’ own assumptions about young women’s sexuality. Joyce is thus subject to repeated 
testimonial injustices that undermine her “capacity as a giver of knowledge, as an informant,” a 
capacity that is “essential to human value” (Fricker 5). DES activists’ initiatives to produce new 
knowledge through collaboration between exposed people and medical researchers have worked 
to restore these women’s capacity to inform and thus reaffirm the human value of both women 
and ill persons as social classes.  
 The ethics of truth-telling and truth-hearing are at stake as well in what Leigh Gilmore 
calls “alternate jurisdictions” for self-representation. If the legal term “jurisdiction” describes the 
“authority and the power to judge; administration, rule and control; and, at its most local level, 
the contexts in which this happens,” Gilmore argues that life narrative functions as an extra-
juridical venue in which truth and consequences are assessed and knowledge about truth-telling 
is produced (Limits 43). The law is a space where certain subjects under certain circumstances—
including people of color, undocumented people, women and transgender people testifying to 
sexual trauma—are particularly vulnerable to testimonial injustice. For these subjects, life 
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writing may provide a safe(r) context for telling a story of a life. But Gilmore’s use of the legal 
term jurisdictions also signals how, as Kelly Oliver explains, in an oppressive culture, “testimony 
of personal experience is put on trial in a way that renders all testimony juridical as well as 
personal” (99). That is, even while life narrative exists outside the law, it is still subject to 
discourses of doubt and veracity, accusation and adjudication. “Because testimonial projects 
require subjects to confess, to bear witness, to make public and shareable a private and 
intolerable pain,” argues Gilmore, “they enter into a legalistic frame in which their efforts can 
move quickly beyond their interpretation and control, become exposed as ambiguous, and 
therefore subject to judgments about their veracity and worth” (Limits 7). The concept of 
autobiography as an alternate jurisdiction suggests how the law functions as a metaphor in 
debates about self-representation.  
 Conceptions of testimonial justice and jurisdictions of truth-telling converge in literatures 
of litigation such as DES Daughter and Daughters at Risk, in which a legal case provides the 
occasion for autobiographical testimony in the form of life writing. Here, the legal imperative to 
“tell the whole truth and nothing but the truth” confronts the autobiographical narrator’s need to 
“address readers whom they want to persuade of their version of experience” (Smith and 
Watson, Reading 7). Although both Bichler and Fenichell and Charfoos offer stories in which 
DES daughters’ testimony sways juries in their favor, Joyce and Anne remain acutely aware of 
the challenges to their credibility as women that emerge throughout the course of their legal 
cases. For example, when Anne is deposed by White Laboratories’ counsel, the coterie of male 
lawyers probes her about her sex life: “the tone began to change into something harsher, like a 
sneer, and he kept asking about men and sex, and Anne got the strong impression that this man 
was trying to make her out to look like a streetwalker or something, as someone kind of loose” 
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(145). Anne recognizes this as “a technique of humiliation” (ibid.), one that depends on strong 
norms of women’s sexual purity. Joyce finds herself impugned not for her apparently out-of-
bounds sexuality but for her emotions. During the trial, the defense counsel implies that Joyce is 
“an embittered and hysterical woman” who “should not be taken seriously. It was a common 
ploy; men who fight for their rights are considered assertive and forceful, whereas women are 
seen as emotional and aggressive” (165). Even if Joyce and Anne are ultimately judged reliable 
witnesses in courts of law, they are still subject to testimonial injustices within the justice 
system. 
 As an alternate jurisdiction, DES daughters’ life narratives have the potential to serve as a 
corrective to the sexist bias apparent in their legal cases. In Bichler’s narrative, the narrating 
subject Joyce controls which elements of the narrative we as readers have access to and, 
importantly, in what order. The division of the book into two parts—the first discussing Joyce’s 
medical treatment and recovery, the second her legal trial—bifurcates the experience of 
witnessing for both the character and the reader such that the autobiographical account in Part I 
appears to verify the legal testimony recounted in Part II. We believe the testimony the narrated 
subject Joyce gives during the trial because the narrating subject Joyce has already borne witness 
for us in the first half of the book. Fenichell and Charfoos use a similar strategy, with the history 
of DES that is embedded in Anne’s narrative serving to further support the legal case against 
drug manufacturers like White Laboratories.  
 It is important to remember that even as they recount legal cases—or even reproduce 
legal testimony directly—these testimonial projects function outside the framework of the law. 
Gilmore argues that life writing can serve as “an alternative jurisdiction for self-representation in 
which writers relocate the grounds of judgment, install there a knowing subject rather than a 
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sovereign or representative self, and produce an alternative jurisprudence about trauma, identity, 
and the forms both may take” (Limits 143). In these early DES daughter narratives, the 
autobiographical is a space where a knowing subject can manipulate the grounds of judgment to 
bolster her claim to veracity. Life writing and the law work in tension and in tandem to further 
the DES embodied health movement’s aims of increasing awareness and challenging the 
scientific status quo. If the drama of the courtroom offers a form of redress congruent with 
neoliberal forms of subjecthood, life writing as an alternative jurisdiction for testimony may have 
the potential to challenge or reconfigure neoliberalism’s self-as-project paradigm, which 
minimizes the continued role of prejudice and structural inequality in shaping life stories. 
However, all testimony is juridical, and life writing comes with its own codes of conduct and 
litmus tests of authenticity.  
 
Twenty Years Later: DES Stories 
 By the close of the twentieth century—nearly thirty years after the first Surgeon 
General’s warning against the use of DES during pregnancy and twenty years after the FDA 
banned the use of the hormone for all livestock intended for human consumption—the DES 
movement had consolidated and had shifted focus from the narrative of personal triumph through 
legal action represented in early the DES life writing I have considered here. If gruesome stories 
of cancer in teenage girls and corporate greed captured media attention and public interest in the 
1970s and 1980s, by the early 1990s the first generation of DES daughters had reached middle 
age. With erroneous assertions from some medical professionals that any DES-related health 
impacts would have manifested by the time exposed individuals reached age 30, the sense of 
crisis was flagging. However, groups representing people exposed to diethylstilbestrol, including 
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DES Action and the DES Cancer Network, recognized the ongoing need for DES awareness and 
further research. Even into the 1990s, half of those exposed to the drug were believed to remain 
unaware of their exposure and its risks (Braun 94). Many questions also remained about the 
long-term effects of DES. Were DES cancer daughters at risk of recurrence later in life? What 
were the long-term health risks for those exposed to aggressive cancer treatments in their teens 
and twenties? Would a third generation—now being called DES grandchildren—face health 
consequences? Could the effects of DES be magnified by exposure to other estrogen therapies or 
endocrine-disrupting chemicals in the environment? 
 As DES organizations lobbied Congress for federal funding for further research into these 
and other questions, as well as continued educational efforts, women who were active in the 
movement began to circulate narratives that reflected and furthered these changing goals. 
Playwrights Darci Picoult and Alice Cohen wrote DES plays My Virginia (1991) and 
Philomela’s Tapestry (1993), both of which were performed at DES organizing meetings. Judith 
Helfand, a DES daughter who was active in letter-writing campaigns and DES workshops, 
produced a documentary about her and her family’s DES experience. The autobiographical film, 
called A Healthy Baby Girl, aired on PBS in 1997. While her cancer diagnosis and its treatment 
spanned months, Helfand’s documentary tracks the ways DES shapes her familial and romantic 
relationships for more than five years. Likewise, the collected testimonies of men and women 
affected by DES that appear in Margaret Lee Braun’s DES Stories: Faces and Voices of People 
Exposed to Diethylstilbestrol (2001) portray an ongoing, intergenerational crisis that remains 
unresolved and unresolvable through legal and regulatory structures that seemed to hold so much 
promise for the narrators of DES Daughter and Daughters at Risk. Through collective appeal for 
further research into the long-term effects of DES, they move away from an individualistic 
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narrative and gesture toward a broader community of people exposed to toxins and seeking 
environmental justice. 
 DES Stories is a collection of photographic and textual portraits of DES-exposed people 
and their families. The collection depicts 51 DES-exposed people and 24 non-exposed people in 
40 portraits. Each portrait consists of a photographic representation produced by Nancy Stuart, 
autobiographical testimony produced by the subject, and a third-person editorial narrative written 
by editor and DES daughter Margaret Lee Braun, who co-founded the DES Cancer Network. 
The book also includes basic information about DES and its health risks, a DES timeline, and a 
list of resources. The testimonies are preceded by a foreword written by estrogen researcher 
Theo Colburn, who pioneered the endocrine disruptor hypothesis;19 an artist’s statement by 
photographer Nancy Stuart; and two statements by Braun. The publisher has issued a disclaimer, 
which appears next to the copyright information and includes this statement: “The stories in the 
book are reported anecdotally, by persons exposed to DES and their families, and may not 
accurately reflect all known information about DES.” Braun also cautions that the collection 
does not purport “to be a statistical cross-section of the DES population” (xx). 
 Still, DES Stories offers a selection of narratives meant to portray the diversity of the 
“faces and voices” of DES, to “represent a range of DES consequences, and a range of feelings 
about being DES-exposed” (Braun xx). The process of editorial curation creates an image of the 
representative subject affected by DES. DES is depicted as primarily a women’s issue: 34 DES 
daughters and 5 DES sons are pictured. All pictured DES-exposed children, their parents, and 
their spouses appear to be white; four of the five adopted children pictured appear to be or are 
identified as East Asian or black. Most of the editorial comments list the profession of one or 
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more of the portrait subjects, and nearly all of those identified hold or once held white-collar 
jobs, including jobs in business, banking, education, and health care.  
 This seems to be a fairly accurate representation of what is known and suspected about 
DES exposure in the United States. It is estimated that more than 90% of DES mothers and 
daughters are white, and at least 70% of DES daughters have completed some college (Bell 186 
n9). But these statistics are only estimates, and they likely reflect not only who had access to the 
kind of prenatal care that DES represented in the 1940s-1960s but also DES daughters’ access to 
preventive and specialist medicine in the 1970s, 80s, and 90s that might have alerted them to 
their exposure and its attendant risks.   
 Moreover, these demographic estimates reflect and inflect the kinds of stories that can be 
and would be told about who is affected by diethylstilbestrol. When Judith explains in A Healthy 
Baby Girl that her mother “was the typical DES mother: white, middle class,” she both draws on 
and shapes the discourse around diethylstilbestrol. In a testimony collection, the process of 
collecting stories produces what Kay Schaffer and Sidonie Smith call an “‘ur’ narrative of 
victimization” (45). The voices chosen to represent a human or civil rights issue in an edited 
volume come to be seen as representative; their stories can easily become the story. The 
proliferation of women’s “faces and voices” represented in the anthology reflects the 
politicization of DES as a women’s health issue in the 1970s and early 1980s during the “second 
wave” of feminism in the United States. Certainly, DES-exposed daughters are known to be at 
risk for serious health problems and changes to their reproductive organs that may cause 
infertility or high-risk pregnancies for women who do conceive. But DES sons, too, have 
reported high incidences of testicular cancer and infertility. However, the risks to males exposed 
in utero have not been as thoroughly studied. Because less is known about DES sons, men have 
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been less likely to be aware of their exposure and to develop a politicized collective illness 
identity around it. Braun’s collection is typical of the toxic discourse of diethylstilbestrol, 
reflecting both scientific fact and cultural ideas about who is affected by the drug.  
 In DES Stories, the ur narrative produced through “the accumulation of voices telling 
stories that conform to a similar structure” is of the trauma associated with the loss, or threatened 
loss, of reproductive capacity (Schaffer and Smith 45). Gaylene Fraser explains her “strong 
feelings of being incapacitated and infertile” when she realized she was DES-exposed, because 
“getting pregnant and being a mother was [her] life’s dream” (in Braun 18). Pam Crist says that 
when women at work have baby showers, “I send a gift and don’t go” (16). Andy Zatyko speaks 
of joy and astonishment when his DES-exposed wife becomes pregnant, because she had told 
him that they would probably never “have a natural child” (68). In the 39 editorial narratives 
about DES daughters and sons, fourteen subjects are described as having biological children, 
eight as having adopted children, ten as infertile, and two as having no children. The desire for 
children is always presented within the context of heterosexual marriage. Nineteen editorial 
narratives describe their subjects as married, and four portraits show DES daughters with their 
husbands. No non-marital or homosexual partnerships are mentioned. 
 One of the themes of the book is breaking silences around DES (Braun xiv, xvii), and 
many of the autobiographical and editorial narratives address communication between DES 
mothers and their children about their exposure and its impacts. DES is portrayed as a relational 
issue, one that both creates and disrupts bonds between (heterosexual, nuclear) family members. 
This is reflected in Nancy Stuart’s portraits, nearly two-thirds of which feature families—mostly 
mothers with children—rather than individuals (Fig. 1-3). Following Marianne Hirsch, who 
argues that “photography’s social functions are integrally tied to the ideology of the modern 
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family” (7), we might say that photographic collections like Braun’s can be read as a family 
album of the poisoned subject. Albums tell stories of relationality, binding within their pages 
lives that may be separated by space, time, and ideology. This means, too, that the family album 
“has the effect of naturalizing cultural practices and of disguising their stereotyped and coded 
characteristics…[I]t perpetuates familial myths while seeming merely to record actual moments 
in family history” (Hirsch 7). So, while Stuart’s relationship-centric family portraits may well be 
an accurate reflection of the subjects’ DES experiences and are undoubtedly central to the 
political work of DES Stories, they also perpetuate the myth of familiality itself. Positioning DES 
daughters in their portraits among mothers, fathers, brothers, and children defines women 
relationally within the context of the family and reinforces the family as a heteronormative 
space.  
 The testimony collection-as-family album describes the ties that bind life stories together 
into a coherent narrative of illness, trauma, and reparation. This effect is heightened in DES 
Stories as Braun herself identifies as what Arthur Frank suggests we call a witness to DES-
related illness. Braun’s own DES stories, presented in the Forward and Preface, establish the 
common themes that resonate throughout the testimonies collected in her volume. Foremost 
among these is the story of DES exposure as threatening or causing infertility and thus 
fundamentally incapacitating exposed women and men. This narrative appears in a substantial 
number of witnesses’ testimonies and structures the editorial commentaries that accompany 
nearly every portrait.20 But the narrative is first introduced in Braun’s own testimony, in which 
she likens DES to a war. “Like a 19-year-old pulled off the battlefield,” she writes, “I woke up in 
a hospital bed forever changed. But, instead of losing my limbs, I had lost my organs, my 
functioning, my health” (xiii). The casualties of the “DES wars” include “the efforts it takes 
  70 
Figure 1. DES daughter Gaylene Fraser with husband, Rob, and daughter, Alexandra          
Photo Credit: Nancy M. Stuart, from DES Stories: Faces and Voices of People Exposed to 
Diethylstilbestrol, by Margaret Lee Braun 
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Figure 2. DES daughter Judith Helfand, with mother, Florence Helfand 
Photo Credit: Nancy M. Stuart, from DES Stories: Faces and Voices of People Exposed to 
Diethylstilbestrol, by Margaret Lee Braun 
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Figure 3. DES son Bill Kenny with mother, Mary Kenny, and sister Kathleen Sanderson      
Photo Credit: Nancy M. Stuart, from DES Stories: Faces and Voices of People Exposed to 
Diethylstilbestrol, by Margaret Lee Braun 
 
some DES daughters to have a healthy baby…the deep, daily worry over reproduction, a process 
that in the ordinary scheme of things is part of the ebb and flow of life…the children and 
grandchildren who will never be” (xiv; xix). These inaugural narratives set the tone for 
audiences’ engagement with the testimonies that follow. Thus, when researcher Theo Colburn 
reminds us to “never forget that DES has undermined the quality of life and potential of all of the 
  73 
people in this book” (x), it is easy to read childlessness or infertility as a traumatic loss or a 
debilitating impairment, which it may not be for many people, including those whose portraits 
and testimonies are featured in the book. 
 Here we see emerge one of the problems that Schaeffer and Smith identify as arising 
when editors collect testimony into anthologies like DES Stories. First, in offering only a very 
limited glimpse of subjects’ lives, they tend to “‘fix’ the life and identity of the tellers in their 
victimhood,” so that the story of trauma becomes the overriding story of the life (45). A 
witness’s DES story comes to be seen as her only story. Moreover, these collections “encourage 
empathetic identification…at the potential cost of reducing differences to sameness” (ibid. 47). 
Reading photographic anthologies as a kind of family album suggests the ways these projects 
link disparate subjects through the bond of the illness experience. If the family photo album 
records shared experiences and memories, the portraits in a testimony collection imply a 
commonality that glosses over the ways race, gender, class, and ability shape individual 
experiences with DES exposure. By fostering audiences’ identification with witnesses, the 
collection’s album-like quality also helps readers ignore the role social factors played in 
determining who would be affected by DES in the first place. The human rights injunction 
“never again” forges a path into the future that bears a specific and often limited critical 
relationship with the past. In reminding readers that the tragedy of diethylstilbestrol must not be 
repeated (Colborn x), DES Stories forecloses important questions about environmental and 
reproductive justice, such as why working class women and women of color had limited access 
to what was once considered by many to be crucial prenatal care. Emphasizing sameness through 
repeated story structures collapses the hierarchies that helped to produce the DES crisis as a 
racialized, classed, and gendered phenomenon.  
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 Another function of testimonial anthologies is to shape the agenda and ideology of a 
movement by presenting a chorus of voices calling for action or offering a new interpretation of 
the issue. In DES Stories, two clear political goals emerge for the DES embodied health 
movement as it entered the twentieth century: to advocate for further research into the long-term 
effects of DES exposure and to reinvigorate the DES narrative by linking it firmly to other forms 
of environmental toxic exposure. As indicated in the caption to each portrait, most of those 
represented in the anthology were exposed to diethylstilbestrol between 1950 and the mid-1960s, 
putting them in their 30s and 40s by the time of the book’s publication—well past what has often 
been considered the high-risk period for clear cell cancer for DES daughters in their late teens 
and early 20s. But the men and women whose faces and voices are represented in DES Stories 
describe a host of other health-related concerns and questions, often emphasizing that they just 
don’t know to what extent DES has affected their health. Witnesses suggest that their exposure 
may have contributed to multiple sclerosis, lupus, duplicated ureter, squamous cell cervical 
cancer, third-generation birth defects, breast cancer, difficulty urinating, low sperm count and 
motility, elevated risk of testicular cancer, and gender dysphoria. DES may not be a factor in 
these health issues, many acknowledge, but “it seems worth looking into” (Rachel Breitbart in 
Braun 88). “I would be happy to know more,” says David Mock (12). DES son David Halvorsen 
laments that “there’s not much going on with DES sons” (76). Sue Froh would “like to see 
statistics on how many DES daughters have children with birth-related defects. More 
reproductive problems than we realize may be linked to chemical exposures” (66). Braun 
addresses many of these same issues in the “DES research agenda” outlined in the Appendix. 
“Basic, clinical, epidemiologic, and psychosocial research are critical to identify potential health 
risks, and for learning all we can about lifelong risks from exposure,” she writes (99). Her 
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research recommendations include studying DES sons, monitoring DES grandchildren, 
following DES daughters for long-term clear cell cancer risk, and studying the effect of hormone 
treatments on DES-exposed women (ibid.). 
 DES Stories advocates for this research agenda in part by positioning DES within late 
twentieth-century concerns about environmental toxins and casting DES-exposed people as 
“canaries in the coal mine,” harbingers of toxic threats (xxi).21 This narrative appears both in the 
editorial material and a number of witness testimonies. It begins on the first page of text, with 
Braun’s claim that “DES has become a significant model for how environmental estrogens may 
disrupt the reproductive systems of wildlife and humans” (viii). The Foreword by World Wildlife 
Fund scientist Theo Colborn lends both scientific credibility and the clout of a widely known 
environmental protection organization to this claim. Colburn puts DES in relation to the 
endocrine disruptor hypothesis that she helped pioneer:  
Today, a much larger global experiment is taking place with not one, but a number of 
 synthetic chemicals that offspring and mothers are sharing through their blood before 
 birth and the mothers’ milk during breast feeding. To date, several hundred or more 
 widely used contemporary industrial and agricultural chemicals have been shown to 
 interfere with the natural chemical messengers that control development and function—as 
 witnessed in wildlife, and proven in the laboratory. Just like DES, these chemicals in the 
 environment interfere in a host of ways to disrupt the signals in the womb that tell the 
 unborn how to develop according to the genes inherited from his or her mother and 
 father…The story of DES provides a glimpse of what should be considered before we 
 allow new chemicals to come on the market. (ix–x) 
 
 In keeping with the strategies of embodied health movements, DES-exposed people are also 
positioned as lay experts, adding an aspect of populism to Colborn’s warning that their stories 
foretell our chemical future. DES daughter Marjon Floris hopes “to let people know that a 
chemical has done harm to people all over the world. Chemicals are advertised as if we can’t live 
without them. Pesticides, solvents, food additives, contaminants. What are we doing?” (in Braun 
22). Likewise, DES daughter Susan Wood, whose sister died of DES-related cancer, argues that 
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“DES is not an isolated incident. Hormone exposure is a big question mark—whether you get it 
through DES, estrogen replacement therapy, spilling in the wetlands, or endocrine-disrupting 
chemicals in industrial products. On a larger scale, DES is what’s happening in our environment” 
(60). “It’s like Agent Orange,” says DES mother Lillian Epstein (86).  
 If the early DES life narratives I discuss in the first part of this chapter employed a 
relatively straightforward version of the David versus Goliath topos, DES Stories broadens and 
complicates the staging of this moral drama. Certainly, many witness testimonies comment on 
the culpability of doctors and drug manufacturers, but as DES son David Mock explains, “It’s 
much more complicated than ‘those are the villains’” (12). Instead, DES is recast as part of the 
ongoing tensions between the drive for technological progress and the precautionary principle of 
risk assessment,22 between a desire for economic growth and for conservation, that characterize 
contemporary debates about environmentalism.  
 This move to situate DES within a growing conversation about environmental toxins 
suggests the prominence to which this toxic discourse had risen by the end of the twentieth 
century. Beyond individual battles against drug companies, beyond even “a national women’s 
health issue” (Fenichell and Charfoos 164), the rhetoric of toxicity forges ties between DES and 
a host of potent political issues emerging in turn-of-the-millennium risk society. It suggests that 
DES life narratives should be read in conversation with the other stories of environmental 
degradation and toxic exposure that have proliferated over the past thirty years. In considering 
DES narratives alongside literature from other embodied health movements, this dissertation 
continues the work of putting the diethylstilbestrol crisis and its dominant narratives into a 
broader context of toxic, environmental, and subject-making discourses.  
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Traumas of “the DES Wars”  
 Theorists of life writing have suggested that crisis is often the impetus of the 
autobiographical act (eg. Starobinski; Kerby; Egan; Fuchs). Life narratives of illness in particular 
are structured by crisis and frequently tell stories of trauma. For Anne Hunsaker Hawkins, “the 
self of pathological writing is the self-in-crisis” (17). In the 1990s, G. Thomas Couser coined the 
term “autopathography” to describe illness narratives, which he sees as a way for subjects to 
“talk back” to the medical establishment, “writing about their own bodies, rather than leaving the 
job to medical professionals” and their genres of the clinical chart or the case study (Memoir 44; 
see also Recovering Bodies).23 The recent rise in such narratives “should be understood in the 
context of the civil rights movements of the last quarter century,” including feminist, anti-racist, 
and disability rights movements (Couser, Signifying Bodies 4). This conception of the illness 
narrative as a form of experiential knowledge in service of collective identity politics aligns with 
the goals of embodied health movements. Telling stories of illness can not only describe but 
perform the challenges to existing medical or scientific practices that characterize EHMs by 
relocating the source of knowledge about illness from the observing researcher/physician to the 
subject who experiences illness.  
 Representations of illness as trauma shape the narratives of embodied health movements 
and the politics of collective illness identities considered in this dissertation. DES life narratives 
describe classic physiological and psychological symptoms of trauma. In DES Daughter, Joyce 
and her family members experience post-traumatic symptoms as a result of their experience with 
DES. Joyce testifies—both in court and in her narrative—about nightmares, the constant fear that 
her illness has returned, the fear that she is inadequate for her husband, her feelings of 
abnormalcy or “freakish”-ness.24 In this way, Joyce testifies to a state of traumatic embodiment, 
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of living in a body whose sexual and reproductive functioning requires her to face the effects of 
her cancer “every night of my life” (149). Joyce also sees that her parents have become 
“exhausted and worn” after what they had “suffered” throughout their daughter’s illness (146-
147). On the stand, Mrs. Bichler describes a “tremendous sense of guilt” for her role in her 
daughter’s illness (147). Anne Needham’s mother, too, testifies to the responsibility she feels for 
having taken DES and its disruption of her family’s dynamics.  
 In these narratives, the effects of DES exposure resonate far beyond the immediate crisis 
of cancer or the high-risk pregnancies many of the witnesses in DES Stories describe. Witnesses 
characterize DES exposure as an experience that reverberates through time, illustrating Cathy 
Caruth’s claim that trauma constitutes “a narrative of belated experience” and “its endless impact 
on a life” (7). They testify to the continued effects of diethylstilbestrol on their relationships, 
from their sexual and reproductive lives, to problems of communication between DES mothers 
and their children, to fears of potential health impacts in DES grandchildren.  
 Anne’s struggles to sustain her place within a nuclear family in Daughters at Risk are 
exemplary here. Anne ends two romantic relationships throughout the course of the narrative. 
While Anne’s boyfriend John remained her partner through her surgery, they eventually split 
amicably, in part because Anne was “feeling insecure about her own identity as a woman…She 
knew that being unable to have children made her uncomfortable about settling down” (139). 
She eventually moves in with another man who is not interested in her medical history, but the 
strain of the trial—from which he prefers to remain separate—ends their relationship. Her 
mother is wracked with guilt over having taken the drug that led to Anne’s cancer, and Anne 
finds that she harbors a certain amount of resentment toward her. Mary Needham also testifies in 
court that the cancer has disrupted the broader family dynamics. Anne, she says, is saddened by 
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the birth of her nieces and nephews because “she would have been the mother” figure to them, as 
she has mothered all of her siblings (272). Anne’s hysterectomy also complicates her relationship 
with her father, who is almost entirely absent from the narrative. Anne is haunted by a story she 
has heard that when Mary had a hysterectomy years before, Mr. Needham told his wife that she 
“[wouldn’t] be a woman anymore” (80). According to both her mother and her father, Anne’s 
inability to have children means that she has failed to fulfill her role within the family. Through 
its effects on the physical bodies of exposed women, DES disrupts the familial body— not 
simply through “the removal of the children, the removal of the grandchildren” (Fenichell and 
Charfoos 277), but in the Needhams’ unmet expectations of their daughter’s function in 
reproducing the nuclear family. 
 For Anne, the suit against White Laboratories for manufacturing and distributing the DES 
her mother took holds out the possibility that she herself will be exonerated of these perceived 
failures. Although she is anxious about testifying, she feels relived that “in this court would be 
the proof that it was in the pill that the source of the trouble could be located—not in her” (184). 
Telling her story may be frightening, but it also promises to relieve some of trauma’s lingering 
pressures on Anne’s sense of self. Belief in testimony’s healing promise is common among DES 
narratives and reflects broader cultural ideas about the value of telling stories of trauma in 
general and of illness in particular. Nancy Stuart suggests the productive potential of witnessing 
through photographic portraiture, indicating that posing for the camera serves as a form of 
therapeutic testimony. “By looking into the camera,” she writes in her artist’s statement for DES 
Stories, “each participant in this project breaks through the anonymous wall around DES. They 
become healers and storytellers themselves” (xi). Stuart’s understanding of autobiographical 
presentation as a form of what Suzette Henke calls scriptotherapy—a therapeutic act of “writing 
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out and writing through traumatic experience”(xii)—is supported by many theorists of trauma, 
including Dori Laub. Laub argues that “repossessing one’s life story through giving testimony is 
itself a form of action, of change, which one has to actually pass through, in order to continue 
and complete the process of survival after liberation” (“Truth and Testimony” 70). This process 
of repossession is crucial, argues Susan Bell, when “lives are interrupted by illness” (9). 
Narrative may help to heal wounds or ruptures caused by the material and social experiences of 
illness, to suture the life back together. 25  
 Narrative may offer the possibility of healing to both those who tell stories and those who 
hear them—and hear themselves in them. Margaret Lee Braun explains that she began the 
project for DES Stories because she “wanted to find [her] own story in others’ experience” (xix). 
Through narrative, trauma’s gaps and inconsistencies can be integrated and understood. Jason 
Tougaw explains that trauma “need[s] testimony to frame it, to put it inside ‘the range of 
associatively linked experiences,’ inside ‘the range of comprehension, of recounting and of 
mastery’” (qting Laub and Felman 170, emphasis in original). Anne Needham experiences this 
herself, when reading a magazine article about another DES daughter helps her recognize her 
own deep-seated anger toward her mother for having taken the drug that caused her illness. “It 
was only then that what had happened to her really started to hit,” recounts the narrator. “Up 
until that point, the feelings she had been suppressing were safely buried” (Fenichell and 
Charfoos 122-123). It is only through her encounter with another’s story that Anne is able to 
name and confront her own emotions connected to her cancer. Only once she has been given a 
name for her feelings and for herself (this is the first time Anne encounters the term “DES 
daughter”) does Anne find an outlet for her anger in suing the pharmaceutical company. The 
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testimony of the unnamed DES daughter featured in the magazine ultimately compels Anne’s 
legal testimony and the auto/biographical witnessing of Daughters at Risk. 
 
Women’s Bodies, Reproductive Bodies, Able Bodies 
 Anne’s self-recognition in the other spurs her to tell her own story, and the magazine 
article serves as a precedent that shapes the way Anne can conceive of and therefore narrate her 
own DES experience. One of the core arguments of this dissertation is that telling stories of 
illness within the context of the collective illness identities produced through embodied health 
movements produces master or ur narratives of traumatic experience. The flip side of collective 
identities’ political organization is a norming project, one that produces a familiar and repeated 
narrative of victimization that may erase differences among the DES-exposed and their 
experiences. Beyond collapsing difference in favor of homogeneity, as the politicized collective 
illness identities of EHMs coalesce around familiar narratives of harm and redress, they police 
the boundaries of what are considered “normal” forms of embodiment, trauma, and subjecthood 
beyond the DES movement. This can be seen in the ways DES narratives position those exposed 
as both poisoned subjects impaired by the drug and as “typical American girls.” DES daughters 
like Joyce Bichler and Anne Needham must credibly claim to be impaired enough to deserve 
legal (monetary) compensation, but these claims to impairment revolve around auto/biographical 
subjects’ aspirations to normative forms of womanhood that are tied to reproduction. As 
plaintiffs (both legal and autobiographical), they are positioned within the bounds of acceptable 
femininity even as they claim that their femininity has been damaged through exposure to 
diethylstilbestrol.  
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 DES daughters’ simultaneous claims to impairment and normativity center on 
reproductivity. The narratives I consider in this chapter portray the threat or reality of 
hysterectomy or structural abnormalities of the reproductive tract as a traumatic loss of woman- 
and motherhood for DES daughters. This master narrative privileges reproductive bodies within 
heterosexual marriages as the unquestioned norm; the trauma of DES becomes the trauma of this 
violated heteronorm. Susan Bell explains how biological reproduction may function as a 
barometer for measuring “true” womanhood, a litmus test that subjects DES daughters—who 
“are more likely than women not exposed to DES to suffer infertility and pregnancy loss”—to 
particular scrutiny (72). 
The expectations and bodily experiences of DES daughters frequently do not conform to 
the dominant cultural expectation in the United States of a seamless progression that 
begins with a decision to conceive and continues smoothly to pregnancy and the birth of 
a healthy infant (Bell 2004). The dominant narrative connects biological performance—
reproduction—to adult womanhood (G. Becker 2000, 73). A woman becomes a ‘real’ or 
‘complete’ adult only when she has given birth to a child (Layne 2003). The dominant 
cultural narrative assumes that all women want to and will become mothers. (ibid.) 
 
This cultural imperative is given voice in DES narratives, which focus on non-reproductivity as 
one of the greatest injuries of DES exposure, despite data suggesting that 80% of DES daughters 
will complete at least one pregnancy resulting in full-term live birth (Braun 94). In DES 
Daughter, Joyce fears that her partner will not be able to “love a deformed woman,” and she 
identifies disruptions to her sexuality as “the core of what DES had done” to her (73; 148). Anne 
experiences similar concerns that her surgeries have unsettled her identity as a woman and made 
her unfit for long-term romantic relationships. The often-frustrated desire for “natural” (that is, 
biological, non-surrogate) children is arguably the most common theme of the testimonies in 
DES Stories.  
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 One possible explanation for this linkage between trauma and infertility is the existence 
of sexual violence as the paradigm for women’s trauma. Following second-wave consciousness-
raising about rape in the 1960s and 1970s, and during a period when debates about recovered 
memories of childhood sexual abuse were on the rise, traumas arising from sexuality were 
particularly visible and legible in the 1980s. Even as Joyce comes to realize that her “greatest 
fear was not that [she] would wake up without a uterus or a vagina, and not be able to make 
babies, but that the doctors wouldn’t be able to help,” anxieties about reproductivity become a 
recurring expression of these fears after her surgery (64). For Joyce, the inability to reproduce 
signifies a mortality that may come too soon.  
 If the dominant paradigm suggests that reproductivity is the greatest aim and greatest 
tragedy of DES daughters, the scene of reproduction offered in these narratives is itself highly 
circumscribed. In all of the DES narratives I have considered here, reproduction is represented as 
the sole province of heterosexual, nuclear families. In fact, despite claims by some activists and 
researchers that DES exposure may be connected to homosexuality and gender dysphoria,26 and 
despite the use of DES to facilitate pre-operative gender transition, the stories of gay, lesbian, 
and transgender people are not acknowledged as part of the DES legacy as represented in DES 
Daughter, Daughters at Risk, DES Stories, and other DES life narratives.  
 When Warren Lehrer, featured in DES Stories, suggests that DES exposure may have 
impacted his gender identity development, he must be reabsorbed into the paradigm of the 
heteronormative family. He testifies, “[F]or a time, around puberty, I remember wishing I was a 
girl. I had a secret doll collection…and I didn’t relate to other guys. I just thought would fit in 
better as a girl, I grew out of it, but I can’t help but wonder” (44). The text accompanying Nancy 
Stuart’s portrait of Warren informs us that he is married and would like to have a child, although 
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he worries about infertility. Both his own testimony and Braun’s editorial commentary can be 
read as distancing the adult man Warren from his claim that as a child he might have preferred to 
be a girl. Instead, like most of the subjects in the anthology, he is identified with heterosexual 
marriage and reproduction.  
 This stubborn reentrenchment of the hetero-nuclear family is to an extent a product of the 
heroic paradigm of toxic discourse’s David versus Goliath moral drama. This plot structure 
primarily represents an individualistic model of struggle that relies for its moral force on a 
protagonist who is both representative and exceptional. Leigh Gilmore explains this paradox: “If 
you are an autobiographer, then you stand in the place of the representative person. Your 
position there enables the kind of identification that characterizes autobiography. If you act, then, 
as the mirror of the self (for me), then in my identification with you I substitute myself for you, 
the other” (Limits 22). On the other hand, a protagonist is expected to demonstrate himself to be 
above average, whether through deeds or in his intrinsic character. However, the obligation to 
exceptionalism carries inherent risks to the competing demand for representativeness. “If I am 
barred from [identification] by your nonrepresentativeness,” Gilmore continues, “I withdraw my 
identification and, quite likely, the sympathy that flows from it” (22).  
 Some disability critics caution that life writing itself—with what David Mitchell sees as a 
“devotion to narcissistic self-revelation” (312)—is a form more suited to representing normate 
subjectivities than disabled ones.27 Autobiography too easily “upholds the myth of ‘rugged 
individualism’” that disguises disability as an individual pathology rather than as a social 
problem (Mintz 7–8). This view suggests that there may be a fundamental discord between the 
us-versus-them moral dynamic characteristic of some forms of life narrative and the collective 
political work of embodied health movements. Even though “the politicized collective work of 
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embodied health movements…turns attention away from individual bodies as sites of risk to the 
risky environments in which the patients live” (Bell 4–5), life narrative may work in the opposite 
direction by attending to the subject’s agency in overcoming obstacles and achieving a comedic 
resolution. The disability studies critique also highlights how non-representativeness prevents 
some subjects from being easily interpolated into the morally-laden narrative of triumph over 
adversity. To return to DES’s heteronormative subject, then, the impairments and traumas 
associated with the identities DES daughter or DES son already render autobiographical 
representativeness uncertain and threaten the identification on which rests both legibility and 
sympathy. As Gilmore explains, “trauma narratives often draw skepticism more readily than 
sympathy because they expose the conflict between identification and representativeness” 
(Limits 22). As poisoned subjects, DES life narrators may suffer a representativeness deficit that 
is counterbalanced by other forms of normative self-representation.  
 If we unpack the series of movements I have been tracking here, it becomes clear that 
DES narratives are not merely trading in norms of femininity but, more important, reflect and 
reproduce interlocking social attitudes about gender, sexuality, and ability. If DES daughters’ 
attempts to seek redress depend on claims to physical impairment, and if impairment is largely or 
primarily identified with reproductive difficulties, then biological reproduction becomes a 
positive sign not only of adult womanhood but of able-bodiedness. Moreover, if reproduction is 
located securely within heteronormative families, anyone who falls outside the “charmed circle” 
of reproductive, heterosexual coupling becomes identified with dis-ability. Queer/disability 
theorist Robert McRuer theorizes and historicizes this relationship between norms of 
heterosexualiy and ability. Following Adrienne Rich, McRuer describes “a system of 
compulsory able-bodiedness, which in a sense produces disability [and] is thoroughly interwoven 
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with the system of compulsory heterosexuality that produces queerness…[C]ompulsory 
heterosexuality is contingent on compulsory able-bodiedness, and vice versa” (2). Insofar as its 
prevailing narrative reinforces the cultural imperative that women become mothers, the DES 
movement is complicit in the interlocking system of compulsory heterosexuality and compulsory 
able-bodiedness that McRuer describes.  
 This is not to criticize individuals who testify to their experiences with DES-related 
injuries, nor to undermine the real gains of the DES movement: financial and political support 
for research; feminist analysis of scientific knowledge production and doctor-patient 
relationships; lawsuits that compensated individuals impacted by DES and held industry 
accountable to the public interest; and increased awareness among medical professionals and lay 
people, leading to early detection of DES-related illnesses. Neither is my intention to fix DES 
witnessing statically in the past. Indeed, DES-exposed people continue to adapt old messages 
and strategies to reflect new scientific research and activate the possibilities afforded by new 
representational technologies.28 Rather, this critique approaches the DES movement with 
ambivalence, as sometimes life-affirming, sometimes exclusionary, and ever evolving. It 
recognizes the pressures of witnessing to trauma, which are intensified when testimony puts 
forward embodied, gendered knowledges. Such testimonial injustice places additional demands 
on witnesses and the social movements that would mobilize their testimony toward structural 
change.  
 In the face of challenges to their authority to determine the meaning of their own illness 
experiences, life narrators strategically navigate gender norms to assert the truth-value of their 
claims to recognition and redress. Positioning themselves as poisoned subjects, they shape the 
meanings not only of DES exposure but also femininity, motherhood, and ability. Thus, DES 
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testimony suggests questions about epistemic justice that are raised by all of the EHMs I discuss 
in this dissertation: How do the poisoned subjects of toxic life narrative mitigate the threat of 
testimonial injustice? How do those strategies impact future claims for epistemic justice? How 
do different forms of life narrative facilitate certain kinds of claim-making?  
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Notes to Chapter 1: 
 
1 Thalidomide was marketed as a sedative that was safe to use for the treatment of morning 
sickness during pregnancy. Instead, the drug turned out to have teratogenic effects, and 
thousands of “thalidomide babies” were born with phocomelia, or maldevelopment of the limbs. 
Only about half of those children are believed to have survived childhood. The first documented 
case of in utero thalidomide exposure was in 1956. The child’s father, who worked for the drug 
manufacturer Chemie Grünenthal, had brought home samples of the drug for his pregnant wife. 
It was not until 1961-1962 that the effects of the drug became widely known and thalidomide 
was subsequently withdrawn from markets in Germany, Brazil, Japan, Italy, and England. 
Thalidomide never received FDA approval—largely due to the efforts of a single woman at the 
Administration, Dr. Frances Oldham Kelsey, whose previous research had demonstrated that 
anti-malarial drugs could cross the placenta—but it was still distributed to more than one 
thousand physicians in the United States to prescribe to their patients for investigational use. On 
the history of thalidomide, as well as Kelsey’s role in blocking FDA approval, see Langston (90–
95) and Stephens and Brynner. An interesting pair of thalidomide life narratives are David 
Mason’s 1976 Thalidomide: My Fight and Louise Medus’s 2009 No Hands to Hold and No Legs 
to Dance On. Mason, an art dealer in London and father of a thalidomide baby, used his Fleet 
Street connections to wage an extended public relations and legal campaign against the British 
thalidomide manufacturer Distillers, ultimately securing tens of millions of pounds in settlement 
money. Mason’s narrative chronicles this fight. His daughter Louise later wrote her own 
narrative, challenging mainstream representations of thalidomiders as piteous. Medus also 
describes the physical and sexual abuse she experienced growing up in a group home for 
disabled children, as well her difficult relationships with partners, family, and caregivers who 
challenged her testimony about the abuse and her competence as a homemaker and mother.  
2 On the history of menopause, see Seaman. On the development of DES and its early application 
as menopause treatment, see Langston and Fenichell and Charfoos. 
3 The Food and Drug Administration was originally named the Food, Drug, and Insecticide 
Administration, a body of the USDA that formed in 1927 out of another USDA program, the 
Bureau of Chemistry. The organization was restructured as the FDA in 1930. 
4 Nancy Langston reviews a significant body of medical literature from the late 1930s suggesting 
a DES-cancer link (Langston 32–39). Barbara Seaman carefully documents Dodds’s warnings 
(36–40). 
5 At least four major challenges to the Smiths’ claims about DES were published in The 
American Journal of Obstetrics and Gynecology between 1950 and 1953: Crowder, Bills, and 
Broadbent (1950); Robinson and Shettles (1952); Ferguson (1953); and Dieckmann et al. (1953) 
(see Fenichell and Charfoos 59–63).  
6 Stories abound in DES testimony of women who unknowingly took the drug as part of what 
they believed to be a regimen of strictly prenatal vitamins, and there seems to have been some 
crossover between these two common prenatal treatments. According to the advocacy 
organization DES Action, some prenatal vitamins were supplemented with DES, such that an 
unknown number of women received the drug without a prescription and without documentation. 
At least one manufacturer, the Grant Chemical Company, advertised its desPLEX DES pills as 
containing vitamins B and C. DES awareness materials, such as a 1980 resource guide produced 
by the National Women’s Health Network, have advised women seeking information about 
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possible DES exposure to ask their mothers “if they took any medications or vitamins during 
pregnancy” (8). 
7 In a 1957 advertisement, the Grant Chemical Company claimed that its desPLEX product had a 
ninety-six percent delivery rate and made for “bigger and stronger babies, too.” Nancy Langston 
offers one of the most detailed scholarly discussions available of the relationship between human 
and livestock applications of DES. See Toxic Bodies, 63-75. 
8 While the gender-neutral term “DES grandchildren” is used to describe the generation twice 
removed from DES exposure, the children of DES mothers are almost always referred to as 
“daughters” or “sons” in DES literature. I follow that convention here because this gendering is 
central to my argument about the politics of DES’s toxic discourse, but I recognize that not all 
people with cervixes, for example, may identify as daughters, and not all people with penises 
and/or testicles identify as sons.  
9 Margaret Lee Braun includes a detailed DES timeline referencing dozens of medical studies 
and media stories about the drug from the 1930s through the early 2000s in DES Stories (91–97).  
10 Bichler v. Eli Lilly Corporation was significant in the development of modern US tort law, 
establishing manufacturers’ responsibility both for adequately testing and advertising the risks of 
their products (Peppin) and for cross-generational consequences of dangerous products 
(Feinman). 
11 Plaintiff derives from the Old French plainte, meaning “lamentation.” This is based on the 
Latin planctus, meaning “beating of the breast.” Thus, to complain in the legal sense actually 
suggests a physical expression of grief. This connotation dates back to at least the 1100s in 
French jurisprudence. As I argue later in this chapter, DES daughters claim a poisoned 
subjecthood by testifying, through the body, to the trauma of living as a woman without a womb 
and without a ‘natural’ vagina.  
12 Personal narratives of illness and disability tend to follow strict, premodernist narrative 
conventions. Illness narratives, by and large, offer a linear narrative with a clear resolution. Most 
often this resolution is comic; that is, the protagonist ends the narrative in a better position 
(physically, socially, and/or economically) than she found herself at the beginning of the story 
(Hawkins 106; Couser, Recovering Bodies 14, 293). 
13 Joyce in fact describes herself at the time of her diagnosis as “simply a little girl just turned 
eighteen” (27). 
14 I have yet to discover significant epitextual material that sheds light on the conditions of 
Daughters at Risk’s narrative production.  
15 I have attempted, to no avail, to locate a probable source for the early DES daughter life 
narrative mentioned in Daughters at Risk. The publication is referred to only as “a women’s 
magazine” (122). If indeed this episode occurred as depicted, the article was likely published in 
the fall of 1974 or 1975.  
16 Scholars like Julie Guthman and Becky Mansfield have shown how injunctions to personal 
development and responsibility reflect gendered and racialized expectations about consumption 
and self-care. I explore the personal development claims associated with neoliberalization in 
greater detail in chapter 3.  
17 The “I” of life writing (or, in the case of Daughters at Risk, the third-person auto/biographical 
subject) may encompass the historical subject; the narrating subject, who tells the story of the 
life; the narrated subject, or the protagonist of the life story; and the ideological subject, which 
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“is the concept of personhood culturally available to the narrator when he tells his story” (Smith 
and Watson, Reading 71–76).  
18 One theory I have regarding the magazine article that is credited with introducing Anne to the 
term “DES daughter” is that the “women’s magazine” in question is a feminist publication, such 
as Ms., which might cast doubt on the narrative’s claim that Anne “had never been a feminist.” 
19 Endocrine disruptors are environmental chemicals that mimic the body’s endogenous 
hormones. When exposed to these chemicals, the body responds in similar but not identical ways 
as to its own hormone production. The result can be disruptions to fetal development, sexual 
maturation, reproductive function, fat deposition, energy metabolism, and, potentially, cell 
growth. Some research suggests that endocrine-disrupting chemicals may play a role in breast 
and other cancers. See Steingraber; Seaman; Langston. I will return to the politics of endocrine 
disruption in chapter 4. 
20 Witnesses who testify to DES exposure as a threat to gender identity include Susan Simpson 
(8), Judy Weisman (10), Pam Crist (16), Gaylene Fraser (19), Bill Kenny (30), Richie Hare (36), 
Warren Lehrer (44), Andy Zatyko (68), and Gail Hyman (78).  
21 The canary in the coal mine is a prevalent image in contemporary toxic discourse and is 
especially significant in the MCS movement. See chapter 2, note 15. 
22 Risk assessment, or risk analysis, often boils down to establishing “acceptable” levels of risk. 
The precautionary principle states that when an action may cause harm to human or 
environmental health, precautions should be taken, even if the risk has not been fully established 
through scientific methods. More broadly, precaution dictates that those who wish to use and 
stand to benefit from new technologies or practices should bear the burden of proof. It asks for 
demonstrations of safety before widespread application of new technologies, rather than proven 
risk after the fact. In the case of DES, as with many environmental hazards, some researchers 
and medical professionals immediately cautioned against the widespread use of the drug, citing 
cancer risk and questioning claims that the drug prevented miscarriage. DES is one in a long line 
of examples of “late lessons from early warnings” that demonstrates the benefits of a 
precautionary approach (Brown, Toxic Exposures 241). See also Steingraber (290); Heise (134). 
23 Couser has lately abandoned his earlier coinage in favor of “autosomatography,” or the “some 
body memoir” (see Signifying Bodies), which discards the prefix “patho” in order to place less 
emphasis on the medical condition and foreground instead the experience of living in a particular 
body (Memoir 44). For my part, I think both terms have their place, and they do not seem wholly 
interchangeable. I respect the critique levied by disabled life writers that Couser says ultimately 
swayed him to drop the term “pathography,” which seems to align with a medical model of 
disability that treats disability as an individual problem to be “fixed” by medical experts. But 
some life narrators are undoubtedly writing from and to this perspective. Even as DES narrators 
like Joyce Bichler challenge the male-dominated medical establishment for viewing female 
patients as irrational or infantile, they do not by and large challenge biomedicine as a dominant 
framework from which to interpret their bodies. DES Daughter, for example, is fundamentally a 
story about being a patient, such that “autopathography” seems like a fairly accurate description 
of Bichler’s project. I’m not sure that “autosomatography” fits this narrative quite as well.  
24 Upon first learning that she would undergo a vaginectomy, Joyce feels “appalled at the 
thought. It was so mutilating, so freakish…[I]t was unnatural and bizarre and they were going to 
do it to me” (59). She also describes feeling like a “side show” act when her doctor asks if young 
medical residents and interns might observe her pre-operative consultations (56). On the 
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“enfreakment” of disability, see Hevey; Thomson, Extraordinary Bodies; Alaimo. On the 
reproductive “freak,” see Beauchamp, Davidson. 
25 Telling stories of trauma may not always prove therapeutic. As Sidonie Smith and Julia 
Watson note, writing-as-recovery can easily become writing-as-self-monitoring, “a Foucauldian 
self-surveillance that conforms the writing subject to prescriptive norms” (Reading 147). 
26 Like other endocrine-disrupting chemicals, DES is believed by some researchers to contribute 
to a variety of forms of gender and sexual variance (eg. Hood). A 1995 study reported a small 
but significant increase in lesbian and bisexual attraction among DES daughters over non-
exposed women (Meyer-Bahlburg et al.). Organizations like DES Action and the social media-
based DES Daughter Network publicize possible links between DES exposure and “gender 
issues,” including homosexuality, bisexuality, transsexuality, intersex, gender identity disorder, 
and transgender. 
27 See chapter 2, note 3. 
28 Two examples of very recent DES witnessing that point toward shifting representational 
strategies are Alice Eve Cohen’s memoir What I Thought I Knew and Dominique Le Metayer’s 
web-based DES Daughter Network. Cohen, whose testimony appears in DES Stories and who 
has produced solo performances about DES, writes of bringing a wrongful life suit after the birth 
of her daughter. Because of the effects of her DES exposure, doctors believed that Alice was 
unable to become pregnant; as a result, she only learned of her high-risk pregnancy after six 
months and a misdiagnosis of an abdominal tumor. Cohen’s memoir complicates the normative 
narrative of infertility represented in the earlier DES narratives I discuss here. Le Metayer’s suite 
of platforms for her DES Daughter Network includes a blog, website, Facebook page, Twitter 
account, and Pinterest board, all organized around the proposition that “social media increases 
awareness and brings the DES community together.” Le Metayer attempts to mobilize “The 4 
“C’s [sic] of Social Media for the DES cause”—connect, contribute, collaborate, and change.  
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Chapter 2 
Frames of Disability in Multiple Chemical Sensitivity Testimony  
  
 They admitted that they had initially thought they were coming to “talk to another nut.” But as 
they left, they both agreed that they had just talked to a true victim. 
  -Linda Baker, MCS witness1  
 
 What does it mean to be a “true victim?” How do you distinguish a victim from just 
“another nut”? These questions are at the heart of debates over a contested environmental illness 
known as multiple chemical sensitivity (MCS). MCS describes a condition wherein people 
experience extreme physical reactions to minute levels of a wide array of chemicals. Exposure to 
perfumes and artificial fragrances, adhesives, inks and paints, pesticides, detergents, and natural 
gas may trigger a bewildering array of symptoms, such as headaches, nausea, vomiting, aching 
limbs, respiratory distress, fainting, seizures, temporary paralysis or blindness, sores, and 
psychological symptoms like depression, anxiety, paranoia, and hallucinations.2 With no medical 
consensus about how or why low-dose exposures produce such symptoms, MCS is often 
discredited as psychosomatization or toxic hysteria. When people who identify as multiply 
chemically sensitive communicate their experiences and theories of chemically-induced illness, 
they issue a profound challenge to these biomedical expectations. In the face of pervasive 
skepticism about their condition, these “MCSers” mobilize a variety of interpretive frameworks 
to show that they are not just “another nut” but are instead “true victims” who are disabled by 
toxic exposure.  
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 This chapter considers two collections of MCS testimony in which chemically sensitive 
people theorize their embodied experiences with this chronic and debilitating illness. The 
narratives and images featured in Rhonda Zwillinger’s 1998 testimonial and photographic 
collection The Dispossessed and the narratives of Alison Johnson’s 2008 Amputated Lives 
witness to MCS as a “true” disability. The witness, according to Arthur Frank, “offers testimony 
to a truth that is generally unrecognized or suppressed” (137). To do so, the illness witness 
becomes “a living testimony,” such that “illness stories are not only about the body but of and 
through the body” (Frank 140, emphasis in original). In the testimony collections considered 
here, MCS witnesses make sense and meaning of their bodies as living testimonies by 
negotiating the “multiple and contradictory frames of significance” through which disability is 
surveilled, interpreted, and controlled (Quayson 18).  
 I mobilize Ato Quayson’s concept of “frames” of disability as a critical rubric to unpack 
the ways witnesses theorize MCS as a disability through the production and organization of 
testimony. Quayson suggests that we think of a picture frame as a metaphor for disability’s 
relation to the normate.3 Disability is structured by overlapping conceptions of the “normal,” 
“ideal,” and “able.” Frames of significance determine what can be “seen” as disability, 
determining which aspects of disabled persons’ lives and bodies are “in the picture.” The picture 
frame also calls forth disability as not only socially constructed but as specifically constructed in 
domains of the aesthetic—including both photograph and narrative, representational forms that 
appear in Zwillinger’s and Johnson’s anthologies. Just as a picture frame draws the eye toward 
the image as a bounded aesthetic object, cultural frameworks for understanding disability subject 
persons with disabilities to the gaze of the normate. Yet the frame constitutes, even as it delimits, 
the aesthetic object.4 When persons with disabilities manipulate the “network of symbols” 
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through which disability acquires its cultural meanings (Quayson 18), they do not only 
reconfigure how disability can be understood; they actively shape what disability is. Quayson’s 
metaphor powerfully suggests the integral relationship between symbol and materiality.  
 The rubric of “frames” is particularly useful for reading MCS testimony because 
Zwillinger’s and Johnson’s anthologies are each centrally concerned with the material 
consequences of representational networks. In these curated anthology collections, chemically 
sensitive people render their experiences with illness and disability in visual and narrative forms, 
constructing and re-constructing the image of MCS. To theorize their embodied experiences, 
MCS witnesses situate themselves in relation to the multiple and contradictory frames through 
which physical and mental disabilities signify. In doing so, they not only make an argument that 
MCS should be taken seriously as a disability; they also change the frames of reference for 
understanding relationships between bodies, environments, and toxicity. Zwillinger’s and 
Johnson’s collections thus stand as examples of the “new disability memoir,” challenging 
normativizing rhetorics of disability that celebrate disabled people’s triumphs over adversity and 
encourage pity for or horror of disabled bodies and subjectivities (Couser, Signifying Bodies 
172–178).5 Instead, the narratives collected in these MCS anthologies link individual stories of 
pain and debility to politicized claims for both rights and justice. Witnesses put pressure on 
cultural understandings of illness and disability as they operate within environmental contexts.  
 I treat The Dispossessed and Amputated Lives as collective, curated life narratives, each 
of which offers a broader narrative arc that can be read coherently despite internal disjunctions 
and discrepancies. The ur narratives constructed in these MCS anthologies strategically 
medicalize the environmentally ill body in order to frame chemical sensitivity as a disability 
deserving of compensation and accommodation. The Dispossessed articulates an MCS identity 
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constructed through the imbrication of the human body and its environments. Witnesses claim an 
MCS identity by framing their illness in a diagonal relationship to biomedicine. Amputated Lives 
demonstrates how testimonial injustice shapes MCS embodied health politics within and beyond 
that collection. Johnson’s witnesses attempt to mitigate challenges to their capacities as knowers 
by combining disability rights discourses with the rhetoric of flexible bodies. In the repeated 
telling of stories with familiar structures and tropes, mental illness becomes a foil against which 
MCS is positioned as a “real” illness exacerbated by disabling social conditions. Moreover, in 
articulating environmental illness as an economic crisis of the American nation, Johnson’s 
anthology embraces the promise of “the new image of ‘the able-disabled’” in which “those 
people with disabilities who can best approximate the activities and appearance of nondisabled 
people…will be allowed to participate most fully in the activities of their society” (Wendell, 
“Unhealthy Disabled” 165). Taken together, these two anthologies of MCS life narrative show 
how multiple chemical sensitivity’s poisoned subjects reframe the contest around their illness to 
position themselves as true toxic victims in relation to shifting discourses of disability.  
 
The Dispossessed: Crises of the Chemically Sensitive Self in Space  
 The Dispossessed: Living with Multiple Chemical Sensitivities (1998) is a testimonial 
anthology featuring 44 black-and-white photographs of 64 people with severe sensitivity to 
chemicals. These portraits are the work of the collection’s editor, Rhonda Zwillinger, who 
herself identifies as an “MCS sufferer.”6 Each photograph is accompanied by a short personal 
narrative, often of no more than a paragraph. Together, Zwillinger’s photographs and witnesses’ 
testimonies document the ways MCSers create what Michelle Murphy calls an “elsewhere within 
here,” a social-theoretical space where their condition can be understood and managed.   
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 The Dispossessed represents MCSers’ attempts to theorize their condition as a disability 
at a moment when disability was taking on new valences in the American public imagination. 
Conceived in the early 1990s,7 Zwillinger’s project was created in the wake of the passage of the 
Americans with Disabilities Act, the 1990 federal law prohibiting discrimination on the basis of 
physical and mental disability. The ADA required for the first time that employers provide 
accommodations for people with disabilities, and witnesses like Jim R. deploy language of 
disability and workplace accommodation to testify to their MCS experience (5). In her 
introductory narrative, Zwillinger specifically invokes the ADA’s guarantee of “reasonable 
accommodation” in support of rights for chemically sensitive workers (11). Steve Kroll-Smith 
and Hugh H. Floyd argue that MCS represents “a strategy for understanding a body that is 
becoming disorganized and unpredictable by providing it with a rational story to account for its 
untoward changes” (4). Visual and narrative testimony in Zwillinger’s collection draws on 
shifting rhetorics of disability to create such a story.    
 Multiple chemical sensitivity is known as a “contested illness,” or a condition with 
“contested causation,” because its causes are the subject of significant scientific and public 
debate (Brown, Toxic Exposures 172). Lay people and dissenting experts challenge “dominant 
epidemiological paradigms” when they claim that low-level exposure to environmental 
chemicals are the cause of MCSers’ symptoms (ibid. xiv). As ill people and their allies seek to 
legitimize contested illnesses, they seek recognition and treatment both within and outside of the 
dominant paradigm. This tension is represented within and across testimonial narratives in The 
Dispossessed. Some witnesses describe the benefits of “alternative” therapies, such as the sauna 
detox program described by Katherine D. In the portrait accompanying her testimony, Katherine 
is barely visible within the shadowy interior of her sauna (74). Elaine S. writes of the “special 
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clinic” that helped her heal, where patients “live on oxygen in a porcelain room” (50). Therapies 
like these are not generally recognized as legitimate by a medical establishment that often views 
chemical sensitivity as a psychological, rather than a physical, ailment.  
 Witnesses also situate their condition in relation to more traditional biomedical 
frameworks, even as they engage in diagnostic and treatment practices that challenge the 
foundations of those approaches. For Nina Z., this is a process of re-education within the context 
of the medical model in which she had been trained. “As a trained psychologist,” she writes, “I 
viewed my symptoms as psychological. Fortunately, I found a doctor who told me that my 
condition was not emotional; I had been chemically poisoned” (55). Erica E., a doctor, explains, 
“I now practice the kind of medicine in which I believe from my home—a union of traditional 
and alternative modalities” (44). 
 Witnesses like Nina Z. and Erica E. do not theorize their illness experiences outside of 
existing medical models but instead create spaces within and around biomedicine—an 
“elsewhere within here”—in which MCS can be understood and managed as a physiological 
condition. Borrowing vocabulary from Lauren Berlant’s studies of sentimentality, we might call 
this a juxta-medical space—one that exists to the side of, always bumping up against, traditional 
biomedicine. Berlant’s term, “juxta-political,” “seeks to understand the flourishing of the social 
to one side of the political as something other than a failure to be politics” (Female Complaint 
25). The juxta-medical, then, represents not failure but ambivalence, not opposition but 
adjacency. The juxa-medical is a space “of ordinary survival, not transgression,” of 
“disappointment, not refusal” (ibid. 24–25).  
 MCS witnesses call such juxta-medical spaces into being through their living testimony. 
For example, when chemically sensitive people like Karen A. and her sons say they “are able 
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only to eat organic food” or use only “organic cotton bedding and clothing,” like Christie B. and 
John B., they describe what is probably the most common treatment for allergy: avoidance 
(Zwillinger 20, 38). People with the medically-recognized condition of IgE-activated food 
allergy may avoiding touching others, eat only food they have prepared themselves, or wear 
protective gear such as gloves or masks to reduce contact with trace amounts of the dairy, fish, or 
nuts that could trigger anaphylaxis. Thus, when Karen, Christie, and John say that they manage 
their condition by consuming organic goods, they “call upon already-available caretaking 
performances operating within the biomedical dominant and reconfigure them” (Murphy 114).8 
They engage a recognized epidemiological paradigm (allergy) to make sense of alternative 
consumption practices as a form of medical treatment. Taken together, these testimonies about 
MCS treatment present the condition not as a rejection of biomedicine but as a shifting set of 
practices for managing symptoms that include traditional medicine, alternative therapies, and 
care-taking routines. 
 In the previous chapter, I considered how the testimony anthology DES Stories produces 
an ur narrative of victimization that “reduce[s] differences to sameness” though the repetition of 
common themes and story structures (Schaffer and Smith 45–47). Collating MCS testimonies 
into collections with their own overarching narratives carries these same risks. On the other 
hand, the uniformity and anonymity that Schaffer and Smith caution against also have the power 
to draw attention to the repeated practices that produce identity and/as politics in embodied 
health movements. The act of repetition emphasizes narrative over narrator, and the multiplicity 
of stories invites audiences to locate shared experiences represented in witnesses’ testimony. In 
its insistent focus on the lived experience of MCS through the spaces and practices of everyday 
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living, The Dispossessed frames chemical sensitivity as a disability produced in the meeting of 
bodies and environments.  
 A theme that runs throughout the book’s narratives and substantial peritextual material is 
the imbrication of human bodies with the natural and built environments they inhabit.9 More than 
half of the testimonies in The Dispossessed describe witnesses’ living situations; some discuss 
nothing else. Zwillinger’s photographs, too, are striking for their depiction of chemically 
sensitive people in their environments—in foil-lined rooms, outside Airstream trailers, next to 
detoxifying saunas, or seated in the cars in which they live. The Epilogue captures the 
collection’s overarching argument that MCS is a structural problem created by disabling 
environments and maintained through social neglect. In it, sociologist Steve Kroll-Smith argues 
that the collection “documents a powerful, tragic diaspora of people uprooted and forced far 
from their homes by a debilitating disease and an unresponsive society” (83). As its title 
suggests, then, one of The Dispossessed’s central concerns is how location and dislocation work 
to disable people with chemical sensitivities. 
 One of the ways that MCS narratives depart most clearly from conventional medical 
accounts of the body is in situating the human body within the natural and built environments it 
inhabits. If MCS is fundamentally about having “a body that cannot live in putatively benign and 
safe places” (Kroll-Smith and Floyd 4), then chemically sensitive people must manage both their 
bodies and their environments in order to avoid potential incitants. Michelle Murphy calls this 
“building yourself a body in a safe space,” indicating the ways that bodies, spaces, and the very 
concept of safety are co-constructed. Since theorizing MCS means theorizing the body in its 
environment, people who understand themselves to be chemically sensitive reimagine the 
  100 
boundaries of the self. The illness identity “MCSer” always describes the imbrication of human 
and habitat.  
 The photographic and textual testimony in The Dispossessed demonstrates how the 
chemically sensitive self comes to be defined through the relationship between self and space, 
body and abode. More than half of witnesses’ narratives describe their living arrangements. 
Randy H. testifies to “living in [his] car and sleeping in the front seat,” where he is pictured in 
the accompanying photograph (56–57). The camera is positioned outside the open driver’s side 
door, its panel reflecting the sunlight, with Randy H. framed by the black outline of the open 
window (Fig. 4). Susan M.’s page-long narrative consists of an elaborate description of her 
carefully designed, chemically safe house. With its separate living space, concrete floors, metal 
siding, foil-backed sheetrock walls, cross-ventilation, incandescent lighting, high desert 
landscaping, and wheelchair accessible sinks, it “fits [her] special needs quite well” (30–31; Fig. 
5). Some witnesses, like Martin L., incorporate Zwillinger’s images into their self-narration, 
implicitly endorsing the photographs’ focus on space and environment. “I have lived outside for 
almost 15 years, being unable to tolerate any indoor environments,” he writes. “I am pictured 
here parked in the desert with a travel buddy who also has MCS” (60). Martin and his unnamed 
buddy are pictured seated in the beds of their respective trucks, parked a few feet apart in a 
desert landscape (Fig. 6).  
 A majority of Zwillinger’s portraits not only depict human subjects in their living 
environments but actually feature living spaces themselves as photographic subjects. The images 
thus stand in sharp contrast to Nancy Stuart’s studio portraits of DES-exposed people discussed 
in chapter 1, which appear austere by comparison. Zwillinger’s often visually-cluttered images 
work in conjunction with witness testimonies to make the space surrounding her subjects hyper-
  101 
visible. The carefully-chosen building materials, foiled walls, metal doors, and wheelchair 
accessible design described by Susan M. can all be seen in the photograph accompanying her 
testimony (Fig. 5). While Susan appears in the immediate foreground, the camera looks past its 
human subject to the living space beyond her. But Susan’s narrative encourages us to see the 
bare floor, metal countertop, and electric stove not as so much dead matter but as space that is 
alive with “vapor” and “electromagnetic fields.” Together, the words and images offer “proof” of 
what cannot be seen. Zwillinger’s photographs function as truth-effects, which appear to verify 
that Susan M.’s testimony—and therefore her illness—are ‘true.’ 
 As it represents the illness experiences of more than 60 MCS witnesses, The 
Dispossessed also represents a multitude of environments, all of them potentially threatening to 
Zwillinger, her subjects, and others like them. Multiple chemical sensitivity epitomizes the 
rhetoric of toxic proliferation that characterizes contemporary toxic discourse. MCS narratives 
emphasize that there is no safe place to be chemically sensitive. As Karen A. writes, “We want to 
rent a ‘safe’ place to live, but there is no ‘safe’ housing” (20). For those with the most severe 
chemical sensitivities, theirs is truly a “world without refuge” (L. Buell 38). Several of The 
Dispossessed’s witnesses describe being constantly on the move, in search of an environment 
that will not exacerbate their condition. For Tom S. and Geralyn L., who “have life threatening 
physical reactions to the minutest amount of man-made chemicals,” this means living outdoors 
year-round, “traveling from state park to state park” (77). Mary S., who lives outdoors in a tent 
with her young son, laments, “The area of desert where Baby Kitt and I live will soon be leveled 
for a golf course, making us homeless” (35).  
 Such testimonies illustrate the book’s driving argument that MCS is a form of 
dispossession from the material and social milieu of American life. The constant dislocation 
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Figure 4. Randy H. (b. 1950) Prescott, Arizona  
Photo Credit: Rhonda Zwillinger, from The Dispossessed: Living with Multiple Chemical 
Sensitivities 
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Figure 5. Susan M. (b. 1949), MCS and Disability Rights Activist Snowflake, Arizona  
Photo Credit: Rhonda Zwillinger, from The Dispossessed: Living with Multiple Chemical 
Sensitivities 
 
 
Figure 6. Martin L. (b. 1962) Tucson, Arizona 
Photo Credit: Rhonda Zwillinger, from The Dispossessed: Living with Multiple Chemical 
Sensitivities 
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Figure 7. Jessica B. (b. 1940), Judith M. Prescott, Arizona 
Photo Credit: Rhonda Zwillinger, from The Dispossessed: Living with Multiple Chemical 
Sensitivities 
  
faced by many severely chemically sensitive people is a form of abjection, argues Murphy. If 
abjection “is the making and marking of a domain of impossibility” (Murphy 89), the MCS 
refrain of “no safe place” names the impossibility of inhabiting any environment and therefore of 
inhabiting safely one’s own body. Zwillinger’s images capture this impossibility visually. They 
emphasize through framing and lighting elements of MCSers’ environments that are both 
visible—building materials such as Susan M.’s mental countertops or Elaine S.’s foil-insulated 
shed—and invisible—vapors represented metonymically by face masks, which appear starkly 
white in the colorless photographs.   
 Indeed, across Zwillinger’s portraits, masks and oxygen tanks proliferate amid other 
trappings of everyday living. One way of interpreting these images would be to understand them 
as naturalizing (juxta)medical prostheses as mundane household artifacts. Yet one gets the 
feeling that Zwillinger has carefully arranged these objects to intrude on the family portrait, as in 
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the image of Jessica B. and Judith M (Fig. 7). In that photograph, a shining metal oxygen tank 
occupies the foreground, catching the light. A tray stacked with what appear to be pill bottles and 
a shining metal device that may be a home oxygen machine physically separate MCSer Jessica 
from her partner, Judith. This staging of the women in their living space visually resonates with 
Jessica’s testimony that Judith experiences “compassion fatigue” caused by the stress of “long 
term daily care of a chronically ill partner” (23). Just as in her portrait of Susan M., Zwillinger 
here uses the visual form to make materially manifest what otherwise cannot be read on the 
body. The paraphernalia of illness in Jessica and Judith’s portrait functions not only as a truth 
effect that testifies to Jessica’s physical experience of ailing but also to MCS’s social and 
somatic reverberations beyond Jessica’s own body.  
  The proliferation of medical devices in Zwillinger’s photographs also demonstrates that, 
like other forms of contemporary toxic discourse, The Dispossessed participates in a long and 
troubled tradition of gothification. Zwillinger’s photographic style resonates aesthetically with 
the work of photographer Diane Arbus, whose black-and-white portraits of disabled and 
transgender people have been criticized for fetishizing these subjects as “freaks.”10 Both artists 
use composition and lighting to evoke trauma as a threshold between the everyday and the 
extraordinary. Arbus describes trauma as one of the defining characteristics of freaks, whose 
bodies are a visual reminder that “most people go through life dreading they’ll have a traumatic 
experience” (3). For Zwillinger, documenting chemically injured people is a means of drawing 
attention to the “collective trauma” caused by an ongoing chemical “holocaust” (11). The 
prominent placement of glinting oxygen machines and starkly white face masks in Zwillinger’s 
portraits suggests MCS as an experience of trauma insofar as these objects disrupt or distract 
from the photographs’ human subjects. Like Arbus’s photographs of people living in institutions 
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for those with mental disabilities, Zwillinger’s visual and narrative theme of cultural 
dispossession promulgates the perception that disability is necessarily isolating. This common 
narrative myth decontextualizes disability so that disability comes to be seen as “as a personal 
tragedy…and not the product of either chance or social processes” (Dolmage 43; see also 
Mitchell and Snyder, “Representation”).  
 A comparison between Arbus and Zwillinger only goes so far. Whereas Arbus’s 
relationships with her subjects was always aestheticized,11 Zwillinger identifies as an “insider” 
(8). Her stated aim of “bring[ing] this epidemic to the forefront of the American consciousness” 
represents an important move to politicize MCS and toxic proliferation more generally as 
structural problems (11). Still, her photographs necessarily bear the weight of what Buell 
describes as the “ambiguous legacy” of American gothic imagery (44), which has long been 
invested in the en-freakment of disabled people. Arbus’s work featuring people with disabilities 
and physical differences, which scholars have situated in relation to visual rhetorics of not only 
freakishness but also indigence and criminality, is only one example of this legacy.  
 I do not in any way intend to equate Zwillinger’s photographic witnessing with Arbus’s 
fetishizing artwork. But drawing a limited comparison between the two photographers’ styles is 
useful in that it animates Ato Quayson’s claim that “disability returns the aesthetic domain to an 
active ethical core” (19). Such a comparison might prompt thorny questions about toxicity as it 
functions as both an aesthetic and ethical category: What is the relationship between trauma as a 
characteristic of poisoned subjectivity and the enfreakment of disability? How does the topos of 
gothification impact the ways disability signifies within the frame of toxic discourse?   
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Navigating Identity Prejudice: Amputated Lives 
 MCSers, like other poisoned subjects, must navigate the unstable boundaries of the 
normal in order to claim recognition for toxic impairments. For both individual witnesses and 
those who take on the task of curating testimonial collections, this also means navigating the 
demands of different testimonial contexts. In Alison Johnson’s MCS collection Amputated Lives 
(2008), witnesses make a case for their status as poisoned subjects by drawing on multiple 
overlapping discourses of disability and identity. Johnson and other MCSers represented in her 
anthology identify as disabled in order to make claims of identity prejudice and seek 
accommodation. In claiming a disability identity that would open routes of access to services and 
systems of redress for chemically sensitive people, Amputated Lives strategically defines 
disability in limited ways. It thus bears a complicated relationship to discourses of disability 
studies and disability justice, suggesting some of the challenges of locating the ur narrative of 
toxic exposure within these paradigms.    
 Amputated Lives compiles testimony from more than thirty people who identify as 
chemically sensitive alongside Johnson’s extended analysis of late twentieth-century toxicity. 
The book is divided into two parts. In Part I, Johnson, who identifies herself as an MCSer, 
analyzes the origins and impacts of MCS in the contemporary US context. This section is 
organized around five major toxic events that exposed thousands of Americans to toxins and 
triggered many cases of chronic, debilitating chemical sensitivity: the outbreak of sick building 
syndrome at the EPA’s Waterside Mall headquarters, the Exxon Valdez oil spill and cleanup, the 
(first) Gulf War, the 9/11 terrorist attacks, and Hurricane Katrina. Johnson quotes expert and 
witness testimony about toxic conditions and health impacts created by each of these events.  
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 In Part II, people with multiple chemical sensitivity share their personal stories of 
environmental illness, in which they testify to the conditions of their toxic exposure, their illness 
experiences, and long-term impacts on their health and lifestyles. The thirty individual narratives 
stand alone, without editorial commentary, and do not appear to be arranged in any particular 
order. Instead, Johnson makes sense of these narratives by quoting extensively from witness 
testimonies in her analysis in Part I. Readers are therefore primed to interpret the individual 
illness narratives through Johnson’s own framing of MCS as a disability structured by 
widespread skepticism about the condition. Witness testimonies and the overarching narrative 
Johnson constructs through the interpretation and curation of those testimonies thus mutually 
reinforce one another.  
 The master narrative of MCS that emerges from the multi-layered witnessing of 
Amputated Lives is of a single, preventable toxic exposure leading to chronic illness that 
undermines the narrating subject’s ability to work and live as “productively” as in the past. 
Medical professionals, family members, and coworkers do not understand the condition of 
chemical sensitivity and suggest that the ill person is not physically sick but instead is either 
mentally ill or simply lazy. Witnesses use personal testimony to manage these challenges to their 
embodied knowledges by reframing of MCS as a physical disability against other forms of 
identification.      
 As she works to frame MCS as a disability in Part I of Amputated Lives, Johnson argues 
that lack of recognition of the condition is one of the primary difficulties facing chemically 
sensitive people. Throughout the collected testimonies, narrators describe being dismissed as  
“under stress,” “psychosomatic,” “hypochondriacs,” “mentally unstable,” or “delusional.” The 
deep-seated skepticism they encounter reflects and reinforces existing ideas about the 
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intersection of environmental illness with gender, race, and class. MCS is a condition that has 
been strongly associated with women, who are thought to comprise up to 80 percent of people 
who identify as chemically sensitive (Gibson 477).12 Moreover, despite high rates of toxic 
exposure among people of color and working class people of all races, MCS has typically been 
considered a disease of the white middle class (Radetsky 14–15; Alaimo 117–118).  
 Yet, many researchers dispute these common assumptions (eg. Caress and Steinemann; 
Kreutzer, Netra, and Lashuay; Meggs et al.). They argue that while people of all genders, races, 
and classes experience chemical sensitivity, MCS diagnoses are not evenly distributed 
throughout the population. Stacy Alaimo offers an analysis of MCS through an environmental 
justice lens that helps to explain how these disparities arise: given widespread skepticism in the 
medical community, “the route to the diagnosis category of MCS usually involves a fair amount 
of leisure time and other resources with which to conduct one’s own research and search for a 
sympathetic physician” (Alaimo 118). An EJ-oriented perspective suggests just how complex 
illness identity can be, since diagnosis itself is an effect of a complex alignment of intersecting 
social identities.  
 In turn, diagnosis creates disability as a gendered, raced, and classed phenomenon, often 
in very damaging ways. Disability theorist Anna Mollow, who herself identifies as chemically 
sensitive, argues that the perception of MCS as a white, middle class phenomenon masks the 
way that detractors have attempted to debunk the condition by associating it with feminine 
hysteria. “The feminization of [MCS] aids in discrediting those who claim to have it (‘hysterical 
women’),” she writes, “while its depiction as a disease of the white middle class distracts from 
the misogyny that informs such assumptions” (192–193). Deeply ingrained cultural ideas about 
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gender and mental illness shape medical and lay perceptions of MCS and permeate narrative 
accounts of living with the condition.   
 None of this is to say that physicians who do not accept MCS as a valid diagnosis are 
willfully cruel or even incorrect. Rather, I think it is important to recognize that even to 
acknowledge the testimony of people who identify as multiply chemically sensitive is to 
profoundly challenge the medical establishment.13 Beyond the question of whether the 
biomedical establishment does or should recognize MCS as a legitimate diagnosis is how this 
ingrained disbelief impacts access to resources for those who undeniably experience debilitating 
symptoms, symptoms which they believe to be caused by exposure to minute doses of chemicals. 
Skepticism about the condition can have material consequences and can produce conditions of 
testimonial injustice that deprive MCS witnesses of recognition as authorities on their own 
embodied experiences with illness. To understand these impacts, we should attend to the elision 
that occurs between the illness identity MCSer and the subject to whom it is attached.  
 More than one-third of the witnesses in Part II of Amputated Lives testify to doctors, 
coworkers, or family members challenging their identification as chemically sensitive and thus 
the value of their embodied knowledges. A woman named Sue testifies that doctors would roll 
their eyes and refuse to make eye contact with her after she identified herself as chemically 
sensitive (219). Kelly Colangelo, Phylliss “Dolly” LaJoie, and Sfc. Roy Twymon all describe 
being referred for psychiatric care when seeking medical care or social services for their physical 
ailments (269, 219, 213). When Dolly did see a psychiatrist, he told her that she was “delusional” 
(219). One man describes his physician’s outsized reaction to the patient’s self-identification as 
chemically sensitive: “He went ballistic and said, ‘So you’re one of those people. Let me tell you 
what, you just lost all your credibility with me.’ He turned in a negative report to the Social 
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Security board, which then denied me Medicare coverage” (Sfc. Terry Dillhyon in Johnson 137). 
In this account, the physician’s rejection of multiple chemical sensitivity as a legitimate 
diagnostic category leads him to reject the witness generally as a giver of knowledge. Skepticism 
here constitutes a form of testimonial injustice, which, as Miranda Fricker powerfully argues, is a 
form of injury that harms witnesses as subjects of knowledge. Moreover, while the proximate 
harm of such testimonial injustice may be epistemological, it also has important material effects. 
In the testimony quoted above, Sfc. Dillhyon suffers a loss of both his credibility and his chance 
at Medicare coverage. 
 The link between contested illness and social identity—particularly identities that are 
presumed to be visible on or through the body—suggests that the testimonial injustice to which 
MCSers like Sfc. Dillyhon are subject is rooted in and experienced as identity prejudice. Identity 
prejudice, which describes bias “against people qua social type,” is  
the central case of testimonial injustice: the injustice that a speaker suffers in receiving 
 deflated credibility from the hearer owing to identity prejudice on the hearer’s part, as in
 the case where the police don’t believe someone because he is black. Thus the central 
 case of testimonial injustice can be defined (if rather telegraphically) as identity-
 prejudicial credibility deficit. This definition captures the kind of testimonial injustice 
 that is connected with other forms of social injustice that the subject is likely to suffer. 
 (Fricker 4, emphases in original)  
 
Accounts like Sue’s or Sfc. Dillyhon’s above suggest that MCSers experience prejudice against 
their illness identity that devalues their testimony. Because their diagnosis is unbelievable, 
people who name themselves as having MCS become in-credible witnesses.  
 But the devaluation of MCSers as producers of embodied knowledges is shaped already 
by stigmatizing beliefs about who inhabits that illness identity. When MCS is described as a 
condition of white, middle class women, this demographic pigeonholing is then used to discredit 
people who complain of heightened chemical sensitivities as not only mentally ill but 
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“hysterical” (Mollow 192–193). Beyond simply misapprehending MCS as psychosomatization 
rather than a physiological condition, the label “hysteria” stigmatizes both chemical sensitivity 
and mental illness as feminine weakness. As Barbara Ehrenreich and Deirdre English explain in 
their groundbreaking Complaints and Disorders, medicine has long supported misogynist 
ideologies that “describe women as sick, and potentially sickening to men” (5). Often these 
designations have taken on classed significance as well. Through the technologies of 
medicalization, especially the medicalization of psychology, certain kinds of women patients 
come to be seen “as silly, self-indulgent, and superstitious” (ibid. 79). “Hysteria” is a term used 
to name and shame people who monitor and diagnose their own bodies as suffering from the 
inexpert anxiety of the privileged. It functions as a double-bind: hysterical people are too 
concerned with their bodies yet they cannot “read” them correctly. The lack of diagnosis of 
physical disease is taken as a sign of mental illness. When applied to environmentally-based 
illnesses like multiple chemical sensitivity, “the label ‘hysterical’…empties the illness of its 
environmental relevance” (Hosey 80). This process shifts the onus of illness away from systems 
of power and onto disordered subjects.  
 The accusation of “hysteria” to discredit complaining subjects and derail politics 
demonstrates why disability in particular calls for an intersectional analysis that takes into 
account the complex interactions of overlapping identities, each with their own histories, 
privileges, and identity-credibility matrices. “The presence of disability,” explains Tobin Siebers, 
“further feminizes the female other, further racializes the racial other, and further alienates the 
alien other. In each case, the association of disability with a particular group justifies exclusion 
from the community of rights-bearing people. Disability, then, is a significant factor in the right 
to have rights” (Disability Theory 180). The case of MCS demonstrates further that disability is a 
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significant factor in the right to produce viable or valuable knowledge. Identity-prejudicial 
credibility deficits can compound on one another, and disability may function to amplify existing 
barriers to testimonial justice. In the case of MCS, this is exacerbated by the politics of 
resentment, which causes observers to “wonder whether someone whose disability is not obvious 
is faking or exaggerating it; the trustworthiness of people who claim to be disabled but do not 
look disabled is always in question” (Wendell, “Unhealthy Disabled” 170). As a feminized 
condition; a disability; and a chronic, invisible, and contested illness, MCS produces complex, 
multi-faceted identity-prejudicial credibility deficits, which are refracted through individual 
subjects’ racial and gender identities. These identity politics are easily elided in an anthology 
collection like Amputated Lives, in which differences between witnesses are minimized in favor 
of shared experiences among the chemically sensitive.  
 For MCSers of all identities, the stakes of identity prejudice and accompanying 
testimonial injustice are high. One strategy for soliciting recognition in the face of testimonial 
injustice that appears again and again in witness testimony is to attempt to minimize identity 
prejudice by disidentifying with marginalized subject positions. This is particularly clear with 
respect to mental illness. As Amputated Lives witness Linda Baker testifies in the epigraph to this 
chapter, when investigators from the State Agricultural Department came to look into pesticide 
use in the school where she worked, “They admitted that they had initially thought they were 
coming to ‘talk to another nut.’” (158). Linda alludes to the damaging skepticism many MCSers 
face on a daily basis as they attempt to access services that would assist them in gaining 
workplace accommodations or finding appropriate medical treatment. But the narrative also 
makes clear a dichotomy that operates beneath the surface of many of the testimonies in 
Johnson’s collection as they engage such skepticism: “true victims” versus “nuts.” If nuts are 
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hysterical, true victims are rational. Being hailed as a true victim, as Linda is by state officials, 
signals that one’s testimony is deemed credible.  
 The logic of victims versus nuts can be seen in Johnson’s framing of MCS issues in the 
first part of Amputated Lives. In her introduction, she decries the fact that “some of those who 
insist that MCS is a psychologically based illness state that these people are suffering from 
agoraphobia, or fear of crowds. That’s as cruel as saying to a paraplegic in a wheelchair, ‘Too 
bad you don’t like to walk’” (5). Here, the comparison to a person with paraplegia is used to 
testify to the embodied reality of MCS as a physiological condition, to make it visible through 
metaphor. But in this example the symbolic value of the wheelchair—the International Symbol 
of Access and arguably the single most recognizable sign for disability—is juxtaposed against 
agoraphobia, which by contrast appears immaterial and virtually illegible. In fact, Johnson 
misreads agoraphobia as a preference (as a “you don’t like to”) rather than as an impairment like 
paraplegia or chemical sensitivity.  
 The result of such comparisons is to remove mental illness from the realm of disability, 
as when Johnson describes a witness who was “told by one physician that she was a 
hypochondriac with no real health problems” (55). Johnson reports, by contrast, “It was very 
clear to me in the phone interviews I did with Dolly that she was a very sick woman” (ibid.). 
Johnson’s goal in this passage is clearly to support Dolly’s own assertion that her MCS is a valid 
and serious illness. But in denying that Dolly is a hypochondriac, Johnson also denies 
hypochondria and other mental illnesses the status of “real health problems.” Amputated Lives 
thus reinscribes what Tobin Siebers critiques as a “caste system” that favors the physically 
disabled over people whose disabilities are of the mind (Disability Theory 78). On the one hand, 
MCS sufferers want their condition understood as physiological and environmental, which is an 
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important step toward accessing appropriate medical treatment and accommodation. Yet when 
this appeal takes the form of assertions that MCS is “real” over and against mental illness, it 
denigrates mental illness as less debilitating and less deserving of the accommodations MCSers 
seek for their own disabilities. In attempting to disrupt operant hierarchies of gender and 
visibility that frame disability, Amputated Lives reconfigures disability in a way that leaves 
mental illness outside the frame of recognition.  
 Amputated Lives also reframes discourses of class and labor structuring MCS, 
complicating the class politics of a condition often identified with the middle class. A few of the 
collected testimonials appear to blame toxic exposures on blue-collar workers, the poor, and the 
poorly educated. When Linda Baker explains the results of her investigation into pesticide use at 
the school where she used to work, the school janitor becomes the focus of her frustration:  
A janitor who had no specific training in pest control and who by his own admission 
 could barely read had applied the pesticides. Actually, his failure to keep the school clean 
 had triggered the complaint that led to the business manager telling him to spray the 
 building heavily. After he received this order, the janitor went to the school board office, 
 grabbed three cans of pesticide left by pesticide salesmen, and applied them 
 indiscriminately in the building. (158) 
 
The narrative places responsibility for Linda’s toxic exposure with the janitor, whose limited 
literacy and “failure to keep the school clean” are offered as signs of incompetence that are also 
heavily laden with class-based stigmas. In another narrative, when Wanda Phillips and her 
husband were shopping for a FEMA trailer built in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, they are 
surprised to find that “some had bullet holes in them, and some of the trailers had undergone fire 
damage…[S]ome people in New Orleans had used the trailers to make crystal meth and they had 
exploded and burned” (131). Since Wanda and her husband, who own a home in rural 
Mississippi, do not end up living in one of the burned trailers, the comment seems extraneous, 
serving only to distance them from a New Orleans that is represented as dangerous and degraded. 
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Like Linda Baker’s comments on the school janitor’s reading ability and cleanliness, the 
reference to methamphetamines is freighted with not-so-subtle class and race codes. These 
disidentifying moves shift the focus from the political and economic conditions that have made 
toxic exposure the norm and instead single out individuals for a class-based critique that obviates 
structural analysis or coalitional politics in the face of pervasive toxins.  
 On the other hand, Johnson clearly attempts to establish MCS as an issue that spans 
socio-economic classes by including a broad spectrum of class and professional experiences in 
the narratives she curates. She also links class and citizenship in a structural critique of 
contractors’ deliberate use of immigrants and undocumented laborers during the dangerous post-
9/11 cleanup efforts. These laborers now have little or no recourse for seeking compensation for 
what Johnson claims are widespread injuries resulting from exposure to toxic dust “as caustic as 
drain cleaner” (85). Johnson critiques a nation that relies on politically abjected non-citizens to 
“get…America’s financial hub running again” and draws an implicit parallel between the 
nonrecognition of undocumented labor and the nonrecognition of chemically sensitive people 
(ibid. 85). Johnson’s approach to the politics of toxic exposure, which offers a more 
intersectional analysis than some of the testimonies she includes in her anthology, highlights how 
some attempts to minimize identity prejudice may contribute to the marginalization of the most 
vulnerable subjects within and beyond MCS communities.  
 Across class lines, work constitutes the primary ground on which witnesses in Amputated 
Lives claim justice as disabled people. Half of the narratives in Part II feature witnesses who 
testify that they quit or were fired from their jobs because of their condition. Johnson’s anthology 
may even underrepresent the threat of job loss for people with chemical sensitivity. In one study, 
two-thirds of MCSers reported losing or being forced to quit their jobs as a result of their 
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condition (Gibson et al. 503). Many witnesses testify to both the material and emotional 
difficulties they experience after losing a job or being forced to stop working because of their 
disability. Rachel Hughes explains, “Because I have not been able to work for years, I have now 
spent all my savings, have had to sell my car and my home, and can no longer afford to rent my 
painting studio” (140). For some, like Bonnie Giebfried, her former work provided financial 
support and personal fulfillment, both of which are lost when she cannot continue in her job as 
an emergency medical technician. “That has been a big loss in my life because it was a 
profession I loved,” she testifies. “I am also struggling financially now” (166). In her own 
contributions to the volume, Johnson focuses on the loss of self-worth that some MCSers 
experience when they can no longer work. “The stories in Part II,” she argues, “illustrate how 
chemical sensitivity can destroy a productive life all too quickly” (5).  
 Productivity is imagined here in principally economic terms. “Work,” Johnson reminds 
us in no uncertain terms, “is the key to our existence” (11). The workplace is a frequent site of 
contest over rights and recognition for Johnson’s chemically sensitive witnesses. Institutional 
forms of recognition—in particular the right to workplace accommodation protected under the 
Americans with Disabilities Act and access to Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI)—
figure repeatedly in these MCS narratives and are central to witnesses’ claims for justice. As 
Bobbie Lively-Diebold explains, “I met the criteria for being handicapped and filed papers to be 
declared so. This allowed me to apply for reasonable accommodation under the Americans with 
Disabilities Act of 1990” (176). Victoria Savini testifies that she was able to continue working 
after adjustments to her work environment. “Because of [the] simple accommodations that my 
employer provides, I am able to keep working,” she explains. “It’s so important for other 
employers, including the federal government, to realize that people like me can be extremely 
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productive in a job if the employer is willing to do some simple things that allow us to continue 
working instead of treating us as though we are the ones at fault” (147). Those who cannot 
secure adequate accommodation, either because employers are not willing to “do some simple 
things” or because of the severity of their illnesses, may seek assistance from federal programs 
that provide disability benefits. Jill Sverdlove, for example, writes that she is “legally disabled 
and surviving on Social Security disability income” (210). Mike Potter “had to take early 
retirement at age forty-eight and get Social Security Disability Insurance” (151).   
 Access to legal forms of recognition and compensation is far from guaranteed, however. 
Causation is not a prerequisite for claiming SSDI, which requires only that claimants 
demonstrate their impaired ability to function. However, claims to Social Security benefits and 
workplace accommodation for MCSers have nevertheless been vigorously and successfully 
challenged in the courts (Murphy 104 n41). This is due in no small part to the perception that 
people who identify as chemically sensitive are hypochondriacs, phobics, or malingerers. Many 
MCSers seeking legal recognition, either to claim SSDI or to access the workplace 
accommodations theoretically afforded them under the ADA, ultimately make legal claims of 
mental, rather than physical, disability (ibid.). The politics of such claims are contested, as 
individuals and communities weigh the economic benefits of accessing these structures against 
institutional failures to recognize MCS as a legitimate physical condition within the dominant 
epidemiological paradigm. MCSers’ shifting dis/identifications with mental illness bring into 
sharp focus the import of what Siebers calls “complex embodiment” for understanding 
environmental illness as disability. Complex embodiment represents a development beyond the 
binary medical model/social model that recognizes “the body and its representations as mutually 
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transformative” (Siebers, Disability Theory 25).14 It also fleshes out, as it were, intersectional 
analysis by insisting on the imbrication of the social and the corporeal (ibid. 29).   
 While some testimony in Amputated Lives rejects the label of mental illness in a way that 
reconstitutes the caste system of disability, it would be overly simplistic to read such gestures as 
merely a symptom of “stigmaphobia” (McRuer 82). In “‘stigmaphobic’ sectors of identity 
communities…you find people scrambling desperately to be included under the umbrella of the 
‘normal’—and scrambling desperately to cast somebody else as abnormal, crazy, abject, or 
disabled” (Bérubé viii). Poisoned subjectivity is a hierarchy-producing framework, and claims 
for recognition and redress for toxic injury are subject to the paradox of autobiographical 
representation theorized by Leigh Gilmore and discussed in chapter 1. But, as both The 
Dispossessed and Amputated Lives testify, cultural “frames of significance” directly impact how 
disability is recognized and accommodated by biomedicine, under the law, and in the workplace, 
and cultural understandings of disability have material consequences. If at times MCS witnesses 
reject labels of mental illness to claim the status of “true victim,” in other contexts the condition 
may only be legible as disability when identified with mental rather than physical impairment. 
Navigating the waters of testimonial injustice may require MCSers to reframe their living 
testimony—to performatively enact different orientations toward their illness identities at 
different scenes of witnessing.  
 
Multiple Chemical Sensitivity’s Neoliberal Futures  
 The motif of a world without refuge that structures MCS as a toxic discourse suggests 
that no one is exempt from toxic exposure and its effects. Zwillinger’s and Johnson’s aggregated 
collections each make both minoritizing and universalizing moves to shift the frame around 
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MCS. The repetition of personal testimony emphasizes individual illness experience. Taken as 
whole, each collection also positions readers as potential victims of everyday toxins. As curators 
of MCS testimony, and as witnesses in their own rights, Zwillinger and Johnson draw explicit 
connections between individual stories of illness and widespread chemical hazards. While 
relatively few people currently experience acute chemical sensitivity, Zwillinger warns that toxic 
proliferation constitutes a “collective trauma” that “will surely reach critical mass” (11). Johnson 
levies the same argument through the metaphor of the canary in the coalmine, a prevalent image 
in MCS literature.15 In the preface to Amputated Lives, she describes MCSers as “proverbial 
canaries in the mine alerting us that the rapid proliferation in chemical products in our 
environment may be endangering us all” (np). People who become ill in response to minute 
levels of environmental toxins, Zwillinger and Johnson suggest, serve as a warning that such 
toxic exposures will soon threaten even those who do not yet seem to react to the incitants that 
pervade our lives. This is a move to universalize chemical sensitivity as eventually affecting 
everyone. That is, The Dispossessed and Amputated Lives bring audiences within the sphere of 
disability, rather than exempting exceptional subjects from that category, as do so-called 
Supercrip narratives and other rhetorics of disability that uphold an abled/disabled binary.  
 The universalization and politicization of MCS constitutes a challenge to some of 
modernity’s most alluring fictions. The underlying problem theorized by these testimony 
collections is the proliferation of (often untested and undisclosed) human-made chemicals 
throughout all aspects of human culture. The problem is not the canary, but the coalmine. In 
other words, chemical sensitivity should not be treated as merely an individual problem requiring 
individual medical treatment. Instead, argues Stacy Alaimo, truly addressing MCS “would entail 
a staggeringly thorough overhaul of nearly all military, industrial, manufacturing, agricultural, 
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domestic, and consumer practices” (114–115). Alison Johnson specifically links ignorance of the 
problem of chemical exposure to corporate profits:  
It’s hardly surprising that industry doesn’t want anyone to believe that chemical 
 exposures could produce a debilitating condition like MCS. The consequences for 
 corporations would be enormous if members of the public increasingly began to wonder 
 if installing new carpet, using pesticides in their house or yard, or buying particleboard 
 cabinets or furniture might affect their health. (8) 
  
Yet the ur narrative produced by these testimony collections relies on the interrelated vocabulary 
of capitalism, nationalism, and citizenship that undergird the practices of production and 
consumption Zwillinger and Johnson criticize.  
 This is particularly clear throughout Amputated Lives, which is structured along the lines 
of major American toxic disasters. Testimonies included there from Gulf War veterans and 9/11 
cleanup workers especially hail readers as Americans through patriotic rhetorics of liberty, duty, 
and sacrifice (John Sferazo 109-110, Sfc. Roy Twymon 214-215). Productivity is used as a 
barometer for the impact of chemical sensitivity not only on individual health but on the health 
of the nation. Johnson expresses concern that “chemical sensitivity can destroy a productive life 
all too quickly” and thus “has the potential to be a huge drain on public finances” (6). MCS 
presents a biopolitical problem that threatens national interests. “At some point,” she writes, 
“America’s leaders must realize that their refusal to take toxic exposures seriously is in the long 
run a costly mistake that engenders not only potentially large legal settlements but also creates a 
group of citizens whose health is so impaired that they will need public assistance to get through 
life” (106). While less pronounced, Zwillinger mobilizes similar discourses of efficiency to argue 
for attention to the needs of chemically sensitive people. After detailing the economic costs of 
poor air quality in workers’ compensation, lost productivity, and lawsuits, she argues that “it is in 
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the corporate technological industries’ best interests to learn more about this illness” (10). Doing 
so will “keep the MCS worker working” (ibid.). In disabling workers, MCS disables industry.  
 These moves to rationalize disability demonstrate that (to paraphrase Berlant, following 
David Harvey) under neoliberalism disability may come to be defined as the inability to work 
(Cruel Optimism 95).16 Zwillinger’s and Johnson’s concerns with the efficiency of American 
capitalism suggest what David Mitchell and Sharon Snyder name a new “ablenationalism…in 
which some aspects of disability have entered into the discourse of American exceptionalism as a 
normative claim” (“Minority Model” 42).17 Ablenationalism theorizes “the ascendency of a more 
neoliberal contemporary concept of disability…based on advocacy of assimilation through social 
accommodation—that is, the entry of a normalized disabled body into the social sphere of active 
citizenship promoted by democratic social orders” (ibid. 42–43). This assimilation of the 
disabled body is part and parcel of the neoliberal valorization of flexible bodies that organizes 
compulsory able-bodiedness (McRuer 18).18  
 In emphasizing MCSers’ continuing value to the corporation and the nation, Zwillinger’s 
and Johnson’s testimony collections reproduce one of the central tenets of neoliberalism’s 
ideology of the body: that, “[p]ossessed of agile responses, and flexible specificity, our adroit, 
innovative bodies are poised to anticipate any conceivable challenge” (Martin 37). Rather than 
posing a radical challenge to the endless expansion of capitalism, under the regime of flexible 
bodies debilitating chemical exposures become once again a problem lodged in individuals, who 
either respond flexibly or are consigned to the realm of the unproductive. Under neoliberalism, 
“disability itself is seen as a personality flaw,” because disabled people are always already 
presumed to have bodies that are limited and limiting (Dolmage 159 n9). The turn to 
ablenationalism in these MCS narratives suggests a trend that will become more apparent in my 
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analysis moving forward: The formation of the poisoned subject has become increasingly 
attached to neoliberal forms of subjectivity and governmentality in the twenty-first century, even 
as contemporary poisoned subjectivity emerged through feminist- and working class-identified 
embodied politics of the 1960s and 1970s. 
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 Notes to Chapter 2: 
 
1 Quoted in Alison Johnson’s Amputated Lives, 158.  
2 Multiple chemical sensitivity overlaps with an array of contested illnesses, including Gulf War 
syndrome, sick building syndrome, food intolerance syndrome, twentieth century disease, and 
toxin-induced loss of tolerance (Alaimo 114; see also Radetsky). These environmental illnesses 
are characterized by acute adverse reactions to low-level exposure to multiple everyday 
chemicals. MCS may manifest in a wide variety of symptoms affecting multiple bodily systems 
(respiratory, nervous, etc.) within a single patient (Radetsky 13). MCS is distinct from other 
familiar forms of sensitivity to chemicals: classical toxicity (such as lead poisoning) and IgE-
mediated allergy (such as common food, pollen, and pet dander allergies) (Ashford and Miller 
34). Although there is no consensus about the mechanisms or underlying causes that produce the 
wide array of symptoms associated with the condition, MCS is generally thought to arise through 
a two-pronged process of exposure. An initial sensitizing exposure—usually to a relatively large 
dose of chemicals such as when spraying one’s home with insecticides—precipitates the 
condition. Later, repeated triggering exposures cause debilitating symptoms once the body has 
been rendered highly sensitive by the earlier, sensitizing exposure. These triggering exposures 
may produce acute illness in response to even trace amounts of toxins, and symptoms may be 
triggered by any number of chemicals, including but not limited to the chemical(s) that caused 
the sensitizing exposure. 
3 Normate is a term coined by Rosemarie Garland Thomson that designates an ideally powerful 
subject position. The normate can be identified “by peeling away all the marked traits within the 
social order,” leaving, in the contemporary US, a straight, cis-gendered, able-bodied, white male 
who possesses other markers of cultural capital, including (a certain kind of) college education 
and white-collar employment (Thomson, Extraordinary Bodies 8). The concept of the normate 
extends “beyond the simple dichotomies of male/female, white/black, straight/gay, or able-
bodied/disabled so that we can examine the subtle interrelations among social identities that are 
anchored to physical differences” (ibid. 8).  
4 We might think of the frame as paratext that constitutes the threshold of the image. On this 
construct, the picture frame is specifically analogous to what Gérard Genette calls the peritext 
(see note 9). While peritext may at times seem extraneous, it offers important signals about and 
can powerfully shape interpretation.  
5 I acknowledge that I am playing a bit fast and loose with terminology here. Neither these 
anthologies nor the individual testimonies collected within them is technically memoir, if one 
understands memoir as a genre that arose historically in conjunction with the novel, that is 
dialogical, and that narrates a set of connected experiences (Couser, Memoir 15; Quinby 299; 
Smith and Watson, Reading 274). But, as Couser notes, memoir is also a subgenre of life 
narrative that is usefully understood along two continua—autobiography-biography and memoir-
novel—which distinguish the relational and ethical work of the genre, respectively.  
6 Zwillinger self-identifies as an “MCS sufferer” and uses that term to describe others 
represented in her collection, but this language is not widely used in the MCS testimony I have 
encountered. I will be using the terms “MCSer” or “chemically sensitive person” throughout this 
dissertation to refer to individuals who identify themselves as experiencing this condition. While 
I agree with Liz Crow, Susan Wendell, and other feminist disability critics who want to lift the 
taboo within some disability communities on speaking about suffering as part of the experience 
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of impairment and disability, I am reluctant to identify an illness community of which I am not a 
part primarily through the experience of pain.  
7 According to Zwillinger’s narrative of her project’s development, work on The Dispossessed 
began in 1993. A smaller number of images than appears in the book were displayed that year in 
an exhibit in an Amsterdam museum (Zwillinger 8). 
8 Murphy rightly notes that women, who are expected to engage in elaborate grooming and body-
monitoring practices, tend to be more practiced at such caretaking performances than men. 
Makeup, hair removal, weight management, birth control technologies, and women’s routine 
reproductive health screenings are all forms of body management. Murphy’s analysis suggests a 
possible explanation for the apparently higher rates of MCS among women than men. Women 
may be more likely to recognize adverse reactions, seek diagnosis, and engage in practices of 
treatment and prevention because we tend to be savvier managers of our own (and others’) 
bodies through a lifetime of training in feminine grooming and domesticity.    
9 The French structuralist Gérard Genette coined the term peritext to describe materials that 
appear within a volume but are distinct from the literary work itself, including formats, 
publishers’ emblems, cover pages, dedications, prefaces, epilogues, and other spatial and 
material apparatuses. Together, the peritext and the epitext (the physical and social apparatus 
outside the volume) make up what Genette calls paratext—the threshold between text and world. 
Sidonie Smith and Julia Watson explain the paratextual threshold: “Paratextual materials—
peritexts and epitexts—may appear to be ‘neutral’ aspects of the presentation of a text, but 
…[they] affect its interpretation and reception by variously situated reading communities” 
(Reading 100). In the case of The Dispossessed, introductory essays by doctor Gunnar Heuser, a 
chemically-injured nurse named Lynn Montandon, and editor Zwillinger, as well as an epilogue 
by sociologist Steve Kroll-Smith, make deliberate claims for how the photographs, testimonies, 
and subjects represented within the volume should be understood.  
10 “Freaks” is Arbus’s own word for her subjects. The authors of Picturing Disability note the 
common use of “freak” to describe hippies and beatniks in the 1960s when Arbus was working. 
“In that context,” they write, “it was not necessarily as negative as it is today” (Bogdan 134 n6). 
See David Hevey’s “The Enfreakment of Photography” for a critique of Arbus’s work.   
11 Although Arbus knew many of the people she photographed relatively well and maintained 
relationships with them for years, she always saw them as people with whom she might be close 
but never intimate. Comments she made about her subjects indicate that she believed “freaks” 
belonged to the world of “legend” or fantasy (Arbus 3). This stands in stark contrast to 
Zwillinger, who does not romanticize the trauma and isolation that she evokes in her 
photographs. 
12 Those who agree that women are indeed more susceptible to chemical sensitivity offer both 
physiological and cultural explanations. A number of biological sex differences have been 
implicated, including body size, fat deposition, estrogenic activity, paternal antigens, and alcohol 
dehydrogenase levels (Gibson 476; Freeza et al.; Miller). Gendered expectations about personal 
grooming and domestic maintenance may also play a role. Women remain the primary 
consumers for households and families, and are themselves the primary users of cosmetics, 
fragrances, and household cleaners that may trigger MCS reactions (and contain parabens, 
petrochemicals, endocrine disruptors, neurotoxins, and known carcinogens) (Murphy 98–99). 
13 As Michelle Murphy notes, individual doctors may credit patients’ accounts of illness or offer 
an MCS diagnosis, but to do so falls outside the official positions of the major professional 
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associations and has certainly not been the norm in the United States. Murphy cites position 
statements from the American Academy of Allergy and Immunology, American College of 
Physicians, American Medical Association, and California Medical Association challenging the 
field of clinical ecology or the diagnosis of MCS (88 n2). In 1994, a joint position paper by the 
American Lung Association, American Medical Association, Environmental Protection Agency, 
and Consumer Product Safety Commission rejected the idea that MCS is psychogenic in nature, 
although these agencies cautiously refer to MCS as a “diagnostic label” (20). Albert Donnay 
emphasizes that, despite a lack of medical consensus, “[d]ozens of federal, state, and local 
authorities accept MCS as a legitimate disease and/or disability that deserves reasonable 
accommodation in housing, employment, and public facilities” (383). It would be misleading to 
paint a picture of MCS as a diagnosis entirely on the fringe of the medical establishment. In fact, 
it is precisely the contested status of the condition that makes access to medical, legal, and social 
support so uncertain for many MCSers and creates markets for testimony collections like 
Zwillinger’s and Johnson’s.   
14 See note 18 to the Introduction. 
15 The image of the canary in the coalmine is suggested in the titles of other MCS literature, like 
the popular newsletter Canary News and Lynn Lawson’s autobiographical introduction to her 
book Staying Well in a Toxic World, which is called “Notes from a Human Canary.” Some 
MCSers even use the term “canary” as an alternative to “MCSer” or “chemically sensitive 
person” (eg. “Safe Canary Nest” np). With these allusions, chemically sensitive people compare 
themselves to the canaries that nineteenth-century coal miners used to warn them of dangerous 
buildups of methane and other gasses before they became life-threatening to humans. The 
metaphor suggests that people who currently experience MCS should be an early warning to 
others about the risks of chemical proliferation.  
16 Berlant links her work on slow death and crisis ordinariness to what she calls Harvey’s 
“polemical observation…that under capitalism sickness is defined as the inability to work” 
(Cruel Optimism 95). Harvey’s argument is that under capitalism, people are expected to 
function as variable capital. As such, unproductive, undisciplined (in a Foucauldian sense), ill, or 
otherwise pathologized people do not admit the extraction of surplus value from their labor. His 
point is actually broader than what Berlant elaborates, for Harvey sees the relegation of the ill to 
either the institution or the underclass as part of the reconstruction of race into “distinctly 
capitalist” formations (106). 
17 Mitchell and Snyder are here repurposing Jasbir Puar’s concept of homonationalism, “the dual 
movement in which certain homosexual constituencies have embraced U.S. nationalist agendas 
and have also been embraced by nationalist agendas” (Puar, Terrorist Assemblages xxiv). 
Ablenationalism describes a disability politics, especially prominent in the United States, which 
has followed other civil rights-based models in demanding access to majority social privileges 
without a critical analysis of who has access to the dominant community’s norms or whether and 
under what circumstances those norms might be sustaining or life-affirming. “So, for instance, 
curb cuts made wheelchair accessibility feasible, audible signals at intersections and Braille 
signage accommodated those with visual impairments, and lighting-based signaling systems in 
the home or hotel provided those with hearing impairments with the means to more adequately 
respond to cues in a hearing world. Yet the emphasis in each of these instances did not 
necessarily result in a meaningful integration of differences. Rather, accommodation provided 
those bodies with levels of already integrable disability into normative frameworks that did not 
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significantly upset or disrupt environments suited to a narrow range of abilities” (Mitchell and 
Snyder, “Minority Model” 47). Ablenationalism produced a class of “able-disabled” people who 
are defined against an abjected, non-normative class of unproductive or unassimilable disabled 
people. We can see this aspect of ablenationalism at work in MCS narratives’ assertion of the 
mental fitness of chemically sensitive people.  
18 McRuer draws on Adrienne Rich’s concept of compulsory heterosexuality to theorize the 
connections between the production of sexual and bodily normativity through what he calls 
compulsory able-bodiedness. He argues that, “despite the fact that homosexuality and disability 
clearly share a pathologized past and despite a growing awareness of the intersection between 
queer theory and disability studies, little notice has been taken of the connection between 
heterosexuality and able-bodied identity. Able-bodiedness, even more than heterosexuality, still 
largely masquerades as a nonidentity, as the natural order of things” (1). I discuss McRuer’s 
contributions to ideas about neoliberal flexibility in chapter 1. 
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Chapter 3 
Toxic Life Narrative in the Alternative Food Movement 
 
Though seldom articulated as such, the attempt to redefine, or escape, the traditional role of 
consumer has become an important aspiration of the food movement. In various ways it seeks to 
put the relationship between consumers and producers on a new, more neighborly footing, 
enriching the kinds of information exchanged in the transaction, and encouraging us to regard 
our food dollars as “votes” for a different kind of agriculture and, by implication, economy. 
  -Michael Pollan1 
 
 In a June, 2010, essay in The New York Review of Books, local food guru Michael Pollan 
outlined the broad goals and internal tensions of a growing set of political, economic, and 
gastronomical trends he calls simply “the food movement”—really a loosely-related body of 
movements advocating related agendas of organic agriculture, workers’ rights, animal welfare, 
and food sovereignty (“Food Movement” np). The food movement Pollan describes here 
privileges consumers as the primary stakeholders in a food economy and reframes consumption 
as a political act. A more ethical consumerism, the argument goes, will change the food system 
through market mechanisms. 
 Within the discourses of toxic proliferation and poisoned subjectivity I have been 
tracking, the most prominent strand of what I will be calling here the “alternative food 
movement” represents a neoliberalization of toxic discourse that exists in tension with the 
grassroots collectivism of embodied health movements.2 Mainstream alternative food advocates 
have turned away from food justice paradigms that seek structural changes to conditions of food 
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production in favor of a toxic discourse that locates both risk and politics in practices of 
consumption. If industrial food threatens to bring carcinogenic or endocrine-disrupting chemicals 
into consumers’ bodies as pesticide residues, eating alternatively offers protection to those who 
can afford it. This chapter interrogates the imagined role of consumers in advancing anti-
pesticide agendas within the alternative food movement by looking at autobiographical texts by 
two of the movement’s most public faces: Michael Pollan’s The Omnivore’s Dilemma and Barry 
Estabrook’s Tomatoland.  
 These writers’ journalistic explorations of industrial food production are characteristic of 
alternative food’s popular literature in blending autobiographical and exposé forms to address a 
set of interlocking environmental, epidemiological, and economic concerns. The alternative food 
movement is not only or even primarily concerned with environmental toxins, but its attention to 
agricultural chemicals cannot be disentangled from other movement goals, such as those 
regarding public health outcomes, animal rights, or localism. The literature of alternative food 
reaches beyond, even as it constitutes, toxic discourse. In focusing primarily on alternative 
food’s journalistic exposés as forms of toxic life narrative, this chapter in many ways represents 
the limit case of my dissertation’s central concerns.  
 The status of mainstream alternative food as an embodied health movement is also 
ambiguous. While alternative food discourses invoke bodies to promote political identification, 
the bodies most at risk—agricultural laborers, the vast majority of them Mexican migrants, many 
undocumented—are not placed at the center of the movement’s claims toward bodily crisis, as 
represented by Pollan, Estabrook, and other mainstream voices. Instead, the movement mobilizes 
a discourse of cultural trauma in which the risks of industrial food production threaten the bodily 
integrity of the middle class consumer of both text and food. In The Omnivore’s Dilemma, wage 
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labor is simply erased; farmers are imagined as owner-operators, and consumer health and 
pleasure are the ultimate barometers for the ethicality of a food system. In Tomatoland, the 
specter of endocrine-disrupting and teratogenic pesticides—prompting gruesome accounts of 
eyeless, limbless, and severely impaired babies born to migrant farmworkers—haunts the 
narrative as a warning about consumer safety. Toxic threats to reproductive and working bodies 
are mobilized to discipline consumer choice with the aim of compelling corporate responsibility.  
 In the face of what they portray as the industrial food system’s chemical abuses and 
corporate negligence, alternative food advocates encourage readers to practice a form of 
consumerism they deem both ethically and aesthetically superior. Even as they draw on toxic 
discourse’s framework of a moral drama played out on a David versus Goliath scale, neither 
Pollan nor Estabrook gives serious attention to the possibility of collective political action that 
would bring about a radical shift in the policies of free trade, privatization, and deregulation that 
have made exposing farmworkers (and, yes, consumers) to dangerous chemicals just one of the 
costs of doing business. Rather, they propose individual solutions to what they acknowledge are 
structural problems, encouraging readers to vote with their consumer dollars in the belief that 
industrial agriculture will be forced to meet middle class consumers’ increasing demands for 
food that is “not only good to eat, but good to think” (Pollan, Omnivore 289). Ultimately, this 
logic blunts structural critiques that are embedded within alternative food politics. In particular, 
the political vocabulary of “alternatives” shores up neoliberal ideologies that privilege good 
consumerism as good politics. 
 Alternative food narratives are inheritors of a multifaceted history of food politics in the 
United States. In contrast to early anti-pesticide action by the United Farmworkers’ Union, in 
many ways an important predecessor in its use of testimony to link producers and consumers of 
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food, the narratives of today’s mainstream alternative food movement represent a consumer-
oriented approach that favors individualism over collective action. This kind of “not in my body” 
politics has helped to transform the alternative food movement from a radical critique of 
industrial agriculture into a prestige movement that allows the economically privileged to 
insulate themselves from toxic harms while leaving the most vulnerable constituencies to 
continued exposure.3 Building on food systems scholars’ critiques of the economic logic of 
alternatives,4 I consider how life writing has helped to advance market-driven solutions in the 
form of a flexible, ethical consumerism embraced by mainstream alternative food activists. 
These are, at heart, issues of testimonial justice that shape toxic discourse and the direction of 
environmental critique of industry writ large.  
 Alternative food narratives bring together the interrelated issues of sex and gender, ability 
and disability, production and reproduction implicit in contemporary toxic discourse to suggest a 
set of questions that resonate across all of the embodied health movements considered in this 
project: What are the stakes of claiming identities around toxic exposure? How and on whose 
behalf is toxic testimony mobilized? Which bodies, identities, and testimonies are valued or 
marginalized by the vocabularies of normativity, ability, and productivity that have long been 
central to environmentalist critiques of toxic proliferation?  
 
Defining Alternative Food as an Embodied Health Movement   
 Like any social movement, alternative food is a heterogenous network of institutions and 
activists with overlapping but non-identical agendas.5 Inevitably, scholars parse the various 
strands of alternative food politics differently. Jill Lindsey Harrison identifies four realms of 
what she calls alternative agrifood activism—“the farmworker justice movement, antitoxics 
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critics of conventional agriculture, alternative farming organizations (including sustainable 
farming and small farm advocates), and food reformers (a diverse category that includes 
nutritionist ‘what to eat’ diet reformers, gourmet ‘foodies,’ and antihunger, food justice 
activists)” (Pesticide Drift 145). Patricia Allen, on whose work Harrison is building, sees 
sustainable agriculture and community food security as the most prominent among a 
proliferation of agrifood movements (21). Michael Pollan singles out environmental and 
epidemiological concerns as having “the strongest claim to public attention” within a movement 
“unified as yet by little more than the recognition that industrial food production is in need of 
reform because its social/environmental/public health/animal welfare/gastronomic costs are too 
high” (“Food Movement” np).  
 For my part, I follow food systems scholar Julie Guthman in using “alternative food as a 
shorthand to describe institutions and practices that bring small-scale farmers, artisan food 
producers, and restaurant chefs together with consumers for the market exchange of what is 
characterized as fresh, local, seasonal, organic, and craft-produced food” (Weighing In 3, 
emphasis in original). Within this definition lies a recognition that, in large part due to the 
amplification of voices like Pollan’s, thornier issues of food justice have given way to alternative 
food as a prestige movement focused on finding market-driven solutions to the concerns of 
consumers. Food systems scholars have begun to articulate a forceful critique of these politics. 
Alternative food’s predominant “narrative linking the production and consumption of local 
organic food to positive economic, environmental, and social changes,” critics assert, assumes “a 
group of ‘like-minded’ people, with similar backgrounds, values, and proclivities, who have 
come to similar conclusions about how our food system should change” (Alkon and Agyeman 2–
3). That those conclusions tend to serve the interests of the white, middle class consumers who 
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have been the public face of alternative food comes as little surprise. Emerging critiques call out 
the mainstream alternative food movement for its neglect of issues of race and class justice 
within the industrial food system. These critiques align with this dissertation’s larger project of 
approaching testimonial injustice within environmental discourses through an intersectional 
feminist analysis. Together, environmental and testimonial justice analytic lenses can reveal how 
personal testimony is used within alternative food literature to represent relationships between 
producers, consumers, and toxic risk.   
 As we have seen, embodied health movements are defined by three key characteristics 
(Brown et al. 52–55). Alternative food clearly meets the second and third of these criteria. 
Proponents of organic, local, and sustainable food production challenge the dominant trends in 
agricultural and nutrition science (often with explicit opposition from the two government bodies 
that drive food policy in the United States: the FDA and the USDA).6 They also collaborate with 
members of the scientific and healthcare communities—from ecologists to food scientists to 
nutritionists—to further their research and policy agendas. Scholars have shown how discourses 
of bodily health and wellness drive food movement agendas, from farm-to-school initiatives to 
weight-loss claims,7 and alternative food is not alone among embodied health movements that do 
not focus on a specific medical condition.8 While it is quite clear that alternative food constitutes 
a health social movement, somewhat muddier is the question of whose bodies and experiences 
are shaping movement goals. As I have suggested, if today’s mainstream alternative food 
movement places bodies at the center of its analysis, there is a profound disconnect between the 
bodies represented as having experienced illness or disability as a result of industrial agriculture 
and the bodies that local, organic food is meant to protect. Alternative food differs in this respect 
from, say, the DES movement, which is driven by and seeks to ameliorate the embodied 
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experiences of constituencies directly impacted by exposure to the drug. Approaching alternative 
food through the rubric of embodied health movements helps to elucidate how collective 
political identities have structured and advanced the dominant narrative of alternative food 
politics throughout the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries.  
 In particular, I am concerned here with the role of testimony in shaping perceptions of the 
risks posed by agro-industrial chemicals. Who is represented as being at risk? In what ways are 
the effects of these chemicals represented as adverse or risky? On whose behalf are claims for 
rights or justice around pesticide exposure made, and how are those claims articulated? 
Questions about toxic risk are crucial to understanding contemporary alternative food politics. 
Food movements have addressed pesticide exposure throughout the twentieth century, and 
alternative food is one of the primary sites—and certainly the most public face—of anti-pesticide 
politics today. In the next section, I offer a brief history of pesticide discourse in the United 
States, considering how different lineages of pesticide politics have shaped the toxic discourse of 
today’s alternative food movement. 
 
Pesticide Discourse 
 The publication of Rachel Carson’s Silent Spring (1962) is often touted as the principal 
catalyzing event of anti-toxics activism and the renewed vitality of the environmental movement 
in late twentieth-century United States. Greg Garrard claims that “it is generally agreed” that 
Silent Spring is “the founding text of modern environmentalism” (Ecocriticism 1–2). Buell calls 
Carson’s book the “effective beginning” of toxic discourse and develops his schema of four 
defining toxic topoi around a reading of the work and the woman embraced by environmentalists 
“as harbinger, prophet, and foremother” (35; 44). Like Buell, historian Linda Nash notes how 
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Carson’s legacy influenced the agenda and strategies of environmental justice advocates and 
challenged biomedical understandings of the spatiality of disease. Ursula Heise locates Silent 
Spring within her history of the literature of the “world risk society,” and Rob Nixon sees Carson 
as addressing the challenges of representing the “slow violence” of environmental crises. 
 The importance historians and environmental critics place on Silent Spring has also 
meant a privileging of Carson’s narrative of the pesticide industry as “a child of the Second 
World War” (16). Under the influence of Carson and the sociological theories of risk put forward 
by Ulrich Beck and Anthony Giddens, World War II has arguably become the second most 
important event (following only Silent Spring) in narratives of the rise of toxic risk. Both World 
Wars I and II fueled rapid scientific and industrial development, including the synthetic 
pesticides Carson decries in her now-classic exposé. The federal government released excess 
supply of these chemicals into consumer markets after WWII. With the help of a growing 
advertising industry that drove new consumer demands in the booming post-war economy, this 
military technology became a commercial and household product, helping to mitigate the 
economic impact of leveling off in war-related industries. These conditions led directly to the 
widespread use of DDT and other synthetic pesticides at mid century. Carson hammers home 
this history in her book with frequent references to World War II and repeated invocation of 
nuclear discourse. The received narrative points to the war and Silent Spring as the origins of 
toxic proliferation and toxic anxieties, respectively.  
 These admittedly simplified but widely repeated narratives about the rise of synthetic 
pesticides and accompanying toxic discourse can be both revealing and concealing. The focus on 
these two historical moments is most compelling with respect to the rise of toxic discourse 
throughout the second half of the twentieth century. Adequately situating alternative food within 
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this discourse requires a longer view, however. While Silent Spring was truly a watershed 
moment in US environmentalism that would shape the future of anti-pesticide politics, the 
constant harkening to the book within environmental criticism’s origin stories misleadingly 
suggests that Silent Spring is the source of these politics. In actuality, Carson’s book was so 
successful in part because it built on previous scientific work and tapped into latent public 
interest in pesticide poisoning. While still recognizing what was new about the glut of synthetic 
organic pesticides that flooded consumer markets in the wake of WWII,9 as well as the backlash 
these developments engendered from Carson and those who came after her, some scholars have 
pursued a more robust history of anti-toxics politics. Robert Gottlieb puts Carson’s anti-DDT 
stance in context with earlier pesticide scares: 
 The pesticide explosion, including the development and use of chlorinated hydrocarbons 
such as DDT, largely dated from World War II, although a range of poisonous and 
potentially harmful insecticides—inorganic chemicals and heavy metal products such as 
lead arsenate—had been widely used prior to the war. These insecticides had also been 
controversial: a series of insecticide-related food poisonings during the 1920s, for 
example, generated significant public protest, including demands for product bans and 
stronger regulatory actions by the Food and Drug Administration. One best-selling book 
of the 1930s, 100,000,000 Guinea Pigs, focused on the hazards of consumer and 
industrial products and specifically singled out lead arsenate for a possible product ban.  
(127) 
 
Some scholars have positioned Carson as an intellectual daughter of early twentieth-century 
industrial hygienists and industrial toxicologists like Alice Hamilton (eg. Gottlieb; Sellers). 
Buell, too, acknowledges this history, citing Hamilton as part of a tradition of urban gothic that 
influenced Silent Spring’s darker imagery (43). Buell is not the only ecocritic to insist on a more 
complex historical account of the toxic landscape, but World War II and Silent Spring continue 
to cast long shadows that may unwittingly obscure other lineages. 
 Certainly, Carson’s legacy has played an important role in shaping contemporary 
alternative food discourse. If Silent Spring reinvigorated popular environmentalism in the United 
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States, it also put pesticides at the center of environmentalist critique, laying the groundwork for 
the renewed interest in organic and low-input farming methods in the 1960s and again at the end 
of the twentieth century (Guthman, Agrarian 36–41; Allen 30; Conkin 192). But the first wave 
of the organic movement began decades earlier, in the 1930s and early 40s, responding not only 
to agricultural industrialization but also to the dust bowl (in the US) and the economic and 
ecological destruction wreaked by colonialism (in the UK) (Guthman, Agrarian 4). Moreover, 
the conditions of food production have been central to various US social movements focused on 
both consumer safety and workers’ rights since at least the 1830s (Allen 30–32). At least as 
important to the development of today’s food movements as Silent Spring is Upton Sinclair’s 
The Jungle, for example, which critiqued the turn-of-the-century Chicago meat industry for its 
low wages, horrendous record of workplace injury, and complicity in a system of finely-tuned 
exploitation of immigrant labor. In addition to its central role in shaping the regulation of food 
production through the passage of the 1906 Pure Food and Drug Act, The Jungle also anticipates 
toxic discourse (L. Buell 42–44). Sinclair’s muckraking style has clearly influenced the many 
exposés of industrial agriculture coming out of the alternative food movement in the twenty-first 
century, including Pollan’s and Estabrook’s.10 Understanding the contemporary alternative food 
movement as a site of anti-pesticide politics and a form of toxic discourse requires that we look 
beyond the Carson-centric narrative that characterizes—and at times limits—much 
environmental criticism. Instead, alternative food and its life narratives are products of multiple 
genealogies.  
 In particular, I would like to draw attention to the anti-pesticide activism of the United 
Farmworkers of America as a precursor to today’s alternative food movement. Many scholars 
have discussed the importance of the UFW’s anti-pesticide campaigns in the history of 
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environmental and food justice movements. According to Jill Lindsey Harrison, the UFW’s 
pesticide work in the 1960s was the first time the issue of pesticide exposure “garnered a 
significant public spotlight” (Pesticide Drift 147). While other groups, including the Sierra Club 
and the Audubon Society, engaged in anti-pesticide work during this period, the 1965-1971 
UFW campaign departed significantly from the work of environmental groups primarily 
concerned about DDT in the wake of Silent Spring. Rather, farmworkers, who already possessed 
first-hand knowledge of the effects of pesticide exposure,11 linked growing public concern about 
environmental degradation to political and economic critiques of their working conditions. 
Instead of a narrow approach, the UFW engaged multiple strategies to reach a broad range of 
stakeholders with different political and economic interests in reducing the use of pesticides in 
food production. Two of those strategies bear particular attention in relation to today’s 
alternative food literature: the well known consumer boycott of grapes and the use of personal 
narrative, which has received less attention both in histories of the UFW and in food systems 
scholarship.12  
 The UFW’s grape boycott, begun two years into a targeted anti-pesticide campaign in the 
summer of 1967, signaled a shift in strategy with important consequences for the union and for 
future social movements. Organizers had been lobbying for new contracts with California grape 
growers that would improve both the economic and physical conditions of farm labor, increasing 
wages, protecting workers who refused to labor under dangerous conditions, and eliminating the 
use of certain dangerous pesticides (including DDT, which would finally be banned by the EPA 
in 1972). Faced with intense opposition, the UFW turned to “a new and untried strategy,” 
pressuring growers at the retail end by coordinating a massive consumer boycott of table grapes 
(Pawel 31). By leveraging consumer pressure against retail stores—who in turn pressured 
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growers, switched to union-approved suppliers, or stopped carrying grapes altogether—boycott 
organizers eventually succeeded in securing new contracts with slight economic gains but which 
provided workers new protections from pesticide abuses.13 
 In order to convince shoppers to leave grapes rotting on supermarket shelves, union 
members and their supporters tapped into consumers’ self-interests. Through a multi-faceted 
strategy that emphasized farmworkers’ rights as an intersectional struggle, the UFW appealed to 
groups of consumers who felt either race- or class-based solidarity with its members (Pulido 108-
109). In order for the boycott to succeed, organizers recognized that they also had to “spread the 
gospel” to middle class whites who may not have sympathized with either Chicana/o 
empowerment or the labor movement (Pawel 35). While organizers always continued to 
emphasize the health risks to food producers, they also linked the plight of farmworkers to 
consumers’ health.  
 In her book Environmentalism and Economic Justice, Laura Pulido reproduces a leaflet 
from the AFL-CIO archives warning that “Only a Union Contract Can Protect Farmworkers & 
Consumers From Dangers of POISONOUS PESTICIDES” (106). A split image, with a crop-
dusting plane at the top right and bunches of table grapes on the bottom left, collapses the space 
between the field and the supermarket, suggesting that pesticides are being sprayed directly on 
the produce section. Text below the image explains, “DDT has been scientifically connected to 
the death of fish, sterilization of birds, and cancer in mammals. Doctors and scientists are deeply 
concerned about the long-range effects of DDT on human beings, both in the living and on those 
yet to be born.” This boycott advertisement amplifies the authoritative power of science through 
the imaginative work of the split image. Without making any direct reference to pesticide 
residues on foods, it makes a powerful claim about the effects of DDT on the health of 
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consumers, highlighting the vulnerability of pregnant women and children. By appealing to 
concerns about consumer safety—particularly the risks lingering pesticide residues posed to 
children and the unborn—“the UFW made farmworker illnesses something more than self-
referential” (Nash 164–165). Linking consumers to workers through shared risk allowed 
farmworker pesticide exposure to function as a metonym for threats to consumer health.14  
This strategy was implemented in part through the use of personal testimony in the 
boycott campaign. Such testimony would appear in leaflets “with a skull and crossbones, entitled 
‘Choice Tidbits’—meaning stories of people who suffered from pesticide poisonings” (Pulido 
107). Organizers would distribute these and other materials outside targeted supermarkets in an 
attempt to sow both sympathy and fear that would ultimately overpower growers’ resistance. 
Like the leaflet shown in Pulido’s book, stories about workers’ pesticide injuries circulated in 
supermarket parking lots were part of a larger strategy linking worker and consumer health that 
encouraged shoppers to see themselves as at risk. 
 We can see the coordination of “choice tidbit” and consumer safety strategies in its fullest 
effect in Cesar Chavez’ famous “Wrath of Grapes” speech, delivered on multiple occasions in 
the second half of 1986, during a renewed period of boycott.15 Chavez reiterates the links 
between farmworkers and consumers that had helped the first boycott to succeed, while 
maintaining focus on workers as bearing the brunt of the risks of pesticide exposures. Producers 
and consumers are “one family,” he claims, but “we” farmworkers are “closest” to pesticides and 
“were the first to recognize the serious health hazards of agriculture pesticides to both consumers 
and ourselves” (193).16 After explicitly warning consumers that pesticides affect bodies 
differently and “what might be safe statistically for the average healthy forty-year-old male 
might irreparably harm an elderly consumer, a child, or the baby of a pregnant mother” (194), 
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the speech launches into a series of brief narratives. These cases represent countless stories of 
pesticide injury, argues Chavez, stories he “personally learn[s] of daily”: 
How can I explain these chemicals to three-year-old Amalia Larios, who will never walk, 
born with a spinal defect due to pesticide exposure of her mother. 
 
What statistics are important to Adrian Espinoza, seven years old and dying of cancer 
with eight other children, whose only source of water was polluted with pesticides. 
 
What headlines can justify the loss of irrigator Manuel Anaya’s right hand, amputated 
due to recurrent infection from powerful herbicides added to the water he worked with in 
the fields. (195–196) 
 
These anecdotes represent a family—pregnant mother, child, and laboring father—into which the 
audience has already been interpolated in a move Chavez then repeats: “Now is the time for all 
of us to stand as a family” (196). If consumers must stand with workers against pesticides, it is 
because they may fall to pesticides like Amalia Larios, Adrian Espinoza, and Manuel Anaya.  
 Chavez’s use of these brief stories recalls a form of life narrative known as testimonio. 
Testimonio is an autobiographical form of witnessing originating in Latin America, in which the 
“I” that speaks does so not only on behalf of the historical author but also for an oppressed 
collectivity.17 In so doing, it affirms “the individual self in a collective mode” (Beverly, “Margin 
at the Center” 97). Testimonio often appears as a single first-person narrative that represents the 
stories of multiple subjects. The form is characterized in part through a multi-layered process of 
witnessing; testimonial texts exist in the “delicate realm of collaboration” between witnesses, 
transcribers, translators, editors, and narrators (Kaplan 210). “Wrath of Grapes” stands as a kind 
of testimonio in which Chavez bears witness to a collective farmworkers’ life narrative marked 
by debilitating exposure to agricultural chemicals. If, as John Beverly argues, testimonio has the 
potential to create intimacy or “complicity” between the narrator and the audience as witnesses, 
furthering human rights agendas (Against Literature 77–78),18 then the speech demonstrates 
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aptly how personal testimony works in tandem with the UFW’s strategy of appealing to 
consumers’ concern for personal safety to further the political agenda of the boycott.  
 In its anti-pesticide politics and its strategies, the UFW grape boycott is an important 
precursor to today’s alternative food movement. Scholars like Guthman and Harrison have 
shown how declining union membership, changes in border policy, the regulation of the 
“organic” label at the state and federal level, and the rise of neoliberal trade policies have 
precipitated significant changes in alternative food activism since the 1980s. One of the goals of 
this chapter is to explore how the deployment of personal testimony reflects alternative food’s 
shift not merely toward market mechanisms but toward ideologies of flexible consumer-
citizenship. I address these issues in the next section, showing how the mainstream alternative 
food movement employs the same combination of consumer safety rhetoric and personal 
testimony that helped the UFW secure victory in the 1965-1971 anti-pesticide campaign. In this 
contemporary manifestation, however, farmworkers’ bodies and rights are overshadowed by (if 
not entirely absented to) a discourse of cultural trauma in which consumers, rather than workers, 
are imagined to be put at risk by industrial food production. 
 
Alternative Gastrography 
 Twenty years after Chavez delivered his “Wrath of Grapes” speech, and forty years after 
the start of the first grape boycott, the politics of industrial food production were brought once 
again under intense public scrutiny by a social movement that will perhaps always be thought 
synonymous with the name of its most visible figure. Michael Pollan’s The Omnivore’s 
Dilemma: A Natural History of Four Meals (2006) is a paradigmatic example of the literature of 
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the new alternative food movement, its author the most widely known evangelist of local, 
seasonal, sustainable, organic eating.  
The book’s “natural history” is delivered in three parts, each of which attempts to follow 
one of “the three principal food chains that sustain us today: the industrial, the organic, and the 
hunter-gatherer” (Omnivore 7).19 In each part, the narrator wields “the long lenses of ecology and 
anthropology, as well as the shorter, more intimate lens of personal experience” to describe the 
ecological and political ramifications of a food chain (6). He visits the sites of industrial, organic, 
and local food production, introducing a cast of colorful characters and finally consuming a meal 
produced through each food chain, which he evaluates for its aesthetic and moral pleasures. 
Pollan’s fourth book, The Omnivore’s Dilemma helped catapult alternative food politics into the 
mainstream and secured its author a place at the forefront of the movement. 
 While Barry Estabrook’s renown may not rise to the level of Pollan’s, he has earned his 
foodie chops as a former contributing editor at Gourmet and current advisory board member at 
Gastronomica. Tomatoland: How Industrial Agriculture Destroyed Our Most Alluring Fruit 
(2011) made the New York Times bestseller list, and the Gourmet article on slavery in the tomato 
industry that preceded the book garnered a James Beard award in 2010. Tomatoland is a 
journalistic exposé of industrial tomato farming, with a specific focus on the slicing tomato 
industry in southern Florida. Largely narrated in the first person, the book is framed by an 
explicitly autobiographical introduction and epilogue, which structure an overarching narrative 
of the protagonist Estabrook embarking “on the tomato trail” in search of “a great tomato” (ix, 
193). The first part of the book explores the origins of the Florida slicing tomato industry and 
chronicles the fruit’s decline into a watery, tasteless, and nutritionally poorer version of “the 
tomatoes available to any housewife during the Kennedy administration” (xii). The middle 
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chapters reveal widespread industry abuses: the prodigious use of toxic chemicals, dismal wages, 
and, most disturbing, complicity in modern-day slavery. Toward the end of the book, Estabrook 
introduces readers to individuals and institutions that are “building a better tomato” (153), 
including a grassroots labor organization, charter schools, and an artisanal tomato farmer.  
 The Omnivore’s Dilemma and Tomatoland are each many things, among them life 
narrative. The meteoric rise of alternative food culture in the early years of the twenty-first 
century has overlapped with the memoir boom,20 and life narrative has helped to propel foodie 
culture, including the alternative food movement, into the public consciousness. It is with this 
understanding that I approach Michael Pollan and Barry Estabrook as life writers. One way to 
read these narratives is as a kind of “schtik lit.” While this type of life writing may at times rise 
only to the level of attention-grabbing stunt, G. Thomas Couser locates schtik between two 
respected autobiographical traditions: immersion journalism and the Thoreauvian “account of a 
deliberate, temporary deviation from normal life” (161-3). One certainly gets the sense that 
Pollan would be pleased to think of his experiments with self-conscious, local eating at the end 
of The Omnivore’s Dilemma as Walden-esque. Beyond “mere” schtik, The Omnivore’s Dilemma 
and Tomatoland offer personal journeys, narratives of discovery in which their narrators pursue a 
path of foodie enlightenment. In this way, they resonate with the conventions of the conversion 
narrative: both narrators wade into the dark corners of the industrial food systems in which they 
have long participated and emerge on the other side having experienced a “conversion to new 
beliefs and worldviews,” with a new sense of “communal identity” centered on more ethical and 
more pleasurable eating (Smith and Watson, Reading 91). 
 Reading these narratives as journeys of spiritual awakening is commensurate with what 
Guthman recognizes as a “missionary impulse” within the mainstream alternative food 
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movement. “Seeing their food choices as signs of heightened ethicality,” alternative food 
advocates like Pollan and Estabrook “see social change as making people become like them” 
(Weighing In 141). If Pollan “uses his own personal experience to write about a broader ‘us’ 
driving down the road and stuffing a McDonald’s Happy Meal into our collective face,” he also 
uses his experience to convert readers to the new alternative food orthodoxy and encourage them 
to “spread the gospel” (ibid. 6). Insofar as texts like these offer a conversation narrative, their 
missionary impulse cannot be separated from the autobiographical one. Having experienced a 
gastronomical awakening, the narrators offer their own life stories as part of a model for better 
eating.  
 This is most obvious in The Omnivore’s Dilemma, each part of whose narrative 
concludes with an archetypical meal consumed by Pollan with his family or friends, 
exemplifying the ethical and aesthetic pitfalls or pleasures of each food chain. The book 
culminates at Pollan’s moral and gustatory zenith: the “Perfect Meal,” the “Omnivore’s 
Thanksgiving,” a meal foraged and prepared entirely by the narrator and enjoyed with good 
wine, good company, and good conversation. Here Pollan glides easily between personal 
experience and collective pronouns, interpolating the reader into the Perfect Meal and its moral 
calculus. “Perhaps the perfect meal is one that’s been fully paid for,” explains the narrator. “[A] 
meal that is eaten in full consciousness of what it took to make it is worth preparing every now 
and again, if only as a way to remind us of the true costs of the things we take for granted” (409-
410, emphasis mine). In this, the book’s final scene, Pollan makes a dual move that characterizes 
The Omnivore’s Dilemma and its politics: he conflates eating pleasurably with eating ethically 
and collapses the distance between narrator and audience.  
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 The ethical stakes of Tomatoland are clearer: the Florida slicing tomato industry is made 
possible through slave labor and dangerous “bad actor” pesticides (Estabrook also makes 
aesthetic claims about tasteless supermarket tomatoes that closely mirror Pollan’s concerns. I 
will take up the issue of taste directly later in this chapter).21 Estabrook does not merely describe 
the dire economic, environmental, and culinary costs of this industry from a distance, with the 
reader as a witness-twice-removed.22 Instead, he performs the role of eyewitness, of participant-
observer. The main body of Tomatoland is situated within an autobiographical frame that owes 
to a shared convention of immersion journalism or the adventure narrative: the autobiographical 
subject takes temporary leave of his everyday life to seek rarified knowledge in a dangerous, 
riskier world.  
In his introduction, called “On the Tomato Trail,” Estabrook deploys a move similar to 
Pollan’s, attempting to bridge the distance between narrator and audience. “After months of 
crisscrossing Florida,” narrates Estabrook, “I began to see that the Florida tomato industry 
constitutes a parallel world unto itself, a place where many of the assumptions I had taken for 
granted about living in the United States are turned on their heads” (xvi). The rest of the book 
represents a tour through this parallel world, “a world we’ve all made, and one we can fix” (ibid. 
xvii, emphasis mine). The final sentence of the introduction serves as an invitation to the reader 
to join the narrator on his journey through this world that “we” have wrought. With the words, 
“Welcome to Tomatoland” (ibid. xvii), Estabrook brings the reader into the narrative, hailing us 
as fellow travelers in his quest for an ethically and aesthetically better tomato. This is a move to 
implicate the audience beyond the page, but it also serves to separate readers from the 
farmworkers who inhabit Tomatoland. We know that, like Estabrook, we are on an adventure 
tour, a “temporary deviation” from our normal lives.  
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 These autobiographical narratives of alternative food—what I propose to call, following 
Rosalía Baena, “alternative gastrographies”—use the autobiographical form to different effect 
than the personal testimony leveraged by the UFW in its grape boycott, discussed earlier. The 
testimonio form wielded by Chavez “bears witness to collective suffering, politicized struggle, 
and communal survival” to shed light on the abuse of marginalized farmworkers (Smith and 
Watson, Reading 91). Pollan and Estabrook, as I will show, ultimately locate both suffering and 
politics largely with consumers. This marks a profound shift from earlier anti-agricultural 
pesticide activism and characterizes mainstream alternative food politics in the twenty-first 
century. This shift toward consumers is facilitated by the alternative food movement’s 
investment in autobiographical forms. Through personal narrative, Pollan and Estabrook 
generate a sense of immediacy about consumer health risks and provide prescriptive solutions for 
industrial food’s epidemiological, moral, and aesthetic shortcomings. Form and politics work 
together to advance a narrative of cultural trauma in which consumers, constituted as a body 
politic, are the primary subjects of traumatic injury.  
 
The Omnivore’s Dilemma  
 Industrial farmwork is arguably one of the most physically taxing and least economically 
rewarding jobs in the United States. Many farm jobs are stoop labor, in which workers must 
crouch for hours at a time to pick low-growing crops by hand, causing such injuries as slipped 
vertebral discs, tendonitis, and chronic pain. Farmworkers may be required by growers to live on 
site in crowded accommodations that are poorly ventilated in the summer and improperly 
insulated for the colder months, or they may live an hour or more from the fields, to which they 
may be transported only by a subcontracted “crew boss” who hires them on a per diem basis. 
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Once in the fields, they may be exposed to pesticides that are already dangerous when used 
correctly. Too often, they are not. There are widespread reports of growers sending workers into 
fields too soon after spraying;23 failing to provide workers with required protective gear; 
spraying pesticides directly on workers; and providing only English language pesticide training 
to workers who speak or read only Spanish, Triqui, or other Mixtec languages.24 According to 
the Pesticide Action Network, known risks of exposure to common agro-industrial chemicals 
include dizziness, headache, nausea, trouble breathing, brain and nervous system damage, 
endocrine disruption, reproductive effects, cancer, and death. For all of this, most workers are 
paid on a piecework basis (by the pound, box, or bucket) and live well below the poverty line.25 
These health and economic concerns are exacerbated for immigrants, especially those whose 
immigration is unauthorized, who have less access to social and legal services they might 
leverage to improve their working and living conditions (Thomas 209). In a 2005 report on the 
National Agricultural Workers Survey, the US Department of Labor estimated that nearly 80% 
of farmworkers are immigrants, with more than half of those undocumented (3–6). 
 Given these widely-recognized and decidedly unappetizing facts about the conditions of 
industrial food production, it is notable that The Omnivore’s Dilemma directs no attention to 
industrial farmworkers, with the exception of a single passing reference to pickers on an 
“industrial organic” farm whom Pollan identifies as Mexican (Omnivore 166). Where The 
Omnivore’s Dilemma does attend to the human conditions of agricultural production, the 
narrative focuses on relationships between producers and consumers. As the narrator follows 
different food chains, he attempts to trace them back to their human face, to connect personally 
with the man (there are virtually no women in Pollan’s world of agricultural production) 
responsible for growing the meal on his plate. For example, the narrator spends an afternoon 
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planting traditionally-grown corn with a likeable, if ornery, Iowa corn farmer. However, the 
combination of corn’s fungibility and its incredible chemically-supported yields make it 
impossible for him to trace the corn used to make the ingredients in his son’s Happy Meal back 
to any specific farm. According to Pollan, this creates a lack of accountability that makes 
industrially-produced food bad for consumers. That is, the unhealthfulness of processed foods 
containing corn products (like fast-food burgers, fries, and sodas) is attributed in part to 
unwholesome social-economic organization that separates farmers (in this case, read: farm 
owners) from eaters.  
 In contrast, the narrator promotes an agrarian ideal of small, family-owned farms 
supported directly by local consumers through farmers’ markets, community-supported 
agriculture ventures (CSAs), and farm-to-table dining. In The Omnivore’s Dilemma, this ideal is 
represented by Polyface Farm and its owner, Joel Salatin. In his investigation of organic food 
chains, Pollan visits the Virginia farm to labor and live for a week with the Salatin family. Part of 
what appeals to Pollan—where he locates Polyface’s moral and gastronomical goodness—is how 
“remarkably short” a food chain it produces. “I had been able to follow it for most of its length 
without leaving the Salatins’ property,” he explains approvingly (239). The narrator clearly sees 
a parallel between the ecological health of the farm’s closed-circle ecology (cows eat grass, 
manure nourishes grass) and the moral health of its relatively closed familial economy, in which 
Joel Salatin runs the farm with the help of his wife and their grown children, two interns, and 
some neighbors to help out on slaughtering days. 
 All of this may indeed allow Polyface to run the kind of ecologically conscious and 
community-based business that Pollan admires. Yet, in idealizing Polyface as a model of new 
agrarian success, Pollan neglects the complicated realities of that tradition. As Julie Guthman 
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points out, “deeming the ‘small-scale family farm’ a proxy for social justice” erases the gender 
and racial dynamics that historically structured small-farm economies, as well as the history of 
racial exclusion in US land policy (Agrarian 174). We occasionally catch a glimpse of this 
history under the surface of The Omnivore’s Dilemma, as when Joel Salatin compares himself 
and his customers to “the Indians—we just want to opt out. That’s all the Indians ever wanted—
to keep their teepees, to give their kids herbs instead of patent medicines and leeches” (132). 
Here, Salatin—and by extension Pollan, who reproduces and apparently endorses this view 
without comment—evinces a profound racial ignorance that characterizes the new agrarian ideal 
espoused by writers like Wendell Berry, whom Pollan cites repeatedly and with admiration. 
 Moreover, most family-owned farms today, including those that farm organically, hire 
laborers from outside the family, and, “once hired labor is admitted into the analysis, there is no 
evidence to suggest that working conditions and remuneration on small ‘family’ farms are better 
than on large ‘corporate’ ones” (Guthman, Agrarian 174; see also Holmes). In California, which 
is home to the largest percentage of organic farms in the United States, the majority of wage 
laborers on small-scale farms are Mexican migrants or US-born Mexican-Americans, just as on 
large-scale industrial farms (Guthman, Agrarian 176). All of this is to say that the interrelated 
issues of racial, migration, ecological, and labor justice are central to both industrial and organic, 
large- and small-scale farming. But Pollan chooses not to open this line of questioning at all, 
completely ignoring the role of hired labor in any of the food chains he pursues.  
Instead, Pollan focuses most of his attention on consumers as an index for the 
physiological, ecological and ethical healthfulness of a food system. Even as he devotes most of 
his pages to describing food production, the narrator always turns back to consumers, as when he 
implicitly endorses Joel Salatin’s view that “the only meaningful guarantee of integrity is when 
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buyers and sellers can look one another in the eye” (240). Ultimately, The Omnivore’s Dilemma 
is at its heart a diagnosis of and corrective prescription for “Our National Eating Disorder,” 
which is the title of the book’s introduction. Industrial food is framed from the outset not as a 
primarily economic or ecological problem but as a form of pathological consumption. The 
“omnivore’s dilemma”—the problem of what to eat when your species has not evolved to require 
a specialized diet—understands “disordered” eating as a problem stemming from a surfeit of 
(poor) dietary choices. In some respects, what the narrator offers is an addiction narrative, in 
which he serves as a therapist or witness attempting to “convert” a nation degraded by out-of-
control consumption.  
Like the addiction narrative, Pollan’s alternative gastrography tells a story of personal 
moral uplift; The Omnivore’s Dilemma mobilizes the personal responsibility rhetoric of 
“healthism” to bolster his case for a new food culture. Healthism names “the preoccupation with 
personal health as a primary…focus for the definition and achievement of well-being; a goal 
which is to be attained primarily through the modification of life styles” (Crawford 368). It is a 
form of medicalization that disciplines bodies through moral imperatives. Discourses of 
healthism are at work whenever “appealing to health allows for a set of moral assumptions that 
are allowed to fly stealthily under the radar” (Metzl 2). When the narrator laments what he sees 
as a US food culture that is “apt to confuse protein bars and food supplements with meals or 
breakfast cereals with medicines” and to “eat a fifth of its meals in cars or feed fully a third of its 
children at a fast-food outlet every day,” and when he links these apparent failings to Americans’ 
fatness (3), he taps into the core ideology of healthism: that health is a personal, moral 
imperative.26 “Healthism insists that the maintenance of good health is the responsibility of the 
individual,” as Deborah Lupton explains, “or the idea of one’s health as an enterprise” (70). 
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Pollan’s brand of healthism holds individuals accountable for the physiological and ethical 
goodness of the foods they eat, while at the same time denouncing the corporate and 
governmental interests that make “bad” foods widely available and economically accessible to 
most consumers. Pollan’s personal journey of gastronomic awakening serves as a model for 
readers in transcending these deep contradictions and achieving the heightened ethicality that 
healthism demands through “better” personal choices.  
Most important for our purposes here, both Pollan and Estabrook borrow from earlier 
UFW strategies to position agricultural pesticide exposure in particular as a risk to consumers. In 
The Omnivore’s Dilemma, pesticide risks are incorporated into the ideology of personal 
responsibility that characterizes healthism. That is, pesticide exposure is in the first place 
imagined as a problem of consumption rather than production and in the second place as a 
problem best served by individual, not structural, solutions. Pollan’s approach to pesticide 
exposure plays out in a complex passage in which he weighs the health benefits of the organic 
chicken dinner he has just served his young son. “I happen to believe that the organic dinner I 
served my family is healthier than a meal of the same foods conventionally produced, but I’d be 
hard-pressed to prove it scientifically,” he muses.  
Remarkably little research has been done to assess the effects of regular exposure to the 
levels of organophosphate pesticide or growth hormone that the government deems 
‘tolerable’ in our foods…[but] minimizing a child’s exposure to these chemicals seems 
like a prudent idea…So I can wait for that science to be done, or for our government to 
ban atrazine (as European governments have done), or I can act now on the presumption 
that food from which this chemical is absent is better for my son’s health than food that 
contains it. (177-178)  
 
The narrator’s calculations demonstrate perfectly the characteristic tensions of mainstream 
alternative food discourse, between the structural analysis inherent to embodied health 
movements and the solipsistic individualism of healthist ideology. While he criticizes stagnating 
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research agendas and government inaction, Pollan suggests that the health benefits of organic 
eating are a matter of personal belief and concludes that protecting children from pesticide 
exposure is ultimately a matter of personal choice. Yet that choice is not a neutral one. If serving 
one’s child organic foods is “prudent,” parents who buy conventionally-grown foods fail to do 
what is “better” for their families. Moreover, this failure is implicitly attributed to laziness: such 
parents have chosen to “wait” instead of “act now.” It is hard not to read such subtle aspersions 
as class-coded, especially when read alongside the narrator’s expressed disdain for both fast-food 
and fatness (which he uncritically links to one another).  
 The related themes of personal responsibility, individualism, and consumer politics are 
facilitated by Pollan’s autobiographical narration. All life writing has the potential to serve as a 
model for audiences, and this is especially true of addiction or conversion narratives. As long as 
an audience has faith in the authenticity of the autobiographical performance, the protagonist’s 
journey is represented as achievable and, often, as desirable. In performing autobiographically 
the role of investigative journalist, the narrator of The Omnivore’s Dilemma generates a powerful 
set of truth-effects. As he reports on his research into the natural history, economic policy, and 
biology behind a food system, the narrator appears to verify at once the truthfulness of his 
autobiographical testimony and the fact of hidden truths beyond that which can be accounted for 
in the scene of witnessing—at the table or on the farm, for example. In the process of revealing 
more than what he can claim to have witnessed, the narrator leads us to believe that the whole 
truth of industrial food has been exposed; the audience’s trust in the authenticity of his 
autobiographical performance reinforces our trust in his expertise as a journalist.  
 This makes the autobiographical exposé form particularly effective as a vehicle for 
advancing consumer politics, because it seems to represent the systemic forces that shape 
  154 
consumption practices while also offering an authentic protagonist who contends with these 
forces through skillful navigation of the system. The narrator depicts a set of problems in the 
food system that he reveals to be structural in nature, yet he seems to successfully mitigate those 
problems through apparently simple individual action. This kind of message may be comforting 
to audiences who can imagine themselves driving to a nearby farm to pick up their family’s meat 
and eggs or baking bread with wild sourdough yeast they forage themselves from the Bay Area 
air. The narrator does not address whether or how consumers without cars or Marin County 
addresses can achieve this same kind of moral and gastronomic self-sufficiency. As a politics, 
then, this vision for a path to a sustainable food future simply cannot capture the economic and 
ethical complexity of modern food systems.   
 
Tomatoland 
This same series of authenticating moves is at work in Estabook’s narrative. Yet, in sharp 
contrast to The Omnivore’s Dilemma, Tomatoland’s narrator observes up close the often brutal 
physical and economic conditions of farm labor and clearly traces these problems to corporate 
negligence, federal immigration policies, and poor government oversight. The book is best 
known for its chilling portrait of modern slavery in Florida, but a chapter on pesticide abuse, 
titled “Chemical Warfare,” is equally powerful. In it, Estabrook visits Tower Cabins, a labor 
camp in Immokalee, Florida, where three tomato pickers employed by Ag-Mart Produce gave 
birth to children with significant congenital anomalies within six weeks of one another in the late 
2000s. Through conversations with one of the mothers, Francisca Herrera, and the lawyer who 
helped her family successfully sue Ag-Mart, the narrator offers a startling portrait of the tomato 
industry: fields sprayed with dozens of toxic pesticides; workers, including pregnant women, 
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becoming coated in pesticide dust after a day in the fields; field bosses ordering workers to spray 
pesticides directly onto other pickers; corporate denial that pesticides pose any risks to human 
health whatsoever; and ineffectual regulatory agencies with conflicting mandates to promote 
industry while investigating its abuses. In a court deposition excerpted in Tomatoland, Herrera’s 
husband testified that he and his wife worked without protective gear like gloves, which they 
could not afford. They would also be directly sprayed with pesticides two or three times a week 
during the time that she was pregnant with their son, Carlitos, who was born with tetra-amelia 
syndrome (Estabrook 58).27 Ag-Mart eventually settled out of court, though they admitted no 
responsibility for Carlitos’s injuries. 
By engaging personal narrative—through the narrator’s own journey of coming to 
knowledge about the tomato industry, but also by interviewing farmworkers and quoting 
extensively from legal depositions—Estabrook positions the reader as a secondary witness to the 
slow violence of pesticides. If a primary witness experiences the traumatic event first-hand, the 
scene of testimony may produce a secondary witness, one who becomes through the act of 
listening a witness to both the trauma and the process of witnessing itself. By witnessing process, 
the secondary witness becomes “a witness to himself,” recognizing himself recognizing the 
testimony of another (Laub, “Bearing Witness” 58; see also Laub, “Truth and Testimony”; 
Schaffer and Smith). The primary act of witnessing for a listening other, says Kelly Oliver, 
constitutes more than a claim for recognition. As in juridical contexts, to witness implies a set of 
demands, including demands for retribution, compassion, and redress, which reach beyond mere 
recognition and suggest the ways in which all subjectivity is constituted through the 
intersubjective process of witnessing (7–8). In engaging Tomatoland, the reader witnesses a 
multi-layered testimonial process that includes and exceeds formal sites of witnessing such as the 
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law. In serving as a medium for this secondary level of witnessing, Estabrook also turns the 
reader into a witness to his own process of witnessing. We observe him “identifying with…and 
taking responsibility for” his own role in receiving the testimony of farmworkers like Herrera 
(Schaffer and Smith 109). Like Estabrook, the reader must come to terms with her own  
response-ability; she is charged with the task of reorienting herself in a historical and ethical 
terrain that has shifted with the telling of stories of farmworker abuse.  
 Estabrook works to situate the reader in this new toxic terrain by strategically linking 
farmworker pesticide injuries to consumer health risks, creating a different site of identification 
for his audience. For the UFW, this tactic was part of an attempt to bring the message of worker 
pesticide abuse to a larger constituency whose combined buying power could influence retailers, 
and ultimately growers, to secure a new contract for farmworkers. When Chavez declared that 
workers and consumers were “one family,” he was imaginatively building a coalition in the 
name of farmworkers. Estabrook attempts a similar move, positioning consumers and workers as 
the “two groups [that] come out on the short end of the industrial tomato bargain” (34). 
Tomatoland sheds a harsh light indeed on the industry’s abuse of its workers, yet at times 
farmworkers are imagined as little more than a vehicle for conveying the risks of industrial food. 
In a particularly telling passage lamenting the role of tomatoes in outbreaks of food-borne 
illnesses, the narrator claims that “[b]irds, reptiles, and infected fieldworkers are all vectors for 
salmonella” (33). Here, Estabrook engages in a medicalized nativism that dehumanizes the 
mostly Mexican migrant labor force he purports in other passages to champion, turning workers, 
like animals, into agents of disease representing a threat to consumer health.28  
 This is a particularly disturbing trend in relation to the bodies of pregnant women and 
children. Estabrook focuses almost all of his attention to farmworker pesticide exposure on the 
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case of baby Carlitos, his mother Francesca Herrera, and the other Tower Cabins babies who 
were injured by pesticides during fetal development. Baby Jorge was born, the narrator explains, 
with “one ear, no nose, a cleft palate, one kidney, no anus, and no visible sexual organs. A 
couple of hours later, following a detailed examination, the doctors determined that Jorge was in 
fact a girl. Her parents renamed her Violeta. Her birth defects were so severe that she survived 
for only three days” (36). Tomatoland contains more than 30 mentions of birth “defects” or 
“deformities,” and another dozen references to chemicals causing reproductive problems. Agro-
industrial pesticides can have a significant impact on fetal and infant development, as the stories 
of Carlitos and Violeta demonstrate. But it is also true that toxic discourse has long relied on a 
troubling tradition of grotesque representation as part of its political project.  
 The narrative’s representation of these children as victims of pesticide exposure poses 
two related ethical issues. The first is the subsuming of disability and reproductive difference 
together under the category of “defect.” The repetitive listing of Jorge’s absent body parts, 
culminating in the revelation of his actual identity as Violeta, is so clearly designed to shock and 
overwhelm the reader. Following toxic discourse’s tradition of gothification, Violeta becomes an 
embodiment of toxic degradation. Her impairment, her sexual illegibility, and her death have 
value insofar as they warn against toxic proliferation. Although the gothification of Carlitos’s 
and Violeta’s conditions are meant to indict Ag-Mart, this process reinforces existing paradigms 
for representing disability as either repulsive or piteous, paradigms in which environmentalism is 
heavily implicated. 
 Second, while chapters on farmworker abuse and activism are physically at the center of 
the book, Tomatoland ultimately turns toward “matters of taste,” as a later chapter is called. In 
these final chapters, Estabrook attempts to link the physical and economic toll industrial 
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agriculture takes on its workers to consumers’ desire for better-tasting tomatoes. Estabrook’s 
understanding of the relationship between corporate producers, consumers, and workers pits 
growers against the consumers and workers harmed by the industrial tomato system. “The 
system may work well for big tomato growers and their corporate customers,” he writes. But, 
Consumers occasionally get a tomato that makes them ill. And they are almost always 
 seduced into buying by the beautiful red exteriors and then—in the produce aisle’s 
 version of bait-and-switch—they are rewarded with a mealy mouthful stripped of 
 nutrients and devoid of flavor. ‘A total gastronomic loss,’ wrote James Beard in his book 
 Beard on Food, published in 1974 but still true today. 
 The biggest losers in Tomatoland’s hell-bent race to produce cheap commodity 
 fruits are the men and women whose labor produces the food we eat. Day in and day out, 
 they enter those poisoned fields and expose themselves to a witch’s brew of toxic 
 chemicals…Their horror stories turned my stomach—a total gastronomic loss in the 
 fullest sense. (34) 
 
In this passage, Estabrook establishes a hierarchy in which growers, who benefit from the 
system, occupy the top rung, and workers come out at the bottom, with consumers occupying a 
middle space. In one sense, this hierarchy is reflected in the structure of these paragraphs, which 
address growers, then consumers, then finally workers. But Estabrook also uses parallelism to 
ally consumers with workers, and it is taste that links consumer safety and mealy tomatoes to 
worker pesticide exposure as “bads” of the tomato industry. If the “axial principle of…risk 
society is the distribution of ‘bads’ or ‘dangers’” (Lash and Wynne 3), one critique that has been 
levied at the world risk paradigm is that it cannot adequately account for the uneven distribution 
of these bads. Even while Estabrook clearly recognizes that the harms to consumers and workers 
are on different orders of magnitude, the persistent use of taste—with its intertwined meanings of 
both sensation and judgment—recalls alternative food’s (highly racialized) class troubles. If the 
representation of Carlitos and Violeta as defect-ive threatens to turn real children into mere 
signifiers of a dysfunctional economic system, the focus on taste empties those signifiers of their 
environmental and economic import. 
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Cultural Trauma and Testimonial Justice 
 I follow other food systems scholars who have critiqued the alternative food movement 
for the narrowness of its individualistic politics and privileging of consumption practices.29 This 
project’s approach to alternative food at the intersection of life writing and toxic discourse points 
toward trauma as a productive rubric for thinking about the movement’s implicit biases, as I 
suggest that shifting discourses of traumatic embodiment have been crucial to shaping poisoned 
subjectivity over the past thirty-five years. As alternative food literature turns industrial 
agriculture’s abuses—not only worker pesticide exposure but also agribusiness involvement in 
oppressive border policies, animal abuse, and environmental degradation—into threats to 
consumers’ reproductivity, waistlines, wallets, and cuisine, it generates a traumatic mood in 
which violence plays out not only on the bodies and psyches of those immediately affected but 
reverberates throughout a culture.  
 Kirby Farrell theorizes moods of cultural trauma in his study of the 1990s as a “post-
traumatic culture.” For Farrell, trauma functions as a “trope,” a “strategic fiction” that “reflects a 
disturbance in the ground of collective experience: a shock to people’s values, trust, and sense of 
purpose” (2–3). In the period Farrell describes, the traumatic mood “register[ed] the 
dissonance—the shock—of meeting long-denied realities that threaten our individual and 
collective self-esteem” (15). In this way, Farrell’s theorization of cultural trauma clearly 
resonates with toxic discourse, which is structured by repeated, violent epiphanies of toxic 
proliferation that threatens human health and environmental integrity. Buell describes this “shock 
of awakened perception” as a shift from a simple pastoral imaginary toward a complex pastoral, 
which recognizes the apparently pristine natural world as infused with technology (36).30 This 
initial shock gives way to a generalized anxiety as subjects perceive that they inhabit a “world 
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without refuge” in which toxic harms may seem to strike indiscriminately. Ulrich Beck may well 
have written that, in the world risk society, toxins are democratic.31  
 In the twenty-first century, the alternative food movement engages trauma’s tropes as it 
rehearses the motifs of toxic discourse to awaken consumers to the potentially destructive 
interventions of technology and corporate capitalism under industrial agriculture. The 
Omnivore’s Dilemma, all the way down to its title, suggests a collective experience of traumatic 
eating. The narrator diagnoses cultural trauma by identifying patterns of consumption that he 
deems pathological, without attention to whether and how actual people experience food 
production as damaging to their bodies or minds. Under the regime of modern industrial 
agriculture, he suggests, eating itself is a dilemma, fraught with anxiety. He diagnoses 
Americans with a “national eating disorder” defined by eating habits that are unstable, unrooted, 
confused, and susceptible to pendulum swings (2-3). “The more anxious we are about eating,” he 
writes, “the more vulnerable we are to the seductions of the marketer and the expert’s advice. 
Food marketing in particular thrives on dietary instability and so tends to exacerbate it” (301). As 
a form of toxic discourse, alternative food literature both describes and produces this sense of 
anxiety; as Farrell suggests, trauma functions culturally as both strategy and a mood.  
 Of course, the alternative food movement offers a prescription in answer to its diagnosis: 
ameliorative forms of consumption that can only be achieved by working through “traumas of 
pastoral disruption” (L. Buell 37). As the narrator of The Omnivore’s Dilemma explains of the 
national eating disorder: “Many people today seem perfectly content eating at the end of an 
industrial food chain, without a thought in the world; this book is probably not for them…[T]his 
is a book about the pleasures of eating, the kinds of pleasure that are only deepened by knowing” 
(11). If trauma is diffuse, prompted by and spread across a national eating culture, pleasure and 
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healing are available to those who know how to consume the right foods (and, perhaps, the right 
books to teach them how). By eating pleasurably, which is to say organically, readers will find 
their anxieties soothed as they reintegrate their new gastronomical knowledge through new 
patterns of consumption. Alternative food is imagined as an enclave where the knowing can seek 
refuge from a toxic food landscape. In The Omnivore’s Dilemma, the narrator’s performance of 
increasingly ethical forms of consumption (industrial, industrial organic, beyond organic, local) 
serves as a model that readers can and should follow to achieve the same alternative food 
conversion as Pollan and enjoy its attendant pleasures.  
 Tomatoland also connects pleasure and knowing as ways of registering and moving 
beyond trauma. Linking bad taste with bad ethics, the narrator condemns industrial farming as “a 
total gastronomic loss” (34). This is a move that makes slavery, pesticide exposure, and other 
abuses problems of eating, as well as of labor, regulation, economics, and ecology. Alternative 
gastrography-as-conversion narrative provides a model for more ethical consumption practices, 
allowing readers to imagine themselves as one of the benevolent individuals profiled in the 
book—the investigative reporter, the lawyer working pro bono, the day care provider, or the 
organic tomato farmer—whenever they shop and eat. But readers can also imagine themselves as 
bearing a limited similarity to the laborers whose health is threatened by pesticides. When the 
narrator recites a litany of pesticide facts, listing all thirty-five chemicals whose residues were 
found on conventionally-grown tomatoes in US supermarkets, he knows that readers won’t be 
comforted by the fact that these residues are considered within the range of acceptable risk. 
When audiences read that “at high enough concentrations…fourteen are endocrine disruptors, 
and three cause reproductive problems and birth defects” (28), they are meant to imaginatively 
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identify with Francisca Herrera and baby Carlitos, born without arms or legs due to pesticide 
exposure. 
 In Tomatoland, trauma travels like pesticide residue from sites of production to adhere to 
the bodies of consumers. Trauma becomes “sticky,” to use Sara Ahmed’s language, moving 
across bodies and objects as they come into contact with one another. While “tomatoland” 
constitutes “a parallel world unto itself” that stands apart from “any other American 
jurisdiction,” tomatoes serve as a point of contact (xiv-xvi). While the trope of the parallel world 
dissociates consumers from industry abuses and separates them from producers, the fruit itself 
crosses the porous border between tomatoland and middle America. The market circulation of 
tomatoes brings both pesticides and toxic anxieties into consumers’ homes; not only residues but 
also testimonies are “sticky.” As these testimonies travel, they seem to demonstrate that 
pesticides pose a threat to reproduction writ large, with the demonstrated harm to workers’ 
babies signifying potential health risks to consumers.  
 The Omnivore’s Dilemma and Tomatoland suggest the ways that the alternative food 
movement, in directing its energies toward consumption practices sometimes alongside but often 
at the expense of a rigorous analysis of systems of production, engages in a discourse and 
contributes to a mood of cultural trauma. The specificity of the effects of pesticide exposure on 
farmworkers like Francisca Herrera feeds into a generalized traumatic mood marked by vague 
anxieties about consumers’ health, weight, and appetites. Writing about the Holocaust, Dominick 
LaCapra warns that “the indiscriminate generalization of the category of survivor and the overall 
conflation of history or culture with trauma… have the effect of obscuring crucial historical 
distinctions” (xi). While trauma’s aftereffects can reverberate throughout a culture, LaCapra 
distinguishes between empathy for and identification with the category of survivor, suggesting 
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the value of a narrower understanding of trauma grounded in historical specificity. For example, 
as I argued earlier, Michael Pollan ignores the racial exclusions embedded in US land and 
immigration policies that continue to shape race and class disparities between land owners and 
wage laborers on small farms today when he privileges relationships between producers and 
consumers as part of an agrarian ideal. When Barry Estabrook decries the abuses that industrial 
agriculture heaps on “the men and women whose labor produces the food we eat,” he gestures 
toward but never names the complex and interlocking ideologies of race, class, and citizenship 
that implicitly separate “those” who labor from “we” who consume (34).  
 Discourses of cultural trauma have important implications for testimonial justice in the 
alternative food movement. The Omnivore’s Dilemma virtually erases wage laborers in its 
depiction of industrial and organic agricultural production, turning production itself into a 
problem of consumption. While increasing the market demand for organically-grown foods 
likely reduces overall farmworker pesticide exposure, it is not clear that this sort of “ethical 
consumerism” does ultimately subvert the human, animal, and environmental abuses of 
industrial agriculture. And there is something deeply suspicious about a project that purports to 
follow a food chain back to its roots without more than a passing nod to the millions of people 
who literally tend those roots and harvest their produce.  
 Since the narrator of The Omnivore’s Dilemma himself frames his literary and 
gastronomic projects as problems of knowing, I suggest we consider the absence of farmworkers 
in Pollan’s agricultural imaginary as a specific epistemological harm: pre-emptive testimonial 
injustice. As we saw in chapter 2 with the testimonies of people experiencing multiple chemical 
sensitivity, prejudicial beliefs about subjects’ capacity to reason and to witness veraciously may 
cause hearers to reject the testimony of some social groups. But some social groups may not be 
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solicited for their testimony in the first place. Such “pre-emptive” testimonial injustice “takes 
place in silence” and exerts a powerful silencing force (Fricker 130). “The purely structural 
operations of identity power can control whose would-be contributions become public, and 
whose do not,” writes Fricker, such that “not being asked is one way in which powerless social 
groups might be deprived of opportunities to contribute their points of view to the pool of 
collective understanding” (130–131). Overlooking agriculture’s wage laborers in his analysis, 
Pollan’s narrator perpetuates a long-standing pattern of exclusion, in which the most 
economically and racially marginalized subjects are the least likely to be admitted to the public 
discourse that shapes social understandings of their labor. 
 Beyond the question of whose voices are being heard lies the issue of how and for whom 
testimony is mobilized. Tomatoland incorporates farmworkers’ testimony through interviews and 
excerpts of legal depositions, and perhaps their stories have incited some readers to consume 
differently, or lobby their representatives, or engage in more direct political action. But 
Estabrook also uses farmworker testimony about pesticide abuses to amplify risks to consumers’ 
health, implicitly positioning workers as “canaries in the coal mine,” harbingers of a broader 
public health crisis. This is a common strategy within anti-toxics embodied health movements, 
including the UFW’s anti-pesticide campaigns, as well as the DES and MCS movements 
discussed in chapters 1 and 2. But there stands a crucial difference in that Estabrook cannot 
claim the role of canary for himself, as Rhonda Zwillinger or Cesar Chavez might. This 
represents a fundamental inequality in the auto/biographical relationship between Estabrook and 
the farmworkers whose testimony he reproduces, making the narrative a site of vulnerability for 
those subjects. Issues of access to testimonial apparatuses, including mass-market life writing, 
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suggest a limit to empathic identification as a political strategy and the efficacy of life narrative 
as a political tool.  
 Whether auto/biographical vulnerability in Tomatoland rises to the level of injustice 
remains, I think, an open question. Justice in auto/biographical narratives is multi-dimensional 
and “has to do with whether the text represents its subject the way the subject would like to be 
represented, with whether that portrayal is in the subject’s best interests, with the control the 
subject has over it, and with the degree and kind of any harm or wrong done by 
misrepresentation” (Couser, Vulnerable Subjects 41–42). Moreover, there is the question of 
whomever else’s best interests may be served by the portrayal. While farmworkers are 
undoubtedly being poisoned in industrial agriculture’s fields, Pollan’s and Estabrook’s 
alternative gastrographies represent consumers as poisoned subjects under the regime of 
industrial agriculture. These texts test the limit conditions of autobiographical fair trade. Gillian 
Whitlock reminds us that critics “must hold things together—books on the shelf, production and 
consumption, addressee and addressor,” in order to ask how autobiographical productions impact 
their communities of origin (15). What does it mean to be at risk, and what does it mean to 
witness to it? Where and how do embodiment and testimony meet? Do the tropes of toxic 
discourse support testimonial justice?  
 
The Logic of Alternatives  
 Scholars working in cultural geography, sociology, and economics have long taken a 
systemic view of the cultural and political meanings of food, asking questions about the 
relationship between practices of production and consumption. Literary critics, on the other 
hand, “have tended to treat both agriculture and eating in terms of the symbolic meanings they 
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convey about other cultural issues” (Carruth 165). Following recent shifts in literary food 
studies, I advocate a systems approach to food that can capture its complex function “not just as 
symbol but also as rhetoric and praxis” (ibid. 166). To this end, this chapter has approached the 
literature of alternative food movements as forms of toxic life narrative. As such “alternative 
gastrographies,” The Omnivore’s Dilemma and Tomatoland are representative of the aims and 
ideologies of the alternative food movement, which has gained significant public attention 
through such personal narratives. The life writing of the alternative food movement represents a 
coming-to-knowledge that industrial food is contaminated with material pesticides and what 
John Blair Gamber terms cultural toxins—forms of oppression that make a society literally 
unlivable for some subjects. 
 While I have been using the singular form “movement” throughout this chapter, the 
landscape of alternative food politics is heterogeneous. Conceptions of what constitutes toxic 
risk, who is vulnerable, and how to represent toxic vulnerability vary across the movement, as 
the narratives I have discussed here demonstrate. The Omnivore’s Dilemma enacts a near-total 
erasure of the human abuses of industrial agricultural production, emphasizing instead individual 
choices and relationships at the consumer end of the supply chain. While Tomatoland does, 
crucially, represent farmworkers who are directly subject to the slow violence of pesticide abuse, 
the narrative’s broader focus is on consumers, whom it also hails as potentially poisoned subjects 
and as political actors. Both narratives depict the consumption of local, organic foods as at once 
a moral, political, and an aesthetic good.  
 Some scholars concerned with issues of food and labor justice are troubled by this 
advocacy for an ethical consumerism coming from dominant voices within the alternative food 
movement. In focusing its attention on consumers’ needs and responsibilities, they suggest, the 
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movement has turned away from the individuals and communities most affected by pesticide 
exposure and other industry abuses. Food systems scholar Patricia Allen, whose book Together 
at the Table offers a generally positive assessment of the alternative food movement, laments the 
narrowing of movement goals such that, “at the level of implementation, stakeholder groups such 
as farmworkers may be excluded entirely…thereby limiting the claims and changes [advocates] 
attempt to make” (18). These limitations are represented in and shaped by public narratives of 
food activism that Jill Lindsey Harrison criticizes for supporting “the prescriptions of libertarian 
and communitarian notions of justice,” (Pesticide Drift 186). Libertarian and communitarian 
conceptions of justice individualize and localize food politics, respectively. Both represent a 
flattening out of structural critiques and state-based interventions in favor of market-driven 
solutions (ibid. 186). That is, alternative food politics have been subject to neoliberalization, 
such that movement critiques of traditional systems of food production are absorbed within and 
can actually be seen to prop up the dominant politico-economic paradigm.32 Specifically, the 
logic of alternatives undergirding the alternative food movement supports the neoliberal 
injunction to flexibility, masking and exacerbating existing inequalities within food systems.  
 The robust and growing organic food economy in the United States today is indebted to 
the countercultural experiments of the 1960s and 1970s. Early organics proponents during this 
period were influenced by social movements (anti-war, feminist, ethnic nationalist), the 
developing science of ecology, survivalism, mysticism, and drug culture to develop an 
oppositional food culture (Belasco 68). These “ecofreaks” defined themselves through their 
rejection of mainstream ideas about politics and pleasure, and they sought to develop alternative 
ways of producing and consuming food that would be at once pleasurable, ethical, and healthy 
(ibid. 43). This oppositional ideology led to experiments with organic gardening, cooperative 
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living and working arrangements, and farm-to-table dining in attempts to build an alternative 
food infrastructure. As Pollan explains, “the early organic movement sought to establish not just 
an alternative mode of production (the chemical-free farms), but an alternative system of 
distribution (the anticapitalist food co-ops), and even an alternative mode of consumption (the 
‘countercuisine’)” (Omnivore 143). With strong undercurrents of anti-capitalist and anti-war 
sentiments, the word organic itself “clearly became understood as a critique” (Guthman, 
Agrarian 7). During this period of hippie rebellion, the organic movement believed that food 
could serve as a catalyst for broader social change. In its most expansive forms, an oppositional 
food culture was imagined as part of a larger critique of white supremacy, the subjugation of 
women, and the destruction of the earth.  
 What I am calling the logic of alternatives has been embedded in today’s alternative food 
movement from its roots in the organic food economy that began as part of the late 1960s 
counterculture. Under the influence of radical New Left politics, the early organic movement 
attempted to break away from the industrial food system and develop its own, independent 
infrastructure for producing and distributing what it saw as healthier, better-tasting foods. If 
organic food was to undermine the industrial food system, it would do so by providing an 
alternative, allowing producers and consumers to choose something different (Guthman, 
Agrarian 173). This is, at its core, a market-driven solution; today, proponents of alternative 
food exhibit a belief that consumer demand will drive producers toward agro-ecological 
principles and reshape the food system from the inside out.  
 To a certain extent this has been true. Like other forms of green consumerism, organic 
food has been readily absorbed by corporate capitalism. As demand for alternatively-produced 
food has increased, conglomerates like Mondelez (previously Kraft) and Kellog have gotten into 
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the organic game,33 creating what is sometimes called the “industrial organic” sector of the food 
economy. Industrial organic operations adhere to weakened USDA standards regulating the 
organic label but do not generally uphold traditional organic philosophies of sustainable land-use 
and labor practices. In turn, smaller-scale producers who wish to remain associated with core 
organic values have differentiated themselves with a new name, “beyond organic,” as well as 
higher prices. And so the alternatives proliferate. The logic of alternatives articulates with 
neoliberal economic ideologies, helping to produce a competitive market where consumers have 
an apparent freedom of choice.  
 Thus, through market mechanisms, the logic of alternatives has helped to turn something 
that began as a countercultural experiment into a prestige commodity. Like many other products 
that trade on health and self-improvement claims, foods marketed as organic, local, natural, and 
sustainable today carry a certain cultural capital that has contributed to the higher costs of eating 
alternatively (and higher costs have in turn increased the prestige of alternatively-produced 
foods). Michael Pollan and his neo-agrarian guru, farmer Joel Salatin, are correct when they 
claim that industrial food can only be sold cheaply because it externalizes health and 
environmental costs (Omnivore 243). But the fact remains that alternatively-produced foods cost 
consumers more, and many people are simply priced out of the market. Any claims of a populist 
alternative food economy are undermined by a pervasive focus on aesthetics within the 
alternative food movement. Organic food may be better for workers, better for the environment, 
and better for consumers’ health, but alternative food advocates like Pollan put these issues into 
the proper context: “how did it taste?” (Omnivore 175) This sentiment is echoed in Tomatoland 
when Estabrook asks a New York chef known for his support of local growers why he buys 
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tomatoes from a farmer who “doesn’t harm the land or sicken his workers with chemicals.” The 
chef’s reply? “‘It’s all about taste, really’” (187–189).  
 Proponents of alternative food have a tendency to conflate gustatory pleasure with 
politics. Too often, “good” eaters—those with the moral and aesthetic sensibilities to appreciate 
the locally hunted boar or the “artisan” tomato—are hailed as good citizens. Daniel J. Philippon, 
who takes a positive view of the ways alternative food literature “collapses the all-too-common 
distinction between aesthetics or pleasure on the one hand and politics on the other” (172), 
nevertheless cautions that “focusing on pleasure runs the risk of reinforcing the notion that 
individual lifestyle changes are sufficient” to shift globalized cultures of consumption (ibid. 
175). This is one of the most insidious elisions of the mainstream alternative food movement: a 
belief that the bafflingly difficult work of building a more just food economy can be boiled down 
to “matters of taste” (Estabrook 139).   
 Not only is this a profoundly classist assumption,34 it suggests the neoliberalizing logic at 
the heart of the alternative food movement. By collapsing matters of economic or environmental 
justice with matters of taste, the logic of alternatives mistakes consumerism for citizenship. This 
elision is a hallmark of neoliberal ideology (Allen and Guthman 411). When Pollan speaks 
approvingly about “opting out” of the industrial food chain (Omnivore 254), or when Estabrook 
insists that we should eat “food that meets our standards only, not the standards set by corporate 
agriculture” (xii), our narrators are embracing the logic of alternatives and, importantly, its vision 
for what it means to be a consumer. This is because “neoliberalization is not only a political 
economic project,” as Patricia Allen and Julie Guthman explain, “but also one that instills 
particular ideas about citizenship and subjectivity” (410). Pollan explicitly engages questions of 
subjectivity in the passage that serves as the epigraph to this chapter, as does his character in The 
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Omnivore’s Dilemma, who claims that the alternative food movement is “a novel hybrid, a 
market as movement, for at its heart is a new conception of what it means to be a consumer” 
(254). The kind of consumer described here—the ideal consumer of alternative food—is a 
flexible subject. 
 Cultural theorists have described flexibility as a valued trait for subjects of global, 
neoliberal capitalism. Flexible subjects adapt readily to changing conditions, responding 
dynamically to the economic, technological, and environmental crises that characterize the risk 
society. The logic of alternatives articulates neatly with the ideology of flexibility: in response to 
the risks associated with industrial food, good citizen-consumers are encouraged to “opt out,” to 
adjust their eating habits to new economies of risk, morality, and pleasure. But this means opting 
in to an alternative food system, one that is economically, culturally, or geographically 
inaccessible to many people. Alternative food aptly demonstrates Emily Martin’s warning that 
flexibility is a “commodity, something scarce and highly valued, that can be used to discriminate 
against some people” (xvii, empahsis mine). Insofar as alternative food advertises its products as 
less toxic than their industrial counterparts, the movement markets itself as an enclave of safety 
from pesticide exposure and other risks—for those who can afford it.  
 The sociologist Andrew Szasz calls this phenomenon “inverted quarantine.” When the 
privileged isolate themselves from risks through alternative forms of consumption, it produces a 
kind of gated community of organic eaters. Ultimately, inverted quarantine upholds long-
standing hierarchies of power, because “the availability of seemingly safer alternative 
products…impedes the development of public sentiment that would support a broader 
reconsideration of the toxic mode of production in general” (Szasz 208–209). In encouraging 
consumers to protect themselves by opting out of the industrial food system, the alternative food 
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movement may actually help to ensure that that system continues to function much as it has for 
the last half-century or more. Because the flexibility necessary to consume alternatively derives 
largely from economic and cultural capital, inverted quarantine abandons already marginalized 
populations to a toxic system. This is most clearly true for industrial agriculture’s wage laborers, 
who occupy the lowest levels of what Seth Holmes identifies as the industry’s “ethnic-labor 
hierarchy” (74), a term that emphasizes the intersectional politics of identity, labor, land 
ownership, and migration that shape vulnerability to pesticide exposure. Focusing on alternative 
forms of consumption not only directs political resources away from sites of production, where 
the risk of pesticide exposure is greatest, but it also puts under erasure the racial dynamics of the 
agricultural labor system and the industry’s role in shaping them.  
 Farmworkers are themselves subject to ideologies of flexibility that structure their 
relationships to food systems. For more than a century, agribusiness has worked with the state to 
recruit a migrant labor force. Agribusiness-endorsed immigration and labor policies have helped 
growers quell the pressures of labor organizing by continuously recruiting newer, more 
“compliant” ethnic-labor groups (J. Harrison, “Abandoned Bodies” 1198). Historically, the 
racialization of ethnic-based labor forces has served to naturalize the poor treatment of workers 
and justify labor supply changes that suit the economic and political interests of growers. In the 
early 1900s, Mexican culture came to be identified with seasonal stoop labor in an early 
manifestation of what Mae Ngai calls “imported colonialism” (132; also see Stern). This racial 
metonymy reached its full expression in the Migrant Labor Agreement between the United States 
and Mexico, commonly known as the bracero program. This program to bring short-term 
Mexican contract laborers into the United States began in 1942 to offset wartime labor shortages 
in California’s agricultural industry. Congress voted against extending the program in 1964, but 
  173 
the bracero system continued for several more years, into the late 1960s. Although the bracero 
program gave growers significant control over their workforce, the migrant labor system that has 
replaced it is “more flexible,” argues Robert Thomas, because the end of the bracero program 
represented a significant deregulation of migrant labor that has helped to increase the appeal of 
migrants as a non-citizen and especially an undocumented labor force (76).35 
 With the end of the bracero program, growers have continued to support federal policies 
that facilitate the supply of a cheap, mostly Mexican migrant labor force. Yet the cycle of 
importing more compliant ethnic-labor forces to replace established labor communities 
continues. Increasingly, the lowest paying and most physically demanding stoop labor jobs are 
being filled not by Mestizo Mexican migrants but by (typically undocumented, migrant) 
indigenous Mexicans. At the farm studied by anthropologist Seth Holmes in his ethnography of 
migrant farmworkers, stoop labor was typically performed by indigenous Triqui workers from 
the Mexican state of Oaxaca. Local residents, administrative farm workers, and crew bosses 
justified the Oaxacans’ poor working conditions by racializing indigenous Mexicans 
simultaneously as “lazy” workers and as bodies ideally suited for stoop labor, “because they’re 
lower to the ground” (70; 171).36 This kind of racialization has long been at the heart of migrant 
labor systems, which “presuppose that the migrant is without citizenship rights and has only 
limited power in the state of employment” (Holmes 12-13).  
 It is specifically the limited political power of non-citizens that makes them desirable as 
workers. This is especially true for undocumented immigrants, whose ties to the nation-state are 
almost wholly economic. Lacking political enfranchisement, undocumented immigrants are 
functionally “nonmembers of the community” and as such “can make no claims against the 
collectivity” (Thomas 209). Under these conditions, they are “forced to be more mobile, and 
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subsequently, more ‘responsive’ to economic conditions” (ibid.). This is to say that 
undocumented workers are especially subject to the regime of flexibility that characterizes 
neoliberal forms of personhood.  
 If flexibility “is an object of desire for nearly everyone’s personality, body, and 
organization” (Martin xvii), it functions differently in relation to different bodies. The logic of 
alternatives rewards economic flexibility by allowing privileged consumers to opt out of the 
industrial food system. But the alternative food movement paradoxically contributes to the 
maintenance of a food system that demands flexibility from some of the most economically and 
politically marginalized workers in any US industry. And because some classes of people are 
already presumed to be inflexible, the meritocratic ideology of flexibility serves to justify 
existing racialized labor hierarchies. When Holmes asked why Oaxacan migrant workers did not 
participate in higher paying work picking apples, a crop manager explained that, unlike Mestizo 
Mexicans and Mexican-Americans, Oaxacans are too short to reach the highest hanging fruits 
(171). The manager’s response demonstrates that flexibility is itself flexible, able to expand and 
contract in accordance with the vested interests of industry. If the ideology of flexibility is 
embedded within the alternative food movement and its literatures, as I have argued, we should 
be wary of suggestions that eating local, organic, or craft-produced foods is necessarily 
liberatory.  
 
Alternative Gastrography as Self-Technology 
 As life narrators, Pollan and Estabrook each model for their readers the flexible 
subjecthood that alternative food demands of citizen-consumers. These alternative gastrographies 
suggest the ways that narrating toxic exposure can function as a “technology of the self,” which 
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Sylvia Bowerbank has noted as a growing trend in turn-of-the-millennium environmental 
writing. Environmental literature, she argues, “is being used strategically to inscribe new self-
technologies for establishing, monitoring, and sustaining” subjects’ relationships with the 
environment (165). Like other conversion narratives, alternative gastrography involves the 
confession or reenactment of past (gastronomical) sins, as when Michael Pollan takes his family 
to the McDonald’s drive-thru in The Omnivore’s Dilemma. But alternative gastrography as self-
technology is primarily structured around a self-disciplining performance that “constructs its 
preferred way of living ‘under the theme of care of oneself’” through a certain kind of 
ecologically- and morally-conscious consumption (Bowerbank qting Foucault 171). 
Bowerbank’s framing of environmental autobiography as a technology of the self calls attention 
to the ways that alternative food discourses function as a form of environmental governmentality 
that disciplines consumers.  
 As I have argued here, this focus on consumption practices also serves to paper over 
historical inequalities on all levels of the food system and constitutes a preemptive testimonial 
injustice that continues to silence farmworkers, giving preference to the concerns of more 
flexible consumers. For these reasons, we should recognize the alternative food movement as 
part of a larger normativizing trend within contemporary environmental discourses. While anti-
toxics embodied health movements have served as sites where some subjects can claim 
recognition and redress, they have also contributed to a narrow understanding of poisoned 
subjectivity and the harms and vulnerabilities produced by exposure to environmental toxins. In 
the next chapter, I interrogate the interlocking representations of reproduction and ability that lie 
at the center of toxic life narratives and the poisoned subjecthood they represent. 
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Notes to Chapter 3: 
 
1 Michael Pollan, “The Food Movement, Rising,” no page.  
2 Scholars who use some variation of this phrase include Patricia Allen (“alternative agrifood 
movements”), C. Clare Hinrichs (“alternative food system initiatives”), Jill Lindsey Harrison 
(“alternative agrifood movement”), and Julie Guthman (“alternative food movement”). Like 
Harrison and Guthman, I prefer the singular “movement.” As Harrison explains, despite 
heterogeneity among movement actors, “the hundreds of groups that comprise the alternative 
agrifood movement share a key conviction that food system reform is important because food is 
qualitatively different from other commodities” (Pesticide Drift 146). 
3 The sociologist Melanie DuPuis compares “Not In My Back Yard” (NIMBY) environmental 
politics to consumer backlash against rGBH in milk, which she characterizes as “Not In My 
Body” (NIMB) politics.  
4 If “food studies” describes a field that is at once multidisciplinary and interdisciplinary, 
dedicated to the critical analysis of “the relationships between food and the human experience” 
(Miller and Deutsch 3), “food systems studies” takes a systemic view that connects “food to 
agricultural and nonagricultural uses of the land on the one hand and to human bodies and spirits, 
individual lives, and community experiences on the other” (Hinrichs 2). Food systems 
encompass the interrelated processes of production, processing, distribution, purchasing, 
consumption, and disposal. Jeffrey Sobal and colleagues also include the health and nutrition 
industries in their understanding of the food system (Wilkins 99).   
5 Donatella Della Porta and Mario Diani describe social movements as “dense informal 
networks.” Social movements exist where “both individual and organized actors, while keeping 
their autonomy and independence, engage in sustained exchanges of resources in pursuit of 
common goals” (21). 
6 The USDA is bound by what often appear to be conflicting mandates to promote American 
agriculture and promote healthy eating through the development of dietary guidelines and the 
like. Thus, the agency finds itself in the interesting position of monitoring the organic food 
industry for compliance with low-input standards while denying industry claims that organic 
food is safer or healthier than traditionally-grown food. Guthman discusses the development of 
organic standards in Agrarian Dreams. Marion Nestle explores conflicts of interest in federal 
agencies regulating food safety and nutrition standards in Food Politics. Coppin and High argue 
that federal food policy has since its inception mobilized a “politics of purity” that has masked its 
true goal of regulating competition.  
7 See Allen and Guthman for a food systems studies critique of farm-to-school initiatives. 
Kathleen LeBesco, among many others, dissects the discourses of morality that lie beneath 
concerns about the “obesity epidemic” that food activists like Pollan tie to industrial food 
production. Julie Guthman addresses all of these issues in her provocative book Weighing In.  
8 The women’s health, disability rights, tobacco control, and DES movements have all been 
considered as EHMs although each is concerned with a multiplicity of forms of illness or 
embodiment (Brown et al.; Bell). 
9 “Synthetic organic” refers to organic chemicals—that is, any chemical containing carbon—
manufactured in a laboratory rather than occurring “in nature.” And yet, synthetic organic 
chemicals are derived from substances we recognize as natural, usually petroleum or coal. 
Because of this, many of them are similar enough to naturally occurring substances humans and 
  177 
                                                                                                                                                       
other animals may encounter that they interact easily with our bodies’ endogenous chemical 
processes. These interactions may not be beneficial. It is synthetic organics’ similarity to natural 
organic molecules that makes many of them carcinogenic or otherwise dangerous to human 
health. For an accessible discussion of synthetic organic chemicals, see Sandra Steingraber’s 
Living Downstream. 
10 Gouveia and Juska discuss the role of The Jungle in separating meat production from meat 
consumption in public discourse. This is another way in which Sinclair’s book anticipates current 
trends in alternative food politics.  
11 Both Laura Pulido and Linda Nash make clear that despite claims from growers and 
government officials that pesticides posed no real risk and were necessary to produce affordable 
food for a growing population (and despite environmental groups’ apparent discovery of the 
pesticide problem in the early 1960s), farmworkers developed their own theories of pesticide risk 
through personal experience and popular epidemiology. Nash cites testimony included in a 1961 
report on the bracero program conducted by a University of California graduate researcher in 
public health named Henry Anderson. While Anderson was not specifically concerned with 
pesticide exposure, he interviewed hundreds of bracero laborers about occupational health and 
safety during his fieldwork in the late 1950s. Their responses suggested to Anderson that 
“braceros bear at least their share of occupational injuries and illnesses” (213), which some 
workers attributed to “hav[ing] to breathe in too many chemicals that have been sprayed on the 
plants where they work” (unnamed worker from Michoacan qtd in Anderson 215). As Nash 
powerfully argues, this testimony demonstrates how workers “read their bodies” to locate 
“disease not in their own bodies or in their own communities but in a landscape that they found 
foreign and physically threatening, and one over which they felt they had little or no control…In 
their epistemology, the modern environment, rather than Mexican bodies, was the site of 
pathology” (138). 
12 There is much, much more to say about the UFW’s pesticide and grape boycott campaigns 
than I have the space to do here. Linda Nash, Laura Pulido, and Jill Lindsey Harrison all discuss 
these campaigns in relation to environmental justice. Daniel Rothenberg devotes a chapter to 
farmworker unions, including material on the boycotts, in With These Hands. For dedicated 
accounts of the UFW and Cesar Chavez, see Levy; Ferris and Sandoval. More recently, Miriam 
Pawel’s A Union of Their Dreams and Matthew Garcia’s From the Jaws of Victory include oral 
histories provided by other movement figures. 
13 The contract representing a major turning point in the campaign was known as the Wonder 
Palms Ranch contract, originally signed in 1970 by two Coachella Valley table grape growers, 
Lionel Steinberg and David Freedman. Later that year, 26 major growers from the Delano area 
signed on. The document, “Collective Bargaining Agreement between the United Farm Workers 
Organizing Committee and Wonder Palms Ranch, a Partnership by David Freedman and 
Company, Inc., Lionel Steinberg, Partner,” resides in the Agricultural Workers History 
Collection at Wayne State University’s Walter P. Reuther Library. Laura Pulido includes the 
contract’s health and safety clause—which “recognize[s] the need to protect and conserve human 
life, water, soil and vegetation” and stipulates that pesticides have the potential to “create grave 
dangers to farmworkers and to consumers”—in its entirety in her book Environmentalism and 
Economic Justice (Chavez and Steinberg in Pulido 118). 
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14 Hsuan Hsu argues that metonymy is “[i]nsistently local and material in scope” and so “makes 
visible the fatal contiguities—the effects of environmental risk factors on bodies, minds, social 
relations, and lived space—experienced in places that have been abandoned” (164). 
15 The UFW resumed its grape boycott in the 1980s, with a renewed focus on raising consumer 
consciousness about pesticide exposure. The union produced a boycott video called “The Wrath 
of Grapes,” and Chavez delivered his speech of the same name on multiple occasions.  
16 I take the text of “Wrath of Grapes” from Ilan Staven’s edition of Chavez’s speeches, An 
Organizer’s Tale. 
17 The most widely known testimonio is probably I, Rigoberta Menchú. Menchú’s narrative 
account of violence against her Quiché people in Guatemala’s civil war was subject to a long and 
vicious “truth” campaign waged by the American anthropologist David Stoll, who charged that 
Menchú’s testimony was nothing more than propaganda manufactured by the Guatemala Army 
of the Poor. Stoll cited discrepancies in the account, demonstrating that Menchú could not have 
been present at events to which she claimed to have been an eyewitness. Scholars of life 
narrative and human rights testimony counter that these narrative “discrepancies” are part of the 
testimonio form and that Stoll’s understanding of autobiographical truth-telling was both 
Eurocentric and overly literal. Leigh Gilmore has written about the Menchú-Stoll controversy 
(Limits; “Jurisdictions”).  
18 Doris Sommer challenges what she sees as mere “projections of presence and truth” in 
Beverly’s identification of “fraternal or sororal” connection between narrator and reader (199). 
19 Pollan splits the “organic” food chain into two separate strands—the “industrial organic” and 
what is really a local food system that does not always observe organic regulatory guidelines—
which accounts for the four meals in the book’s title. 
20 The market for personal narrative has grown in both print and online venues over the past two 
and a half decades, reflected in the rise of the academic field of life writing studies since the 
1990s. Narratives of cooking and eating represent a significant trend in the “memoir boom.” 
Rosalía Baena has coined the term “gastro-graphy” to describe these life narratives. Scholarly 
studies of gastrography have tended to focus on the role of domestic food preparation in the 
production of gender and ethnic identity. To distinguish the life writing of alternative food, 
which may take up issues of food preparation and consumption but also addresses structural and 
policy issues, I suggest the term “alternative gastrography.”  
21 The Pesticide Action Network, a worldwide network against the global proliferation of 
pesticides, designates the worst pesticides as “bad actors,” defined as any pesticide that is a 
known or probable carcinogen, a reproductive or developmental toxicant, a neurotoxic 
cholinesterase inhibitor, a known groundwater contaminant, and/or a pesticide with a high acute 
toxicity.  
22 Dori Laub identifies three different levels of witnessing: “the level of being a witness to 
oneself within the experience, the level of being a witness to the testimonies of others, and the 
level of being a witness to the process of witnessing itself” (“Truth and Testimony” 61). I take up 
the question of the secondary witness later in the chapter. 
23 The EPA mandates waiting periods before workers may reenter fields after pesticide 
application, which vary depending on the type of pesticide used. 
24 These and other abuses are documented by Holmes, Rothenberg, and Estabrook. 
25 Although the US Department of Labor collects information on farmworker income and assets 
as part of the National Agricultural Workers Survey, this data is not as illuminating as one might 
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hope. In 2001-2002, the last year for which data is publicly available, the average individual 
income from all sources was $10,000-$12,499 (US Dept. of Labor 47). This data is somewhat 
misleading, however, as farmwork is highly variable not only seasonally but also year-to-year (J. 
Harrison, “Abandoned Bodies” 1198). This number also includes the higher wages paid to field 
supervisors, who represent only a fraction of farmworkers and tend to be both white and US-born 
(Estabrook 100; see also Holmes). 
26 One way in which Pollan’s narrative exceeds the moral imperative common to addiction 
narratives is in linking personal consumption choices to national health. It thus demonstrates 
Becky Mansfield’s claim that “the promise of better living through health is not just about 
individualized responsibility and outcomes…[but] is also about individualized responsibility for 
biosecurity” (972). 
27 Tetra-amelia is a congenital disorder characterized by the absence of all four limbs. 
28 Alan Kraut coined the term “medicalized nativism” to describe the association of immigrants 
with disease. As Priscilla Wald explains, “medicalized nativism involves more than 
superimposing a disease threat on an unfortunate group. Rather, the disease is associated with 
dangerous practices and behaviors that allegedly mark intrinsic cultural difference, and it 
expresses the destructive transformative power of the group” (8). In other words, medical logics 
align with existing racial biases, and fear of contagion becomes an excuse for anti-immigrant 
policies and attitudes. Estabrook’s use of the epidemiological language of disease transmission in 
this passage shows how powerfully myths of contagion shape cultural understandings of risk and 
race.  
29 See Allen and Guthman, “From ‘Old School’ to ‘Farm-to-School;” Gouveia and Juska, 
“Taming Nature, Taming Workers;” Guthman, Agrarian Dreams and Weighing In; Hinrichs and 
Allen, “Selective Patronage and Social Justice;” Shiva, Stolen Harvest. 
30 According to Leo Marx, complex pastoralism “manage[s] to qualify, or call into question, or 
bring irony to bear against the illusion of peace and harmony in a green pasture” (25). 
31 Beck famously, and controversially, writes, “Reduced to a formula: poverty is hierarchic, 
smog is democratic.” That is, “risks display an equalizing effect within their scope…In this sense 
risk societies are not exactly class societies; their risk positions cannot be understood as class 
positions, or their conflicts as class conflicts” (36, emphasis in original). However, what Beck 
calls “risk positions” are socially constituted, including by class. While “wealth accumulates at 
the top, risks [gather] at the bottom…Poverty attracts an unfortunate abundance of risks. By 
contrast, the wealthy (in income, power or education) can purchase safety and freedom from 
risk” (35, emphasis in original). Beck gives toxins in industrially-produced foods as an example 
of the ways risks accumulate at the bottom of class hierarchies. Thus, while the risk society, of 
which industrial agriculture is undoubtedly a part, does cross boundaries of class and nation, 
economically and socially marginalized classes experience higher rates of toxic exposure and 
higher risks from exposure. The perception of a “world without refuge” from toxic harms has a 
flattening effect. 
32 Harrison and others emphasize that neoliberal ideologies are contextual and always subject to 
“exceptions” (see Ong). For this reason, scholars like Jamie Peck and Adam Tickell prefer the 
process-oriented term “neoliberalization.”  
33 Mondelez, one of the largest food processors in North America, owns the Boca and Back to 
Nature brands. Kellog’s organic brands include Gardenburger, Kashi, and Morningstar Farms. 
Other popular organic food labels owned by major processors include Cascadian Farms (General 
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Mills), Horizon (Dean), Muir Glen (General Mills), Petaluna Poultry (Purdue), Silk (Dean), Soy 
Dream (Heinz), Spectrum Organics (Heinz), and Stonyfield (Dannon).  
34 Philippon concedes that in “valorizing pleasure,” sustainable food discourses risk “the charge 
of elitism” (174). In Weighing In, Guthman levies those charges with full force, dissecting the 
complex class and race politics of such alternative food mainstays as urban gardening and farm-
to-school initiatives, demonstrating that discourses of both pleasure and health function to cover 
over specific structures of power. 
35 The bracero program was in many ways an exploitative labor system, but in theory contracts 
provided important worker protections, including a minimum wage. Ngai documents the ways 
that bracero workers involved Mexican consuls to broker wage agreements and settle disputes 
about the treatment of workers. In some cases, the Mexican government refused to contract 
bracero labor to individual US states because of evidence of mistreatment.  
36 Holmes points to the long history of the racialization of Mexican migrants as ideal manual 
laborers, about which scholars like Mae Ngai and Alexandra Stern have written: “The sentiment 
that Mexicans should pick berries was echoed by US Senator George Murphy from California 
during a Senate debate on immigration in the 1960s; he states that Mexicans”—meaning here 
Mestizos—“should be farmworkers because they are ‘built lower to the ground so it’s easier for 
them to stoop’” (Holmes 171). Holmes thus demonstrates that the same process of naturalizing 
labor hierarchies acts on different ethnic groups in different historical contexts.  
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Chapter 4 
Rethinking Environmental Chemicals Through Speculative Auto/biography 
 
 Across the previous chapters, I have tracked the production of an ur narrative of 
environmental chemical exposure. Autobiographical narrators claim recognition as victims of 
toxic proliferation by constituting themselves as poisoned subjects. Poisoned subjects’ ability to 
achieve normative forms of being and embodiment is threatened by chemicals that are 
represented as inherently physically and sexually disabling. This chapter casts a critical gaze on 
this received narrative of anti-toxics environmentalism. Recasting a performance art piece about 
male pregnancy within the rubric of toxic life narrative, I show how the policing of bodily 
difference through toxic discourse that I track across literatures of embodied health movements 
in chapters 1-3 impacts efforts toward testimonial and reproductive justice. The goal of this kind 
of environmentalist self-critique is to think through the role of personal testimony in forging a 
more coalitional discourse of toxic justice. A justice-oriented toxic discourse will seek to 
reinforce individuals’ and communities’ agency in determining the meanings of chemical 
exposures and their effects on human bodies while also working to reduce unwanted exposures 
and the physical and social harms that stem from them.  
 POP! The First Human Male Pregnancy is a website and digital art project created by 
Lee Mingwei and Virgil Wong as part of their interactive, multi-platform Male Pregnancy 
Project.1 POP! first appeared online in 1999, purporting to document the pregnancy of Mr. Lee 
Mingwei, the first pregnant man. The complex, interactive art piece has been performed in 
  182 
multiple venues, including both physical and digital spaces. While some elements of the project 
have remained constant (within POP!’s imaginary, Mr. Lee has been pregnant for the past 15 
years) and others have fallen away (the website contains some broken links that previous viewers 
have described as active), the project is not dead digital matter. Virgil Wong continues to 
prominently feature some aspects of the project on his website, and some of POP!’s online 
material has been updated as recently as 2014. I will focus here on the website as it exists at the 
time of this writing, one and half decades after the project was set in motion.   
 Today, the site’s main page features a prominent image of Mr. Lee, naked except for a 
pair of blue briefs, and with a protruding, apparently pregnant belly (Fig. 8). Mr. Lee stands 
facing the camera; his facial expression is neutral, and he holds his arms slightly away from his 
body at his sides, with his palms open to the viewer, inviting our gaze. The homepage is divided 
visually into three sections. On the left, visitors are invited to “join physicians and scientists 
around the world in monitoring Mr. Lee’s pregnancy online.”  Here we can see a “live image” of 
Mr. Lee’s EKG, ultrasound, and other vitals. Viewers are also invited to click on links that will 
take us to today’s entry in Mr. Lee’s pregnancy journal and to a video archive of the pregnancy.2 
A clock tracks the current date and time. The right-hand side of the page features headlines and 
links to purported media coverage of male pregnancies. In the center are excerpts of what appear 
to be viewer responses, representing three possible positions: “I am appalled,” “I am thrilled” 
and “I want to be a pregnant man.” Viewers are invited to “Read More,” and the excerpts link to 
three “message boards,” each featuring ten messages apparently posted by site visitors who felt 
compelled to respond to the news of Mr. Lee’s pregnancy. Finally, the top of the homepage 
features a banner identifying the project with RYT Hospital/Dwayne Medical Center, whose 
trademarked slogan is “All the miracles of modern medicine.” Below the banner are a set of links 
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to navigate the website: an overview of “the science of male pregnancy,” an interview with Mr. 
Lee, frequently asked questions, the aforementioned message boards, a documentary film, and a 
“news and press” page that includes the same links and headlines found on the right-hand side of 
the home page.  
 Numerous Internet sources characterize POP! as a hoax.3 Such websites take the position 
that POP! is a biomedical ruse—a deliberate attempt to deceive viewers about the nature of 
biological sex, medical science, or the human body—that needs to be debunked. In contrast, I 
approach POP! as an auto/biographical performance that puts pressure on biomedicine as a form 
of truth-telling about bodies and environments. Placing the project within the context of anti-
toxics embodied health movements calls into question the liberatory potential of 
environmentalism in general and toxic discourse in particular. Reading POP! as a form of toxic 
life narrative, I suggest that Lee and Wong’s project opens up the possibility of alternative 
frameworks for understanding and responding to environmental toxic exposures. Rather than 
representing toxic chemicals as inherently disabling or disrupting, POP! as a toxic life narrative 
forces us to ask a different set of questions: How do bodies change when they encounter 
chemicals in their environments? What kinds of social meanings do those changes carry? How 
do subjects make their own meaning out of chemical exposure through the production of life 
narrative?  
 
Performing Non-Normative Reproduction  
  POP!’s title carries multiple meanings. It clearly refers to fatherhood, as well as to Mr. 
Lee’s protruding belly—pregnant bellies are sometimes said to “pop” when the uterus protrudes 
over the hip bones and the pregnancy starts to “show.” It also evokes the surprise that viewers 
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may experience when they encounter the image of an apparently pregnant Mr. Lee, as well as the 
deliberate cultivation of such responses in media portrayals of non-normative forms of 
reproduction. In fact, POP! is centrally concerned with the spectacle of the pregnant man 
(Dasgupta 43; Aristarkhova 27), suggested in the prominent display of “media coverage” of Mr. 
Lee’s and other male pregnancies on the project’s homepage. The first headline featured in this 
section, attributed to the LGBT magazine The Advocate, reads, “Mr. Lee Mingwei congratulates 
fellow pregnant dad Mr. Thomas Beatie.” Beatie, a transgender man, was the subject of 
significant media attention during his 2008 pregnancy, which news outlets represented as 
shocking and singular. By including Beatie in the speculative narrative of Mr. Lee’s pregnancy, 
POP! undermines real-life media representations of Beatie as “the pregnant man,” where the is 
meant to signify the only.  
 In linking—and hyperlinking—Mr. Lee to Thomas Beatie, POP! comments on its own 
framing of male pregnancy. If the website’s banner announces Lee’s as “the first” male 
pregnancy, the Advocate headline reinforces the genealogical work that this kind of moniker 
performs. Naming something “the first” suggests that it will be followed by a second, a third, and 
so on. Both the banner and the headline are historicizing moves that situate Mr. Lee’s pregnancy 
in a timeline of male reproduction. In highlighting the futures of male pregnancy, the site also 
invites audiences to consider its pasts. Toby Beauchamp excavates one of these lineages, 
persuasively arguing that, “[i]n the context of historical surveillance of a variety of bodies 
deemed abnormal, deviant and ‘freakish,’ the image of the pregnant man may function not as an 
anomaly, but as a cultural construction revealing greater biopolitical investments in the 
regulation of bodies and reproductive capacities” (94). Biomedical forms of monitoring pregnant 
bodies are clearly on display in POP!’s representation of ultrasound and EKG images. Reading 
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the project as a form of toxic life narrative suggests additional legacies of surveillance and 
control, which I will take up later in this chapter. 
 Within the context of toxic discourse, the title “POP!” suggests something that is not 
apparent in biomedical readings of the project: a class of chemicals known as persistent organic 
pollutants, or POPs. These toxic (“pollutant”), carbon-based (“organic”) chemicals resist 
breaking down, meaning that they remain in the environment for a long time (“persistent”). 
Almost all persistent organic pollutants have been produced by humans and released into the 
environment primarily through application as pesticides or fungicides; some POPs are used as 
flame retardants in consumer products and building materials, and some are byproducts of 
industrial processes and waste incineration.4 Because of their carbon skeletons, POPs are fat-
soluble and so are easily absorbed into the bodies of plants and animals. Once there, these 
chemicals persist—most bodies are not equipped to break down such molecules. This means that 
POPs tend to biomagnify: when one organism eats another organism, it absorbs the chemicals 
residing in the body of its meal. For this reason, organisms that sit high on the food chain—like 
humans—tend to carry a heavy body burden of persistent organic pollutants. Moreover, an 
individual’s body burden will increase over time, because POPs accumulate faster than the 
human body can excrete them. One effect of this bioaccumulation is that humans of childbearing 
age have generally amassed a significant burden of these chemicals, which are capable of 
crossing the placental barrier and are carried in breast milk. Today, all human beings on the 
planet are believed to carry POPs inside their bodies, and this accumulation begins during fetal 
development.5 Both POPs and POP! highlight the complicated relationships between 
reproduction, technology, and the “natural.”  
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 These issues are doubly important—and fraught—because many chemicals characterized 
as persistent organic pollutants, including all of the so-called “dirty dozen” chemicals targeted 
for phase-out by the United Nations Industrial Development Organization,6 are known or 
suspected endocrine disruptors. Concerns about the effects of exposure on the human endocrine 
system is in large part what has made these chemicals of vital concern to political bodies like the 
United Nations and the European Union.7 Endocrine-disrupting chemicals (EDCs) affect the 
regulation of hormones in the body, which direct neurological development, metabolic function, 
and reproduction. As ecologist Sandra Steingraber explains, “[t]he endocrine system is 
impressively incapable of distinguishing between real hormones and environmental chemicals 
that act like hormones” (Living Downstream xix).8 This sensitivity to chemical “mimics” is part 
of the reason that EDCs have the potential to impact the human body even at the minutest levels 
of exposure. Scientists recognize that the effects of EDCs have more to do with timing (exposure 
during particular developmental phase) than with dose (amount of chemical present during a 
single exposure), which has traditionally been considered the measure of toxicity. Part of what 
has made the dirty dozen POPs a target of so much political energy is their ability to cross the 
placental barrier between a pregnant parent and a fetus and so to alter the course of fetal 
development, as happened to thousands of people whose mothers took diethylstilbestrol during 
pregnancy, causing congenital abnormalities like undescended testes, microphallus, urethral 
duplication, t-shaped uteruses and a predisposition to clear cell adenocarcinoma of the cervix and 
vagina. 
 Diethylstilbestrol was produced and prescribed for its ability to mimic the human body’s 
endogenous estrogens, which regulate sexual development. Many POPs do this as well, but 
EDCs can affect development in a variety of ways. For example, emerging science has suggested 
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a whole new category of endocrine disruptors impacting fat deposition called, somewhat 
problematically, obesogens (Steingraber, Living Downstream xix; Guthman, Weighing In 100–
101, 111–113). EDCs can also influence brain development, because the endocrine and 
neurological systems are interconnected (Steingraber, Raising Elijah 235).  
 When environmentally-concerned scholars and activists write about EDCs, however, they 
almost always focus on the chemicals’ effects on the reproductive system and on reproductive 
outcomes. EDC discourse tends to include a lot of hand-wringing about what constitutes 
“normal” reproductivity, especially for males: 
 Given what we do know about exposure to endocrine disruptors, the biological impact of 
 which depends less on dose than timing, minimizing a child’s exposure to these 
 chemicals seems like a prudent idea…Exposure to vanishingly small amounts (0.1 part 
 per billion) of [the herbicide atrazine] has been shown to turn normal male frogs into 
 hermaphrodites. (Pollan, Omnivore 177–178) 
 
Affected animals have exhibited problems such as a wasting syndrome in young birds; 
 feminization of males, deformed reproductive tracts, and diminished reproductive 
 capabilities in a variety of species; immune-system problems in a number of species; 
 parental inattentiveness and unusual parenting arrangements such as two-female nests in 
 birds…In humans the most publicized and, for some, shocking statistic came from 
 research into male sperm counts. (F. Buell 127–128) 
 
The messages about endocrine disrupters [sic] communicated to the public in the 
 environmental literature and the press are provocative and profoundly disturbing. They 
 include intersex characteristics (reproductive organs with combined male and female 
 features) found in marine snails, fish, alligators, fish-eating birds, marine mammals, and 
 bears; declines in human sperm count of as much as 50 percent; increased risk of breast 
 cancer; small phalluses in Florida alligators resulting from pollution; penises found on 
 female mammals; undeveloped testes in Florida panthers; masculinized female wildlife 
 with a propensity to mate with normal females; and cognitive deficiencies in children. 
 (Krimsky 194–195) 
 
A 1993 BBC documentary subtitled “Assault on the Male” proclaimed that we are “swimming in 
a sea of estrogens.” Its director, Deborah Cadbury, has also written anxiously about “the 
feminization of nature.” Meanwhile, prominent endocrine disruptor researchers have asked 
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whether environmental chemicals are “threatening our fertility, our intelligence, and our 
survival” (Colborn, Dumanoski, and Meyers).9 
 Catriona Mortimer-Sandilands has dubbed this kind of sensationalism “pollution 
hysteria” (32), criticizing its purveyors for promulgating the cultural notion of “queers as abject-
toxins” (27). When ecologists (and the environmental humanists who draw on their research) 
“assume the absolute naturalness of body dimorphism, even in species that harbor a wide range 
of characteristics within members of the same sex” (ibid. 27), they may implicitly—and do 
sometimes explicitly—classify transgender and intersex humans, as well as same-gender sexual 
and child-rearing practices, as unnatural. “Queerness” becomes a negative sign of ecological 
health.10 And, as the examples above demonstrate, queerness, transgender, and intersexuality are 
often conflated in the EDC discourse and closely associated with physical and mental 
impairment. In the third passage quoted above, Sheldon Krimsky places same-sex animal mating 
behaviors next to “cognitive deficiencies” in human children, naming both as “disturbing.” I 
don’t intend to single out Krimsky or others for particular censure. They are representative; this 
move is made over and over again in scholarly and popular accounts of toxic proliferation. Its 
cumulative effect is to conflate gender nonconformity with nonreproduction with impairment, 
while dehumanizing people with disabilities.  
 Let me be clear about my argument here. Endocrine-disrupting chemicals have been 
shown to affect development in humans and other animals, and the proliferation of these toxins 
may have significant consequences for ecosystems. The task is, as Julie Guthman says, “to 
abandon models that neglect pathological environmental conditions and continue to define the 
problem as nonnormative bodies” (Weighing In 113)—and, I would add, as nonnormative gender 
performances. Like other environmental critics, I do not deny that endocrine disruptors and other 
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chemicals in our environment are problems; rather, I frame the problem differently than as a 
crisis of gender, sexuality, or able-bodiedness.  
 
POP! as Toxic Discourse 
 Putting Lee and Wong’s Male Pregnancy Project into conversation with the toxic life 
narratives I have been discussing shifts the frame around debates about environmental chemical 
exposure. If environmentalists are prone to issuing dire warnings about infertility and 
reproductive anomaly, POP! puts such anxieties—rather than sexual or reproductive difference 
itself—under scrutiny. The project is not so much about male pregnancy as an embodied 
experience as it is focused on the meaning-making apparatuses surrounding reproduction, 
including biomedicine, mass media, and life narration. In his artist’s statement on his personal 
website, Lee Mingwei describes his work as sites for audiences to “explore issues of trust, 
intimacy, and self-awareness” (“Lee Mingwei”). In contrast to a mocked up cover of U.S. News 
and World Report featured on the POP! home page naming Mr. Lee “Man(?) of the Year” (Fig. 
8), the project does not represent Mr. Lee’s masculinity as precarious.11  
 If the magazine cover destabilizes Mr. Lee’s identity and asks audiences to serve as 
arbiters of masculinity, POP! mobilizes such displays of heteronormative boundary-keeping to 
direct audiences inward. The physical centrality of audience response on the website reflects 
Lee’s interest in facilitating audiences’ engagement with their own affect. Excerpts from 
“message boards” (which are themselves produced by the artists as part of Male Pregnancy 
Project) sit in the middle of the home page, situated between media coverage, biomedical 
monitoring, and links to Mr. Lee’s pregnancy journal and video archive. Viewer responses are 
visually framed by media and medicine, suggesting the ways that such interpretive structures 
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shape shared understandings of bodies and lives. By foregrounding response, POP! encourages 
us to interrogate our own assumptions about what is “natural” about gender and reproduction 
(represented by biomedicine on the top left hand side of the page) and what is “cultural” 
(represented by media coverage on the right).  
 
Figure 8. Home page view of POP! The First Human Pregnancy.  
Image Credit: Lee Mingwei and Virgil Wong, Male Pregnancy Project 
 
 Male Pregnancy Project can thus contribute to self-critique within environmental studies 
as the field directs increasing attention to environmentalism’s intersections with issues of race, 
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gender, sexuality, and ability. In disarticulating reproduction from femininity and drawing 
attention to biomedicine as a meaning-making apparatus, the project intervenes in troubling 
conflations of queerness, nonreproduction, and disability that are all too common in 
environmentalist discussions of endocrine-disrupting chemicals. This kind of intervention is 
consistent with ecocriticism’s growing embrace of an environmental justice framework. Anti-
toxics movements have often taken the approach of asserting rights. Rights-based frameworks 
are often criticized because they lend themselves to narrow NIMBY politics, but they may also 
involve securing access to institutionalized forms of recognition and redress, as when DES 
daughters sued drug manufacturers or when MCSers seek workplace accommodations in 
accordance with the ADA. Justice frameworks, by contrast, are characterized by intersectional 
analyses that attend to the ways that structural issues play out in specific, localized contexts. 
When Mortimer-Sandilands and other ecocritics raise concerns about “pollution hysteria,” they 
argue that the prevailing discourse about EDCs has very real, harmful implications for queer, 
transgender, and intersex people and is therefore inconsistent with an environmental justice 
agenda. Considering POP! as a toxic life narrative puts POPs in a new context and so suggests 
other ways of thinking about chemicals that affect the endocrine system than as an inherent harm 
from which bodies have the right to be protected.  
 To be clear, I am not arguing that Lee and Wong intended their Male Pregnancy Project 
as a commentary on environmental chemical exposure. Rather, it is the work of the critic to 
unpack the ways that toxic discourse and Lee and Wong’s project speak to one another. POP!’s 
form, I want to argue, invites this sort of approach. The interactive web platform welcomes 
audiences to manipulate the project in novel ways, while its speculative elements also encourage 
speculative readings.  
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Speculative Auto/Biography  
 While many commentators have interpreted POP! as a biomedical hoax, Irina 
Aristarkhova shows that some mainstream biomedical researchers have argued that pregnancy 
may in fact be scientifically viable for people without uteruses (26).12 Moreover, the project 
seems to be less invested in “fooling” audiences than in raising timely questions about bioethics, 
medical technologies, gender, and relationality. For these reasons, Mary Ingram-Waters 
characterizes POP! as “speculative fantasy” and “performative science fiction” (1, 13). While I 
agree that the project engages both fantasy and performativity, I want to argue for a reading of 
POP! not as science fiction but as a form of speculative life narrative.13 Such a reading allows us 
to see the project as an “authentic” performance even as it engages science fictional elements to 
explore Mr. Lee’s subjectivity, embodiment, and desires.14  
 “Autobiography” and “the autobiographical” are contested terms.15 In his classic 
formulation, Philippe Lejeune defines autobiography as a contract between author and audience 
of the “identity (‘identicalness’) of the name (author-narrator-protagonist)” (14, emphasis in 
original). What Lejeune calls the “autobiographical pact” is “the affirmation in the text of this 
identity” (ibid.). Put another way, in an autobiographical text, the author is taken to be “both the 
observing subject and the object of investigation, remembrance, and contemplation” (Smith and 
Watson, Reading 1). Paul de Man argues that autobiography is less a fixed writing or generic 
practice than “a figure of reading that occurs, to some degree, in all texts” (70). But fiction and 
autobiography invite different kinds of reading. “When we recognize the person who claims 
authorship of the narrative as its protagonist or central figure—that is, we believe them to be the 
same person,” Sidonie Smith and Julia Watson explain, “we read differently and assess the 
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narrative as making truth claims of a sort that are suspended in fictional forms such as the novel” 
(Reading 11).  
 POP! is vulnerable to accusations of hoaxing because the pregnant Mr. Lee appears to be 
a representation of the artist Lee Mingwei, who has not been pregnant. This seems to be a 
violation of the autobiographical pact of identicalness;16 Lee’s body does not verify the text’s 
truth claims. Yet people of color in the United States have historically been excluded—whether 
de jure or de facto—from testimonial contexts, even as their bodies are read as testimonies of 
innate racial difference or deficit. Drawing on Leigh Gilmore’s formulation of autobiography as 
an alternate jurisdiction, discussed in chapter 1, we might rethink the speculative elements of 
POP! not as hoaxing or as violations of the autobiographical pact but instead as forging a 
juxtamedical space that captures the contingencies of both medicine and the law as arbiters of 
truth. Read this way, the imaginative work of Mr. Lee’s pregnancy is a prosthetic apparatus that 
allows Lee and Wong to represent and perform “embodied relations to/with others” in novel 
ways (Aristarkhova 25). 
 Male Pregnancy Project is about, on one level, the parent-child relationship. Mr. Lee 
represents an atypical relationship between father and fetus, and the various modes of 
surveillance represented on the POP! website are meant to track the physiological and social 
health of the developing fetus and the pregnant father, respectively. But the speculative work of 
pregnancy also forges other familial bonds between Mr. Lee and characters with real-life 
counterparts. On Lee’s professional website, he explains that when both of his sisters were 
pregnant, he wanted to share the experience with them, a desire that lead to Male Pregnancy 
Project (“Male Pregnancy Project”). This statement resonates with the ethos of Lee’s other art 
pieces, such as 100 Days with Lily, which is referenced in the mock interview with Mr. Lee on 
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POP!. During that project, Lee carried a lily with him twenty-four hours a day for one hundred 
days as a sign of respect and grief for his recently deceased grandmother (Lee and Wong, POP!; 
Lee, “100 Days with Lily”). In The Sleeping Project, which was inspired by the artist’s 
encounter with a Holocaust survivor, Lee invited strangers to sleep with him in the museum 
space for one night, bringing with them an object of their choice. “During the remainder of the 
exhibition,” Lee explains, “these personal objects and recorded voices provide[d] gallery visitors 
with clues about the interactions between myself and the anonymous overnight guests, 
interactions that suggest the range of ways in which individuals experience intimacy and trust 
when confronted with an unknown other” (“The Sleeping Project”). Like the lily and the 
stranger’s object, the pregnancy functions as a prosthesis that bridges divergent experiences 
(death, genocide, gestation) to facilitate and represent Lee’s intimacy with another. 
 While Lee cites his sisters as the inspiration for his reproductive desire, both Mr. Lee’s 
pregnancy and the Male Pregnancy Project represent first and foremost the relationship between 
Lee Mingwei and Virgil Wong, the digital artist with whom Lee collaborated. In his description 
of the project, Lee figures their relationship as one of co-parents.17 Unable to become pregnant 
“in the real world,” Lee writes, “I turned to my friend Virgil Wong, a master digital artist, to 
father my child” (“Male Pregnancy Project”). On multiple conceptual levels, it is Wong who 
makes the speculative pregnancy of POP! possible; he is presented as a “father” of both Mr. 
Lee’s fetus and Lee’s artwork. The auto/biographical co-creation of the project reflects the 
representation of procreation within the project.18   
 Male Pregnancy Project’s auto/biographical acts are bound up with the “biomedical 
imagination,” a term coined by Catherine Waldby to emphasize the “speculative, ‘fictional’ 
dimension of the biomedical enterprise” (14). That is, “biomedical discourse is constitutive of 
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precisely the field of objects and relations that it imagines itself only to describe” (ibid. 140–
141). When life narrative engages a biomedical imaginary, it is “able to hold open a zone of 
exploration that other mediations…foreclose” (Squier 22). So although Aristarkhova quite 
accurately describes POP!’s aesthetic as “biomedical realism” (25), it is Lee and Wong’s deft 
manipulation of biomedicine as a “truth effect” that allows them to explore its imaginative work. 
Realism is a strategy that makes possible the speculative mode.   
 The co-constitutive relationship of realist and speculative representation is nowhere more 
visible than in a section of the POP! website called “The Science of Male Pregnancy.” Following 
a link from the site’s home page, audiences are directed to a lay-friendly explanation of the 
biomedical tools and techniques that have made Mr. Lee’s pregnancy possible. “In the years 
since the first ‘test-tube baby’ was born in 1978,” begins an introduction at the top of the page, 
“physicians and scientists from RYT Hospital have been working to develop a viable technique 
for the successful impregnation of male individuals.” This technique is described as a five-step 
process that involves administering female hormones, implanting an embryo using in vitro 
fertilization techniques to induce an ectopic pregnancy, embryo growth (at which time Mr. Lee 
stopped relying on exogenous hormone sources, as the embryo itself supplied the hormones 
necessary for fetal development), growth of the fetus, and delivery via Cesarean section. A 
“Glossary of Medical Terms” offers brief definitions of some of the vocabulary used in the step-
by-step explanation of Mr. Lee’s pregnancy. What is most striking about this glossary is the 
familiarity of most of its terms, which include “Caesarean section,” “embryo,” “IVF (in vitro 
fertilization),” and “placenta.” The page also features a radiographic image depicting Mr. Lee 
and the developing fetus and two graphs representing Mr. Lee’s hormone levels.  
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 The radiography and hormone graphs are a visual reminder that, if POP!’s 
autobiographical performance is centrally concerned with Mr. Lee’s embodied relations to/with 
others, those others include material actors like hormones, lab equipment, and surgical 
instruments. But while the project represents Mr. Lee’s pregnancy as unique, his embodied 
relations with nonhuman others are not. “The Science of Male Pregnancy” points up the 
mundaneness of trans-corporeal encounters between human bodies and biomedical technologies: 
judging by the glossary of medical terms, the science of “male” pregnancy is not much different 
than the science of “female” pregnancy. For example, the entry for “ectopic pregnancy” reads, 
“A gestation elsewhere than in the uterus. For women, this usually occurs in the fallopian tube. 
Symptoms include abdominal pain, fainting, and/or vaginal bleeding.” The step-by-step guide 
notes the “risk of massive hemorrhage when the ectopic [sic] ruptures; this is also the most 
common cause of women dying in pregnancy.” The intense medicalization and the fixation on 
risk represented here function not to distinguish Mr. Lee’s pregnancy from pregnancies that seem 
more “normal” but instead call attention to pregnancy writ large as a “fiction”—to use Waldby’s 
terminology—of the biomedical imaginary. In this sense, while Mr. Lee’s pregnancy may be 
merely speculative, it is not more fictional than any other pregnancy, if we consider pregnancy as 
a biocultural phenomenon—that is, as a set of narratives and technologies.  
 
Rethinking “Disruption” 
 In mobilizing the biomedical imaginary as an alternate jurisdiction for Lee and Wong to 
imagine and perform Lee’s reproductive self, POP! has the potential to shift the center of 
discussions about embodiment and normativity that run throughout environmental movements. 
This becomes apparent if we focus on the project’s engagement with chemicals. In POP!, 
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hormones are not a threat to gender or sexual integrity, as in the prevailing discourse about 
EDCs. They are instead a means of achieving a desired bodily change. In this, the project stands 
in sharp contrast to the dominant narrative of poisoned subjectivity that circulates in the 
embodied health movements discussed in chapters 1-3. The ur narrative that emerges in the 
repeated telling of stories of environmental toxic exposure is of an able body that is dis-abled in 
its productive and/or reproductive capacities. As with all ur narratives, the assumption of 
representativeness can come to serve a disciplining function. While the familiarity of stories 
about toxic exposure aid some subjects in seeking recognition and redress, this same familiarity 
can make other kinds of stories—and other kinds of subjects—illegible within the schema of 
toxic discourse. Thus, “one fundamental connection between life narrative and somatic 
anomaly,” as G. Thomas Couser explains, “is that to have certain conditions is to have one’s life 
written for one. For people with many disabilities, culture inscribes narratives on their bodies, 
willy nilly” (“Disability” 458).  
 Transgender people, who may take exogenous hormones in order to live in their target 
gender, are subject to similar violations of their agency to define the terms by which their lives 
and embodied experiences are narrated. And, in fact, these processes are reinforced through the 
persistent cultural linkages between queer- and trans-ness and disability.19 When anti-toxics 
movements knit able-bodiedness to reproductivity and sexual dimorphism, while making these 
the measures of environmental health, they propagate both environmental and testimonial 
injustices. Yet, these disparities are not visible when the poisoned subjectivity at the center of 
toxic discourse turns on the disruption of ideally hetero-/cis- normative and able bodies. Reading 
POP! as a toxic life narrative makes room for different kinds of stories about what it means to be 
chemically exposed or to live in a body that is imagined as anomalous.  
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 Of course, POP! is by no means a perfect object. Questions of testimonial justice are 
complicated by the fact that, although Mr. Lee’s pregnancy interrupts dichotomous 
understandings of sex and gender, the character is not represented as transgender or queer. In an 
interview embedded within the project,20 Mr. Lee rejects the interviewer’s suggestion that he is 
“a transvestite [sic] and not a pregnant man.” Mr. Lee remarks that he remains “biologically and 
anatomically” a man during his pregnancy, without regard to the slippery boundaries of such 
categories as biology and sex. The repeated use of the word “transvestite” in the interview to 
seemingly refer at once to a spectrum of gender identities and performances—from cisgender 
drag performers to transgender women—evinces what is perhaps a shallow and problematic 
understanding of the sex-gender spectrum, even as the interview challenges certain kinds of 
gender rigidity.21 At the same time, the interview criticizes the marginalization of “transvestites” 
and draws attention to the normalization of violence against gender nonconforming people. Thus, 
Mr. Lee’s claim that he is “unlike the men who feel this strong desire to physically become 
women” should not, I think, be taken as a disavowal of transgender people or transgender desire 
as such, but rather as a recognition of the breadth of the spectrum of gender identity.22  
 Male Pregnancy Project’s relationship to trans/gender politics is, then, somewhat vexed. 
This is not least because transgender individuals and communities may have fraught 
relationships with biomedicine. While I understand Male Pregnancy Project as actively engaging 
the fraughtness of medical ways of knowing, such a critical approach cannot erase the historical 
and ongoing marginalization of transgender and queer identities through the instruments of 
biomedicine. As Dean Spade argues, the medical and psychiatric discourses to which transgender 
people are subject work to “naturalize and make ‘healthy’ dichotomized, birth-assigned gender 
performance” (np). When transgender people make medicalization work for them—in seeking a 
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psychiatric diagnosis in order to secure health insurance coverage for the costs of transition, for 
example, or in seeking hormonal or surgical interventions in the first place—it may require 
adopting a strategy of “double-edged thinking” that brackets the way these discourses actively 
make transgender lives illegible (Butler 108).  
 So although biomedicine represents the “last court of appeal” on bodily norms (Waldby 
41), one way of reading POP! is as an attempt to broaden biomedicine’s horizon of the possible. 
Interpreted as a speculative form of toxic life narrative, the project could be seen as “embrac[ing] 
our shared interdependent transsex,” as Bailey Kier urges us to do (189). Kier contends that 
“everybody on the planet is now encompassed within the category of transgender” because of the 
proliferation of EDCs (ibid.). Rather than a sign of environmental catastrophe, transsex offers the 
opportunity to rethink reproduction and so to work through the multiple effects and meanings of 
environmental toxic proliferation (ibid. 196). Certainly, Lee and Wong disrupt biocultural 
investments in body dimorphism and reimagine reproduction. In doing so, they create a 
speculative body that both expresses and disrupts the neoliberal injunction to flexibility that has 
been my concern throughout this dissertation.23  
 Male Pregnancy Project does not answer the questions prompted by my readings of toxic 
life narratives in chapters 1-3. But it does create openings for thinking differently. With its 
interactive web format and speculative mode, POP! seems to invite connection and creativity. 
Forging a connection between POP! and POPs forces a new way of looking at environmental 
chemicals as endocrine disruptors that recognizes that “‘disruption’ may not produce something 
bad” (Guthman, Weighing In 102). POP! suggests the crucial need to differentiate between 
violent forms of toxic trespass and the ways that bodies and subjects constitute themselves 
alongside and in response to chemicals.24 Recognizing Male Pregnancy Project as engaging 
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environmental issues requires environmentalism to self-consciously move away from paradigms 
that make bodily difference itself a sign of environmental disorder. A speculative reading of 
POP! as toxic life narrative suggests, troublingly, the ways toxic discourse itself is grounded in 
histories of the surveillance and control of racialized, queer, and disabled bodies.  
 
Environmentalism’s Eugenic Legacies 
 The role of eugenics in shaping environmental conservationist ideologies has been well 
established.25 Modern environmentalism, which has been largely characterized by 
conservationist and preservationist impulses, emerged alongside Progressive Era anxieties about 
urbanization, industrialization, and immigration. Influenced by theories of evolution, social 
Darwinism, and scientific racism, conservationist investment in pristine natural spaces reflected 
concerns about the purity of the national (white) body. In the early to mid twentieth century, 
environmentalist organizations like the Save-the-Redwoods League, the Audubon Society, the 
National Wildlife Association, the Save the American River Association, and the Sierra Club 
were involved with noted eugenicists like Madison Grant and Charles Matthais Goethe.26 Grant, 
a prominent naturalist who helped found the New York Zoological Society in 1895 and the Save-
the-Redwoods League in 1919, also served as president of the Eugenics Research Association 
and was a founding member of the American Eugenics Society. Grant is best known for his 
influential work The Passing of the Great Race, which argued for the superiority of the Nordic 
race (Engs 102).27 Like Grant, Goethe was a president of the Eugenics Research Association and 
an enthusiastic supporter of Nazi race experiments.28 He also cultivated a reputation as a 
naturalist and spent his considerable wealth supporting conservationist organizations, and in 
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1920 the National Park Service awarded him the title of “Honorary Chief Naturalist” (Stern 134–
139). 
 More recently, the Sierra Club in particular has been imbricated with xenophobic and 
neo-Malthusian inheritors of the American eugenicist tradition like the Federation for American 
Immigration Reform (FAIR) and Population-Environment Balance (PEB). The Massachusetts 
Audubon Society likewise served as an organizational founder in 1995 of the Coalition for 
United States Population Stabilization. Organizations like FAIR, PEB, and the Coalition use the 
language of environmental preservation to legitimize racist anti-immigrant and anti-welfare 
policy prescriptions. Just as self-proclaimed eugenicists like Grant and Goethe did before them, 
these groups advocate for restricted immigration and coercive measures to curb reproduction by 
specific populations. The neo-Malthusian ecologist Garrett Hardin, best known for popularizing 
the idea of “the tragedy of the commons,” served for a time on the Sierra Club’s Population 
Committee, as well as the board of FAIR. Through its associations with FAIR, the Sierra Club is 
connected to the Pioneer Fund—which, since its 1937 founding as a eugenic society pursuing 
racial betterment, has been implicated in supporting through various channels Nazi racial 
hygiene, the Ku Klux Klan and Southern White Citizens Councils, McCarthyism, the McCarran-
Walter Act of 1952, pro-apartheid groups, and Richard Herrnstein and Charles Murray’s 1994 
tour-de-force racist study The Bell Curve (Ordover 45–50).  
 Eugenics is virtually synonymous in the American popular imagination with technologies 
and ideologies of racial betterment (in the German context, eugenics was also called “racial 
hygiene”). The ongoing investment of some conservationist leaders and groups in these kinds of 
racist logics is quite clear. But Alexandra Stern has shown that the eugenics movement in the 
United States shifted its focus after World War II (in an effort to “rebrand” after the full horrors 
  202 
of Nazi racial hygiene had come to light) away from an explicit interest in delineating innate 
racial differences to mapping the contours of gender and sexual deviance. “The disarticulation 
and transposition of ‘race’ onto gender and sexuality,” she argues,  
was central to the perpetuation of a hereditarian and evolutionist vision of civilization and 
 its discontents in the United States…The racial panics of the 1920s reemerged as the 
 sexual conformity of the 1950s, even as institutional racism and the racialized baggage of 
 social Darwinism perdured, the latter often embedded in population and family planning 
 or psychotherapeutic constructs of gender and sex. (9–10)29  
 
Anxieties about sex and gender also have a long history within conservative strains of US 
environmentalism, including, in the twentieth century, Rooseveltian muscular Christianity, the 
undercurrents of sexual puritanism within the new agrarianism,30 and Robert Bly’s men’s 
movement. Increasingly, scholars are attending to the intersections of environmental studies and 
queer theory, showing how environmentalism has been invested in the surveillance and 
containment of queer bodies (human or otherwise).  
 We do not have to look very hard to see these legacies echoing in anti-toxics embodied 
health movements, which may or may not be immediately apparent as conservationist in nature. 
If, as Stern argues, eugenics “can simply be defined as better breeding” (11), then concern about 
endocrine-disrupting chemicals apparent within both the DES and the alternative food 
movements is, at least in part, a eugenicist anxiety. This is most obvious in the DES movement, 
which has focused on the threatened reproductivity of women and men exposed to the drug. As I 
argue in chapter 1, the repeated narrative that emerges from the personal testimony of DES 
daughters strongly links mature femininity to successful biological reproduction. To a lesser 
extent, this is also true of masculinity in DES sons. Recall, for example, the testimony of Warren 
Lehrer, who in one breath raises and dismisses the possibility that the endocrine-disrupting 
properties of diethylstilbestrol may have produced in him a transgender desire. Warren’s 
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childhood belief that he “would fit in better as a girl” may be ultimately rejected in his own 
testimony and the editorial commentary that frames it, but his lingering gender anxieties are 
apparent in his unresolved fears that he may be infertile (in Braun 44). The danger posed by DES 
is a multi-dimensional one. Having affected Warren’s mother’s reproduction, it also disrupts 
Warren’s own masculinity and possibly his reproductive capacity, suggesting the ways that 
reproductivity is produced at the intersections of sex, gender, and ability.31  
 So, too, in the alternative food movement. In a passage quoted earlier in this chapter, 
Michael Pollan worries about the health consequences of feeding his son food that may contain 
traces of a chemical that “has been shown to turn normal male frogs into hermaphrodites” 
(Omnivore 178). The younger Pollan’s health apparently depends on being identified as a normal 
male, where normality is defined by intact, differentiated sex organs. Here, the successful 
reproductivity of both father and son are threatened by chemicals that might feminize the 
narrator’s male offspring. As with DES, the hazards of agricultural chemicals are imagined to 
play out across generations. They threaten not only individual bodies but also the sense of 
futurity that inheres in the possibility of procreation that “normal” sex organs seem to represent. 
These same concerns appear with greater force in Estabrook’s Tomatoland, which invests 
heavily in the stories of Francisca Herrera, baby Carlitos, and other migrant farmworkers whose 
children were born with congenital abnormalities caused by pesticide exposure during fetal 
development. Like much of alternative food’s toxic discourse, this channeling of pesticide 
anxiety through the bodies of mothers has a historical antecedent in UFW campaigns. As 
historian Linda Nash explains, “the union’s consumer [grape boycott] campaign focused on the 
fact that pesticides were known to pass into breast milk, and breast-feeding mothers boycotting 
the pesticide-laden grapes at Safeway became a powerful image for the union cause” (166).  
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 I am not dismissing the very real concerns expressed by environmentalists and parents 
like Pollan about the material effects of EDCs. I am drawing attention to the ways that this 
particular kind of toxic anxiety is represented within and across health social movements. The 
repeated invocation of the tropes of trauma (in DES narratives) and the gothic (in alternative 
food discourse) are part of the process of enfreakment that links disability to gender non-
conformity as forms of abjection. The very insistence on the normal across so much of the 
literature on environmental chemicals—be it in the form of personal narrative, muckraking 
journalism, environmental criticism, or scientific writing—betrays the extent to which 
environmental thought is saturated with the logics of eugenics, which is fundamentally about 
conceptions of physical deviance or defect. Examining EHMs for ideologies of “better breeding” 
illuminates the overlap between the domains of gender, disability, and sexuality that have been at 
the center of this dissertation. 
 Shifting eugenic ideologies and technologies demonstrate Karen Elizabeth Jung’s claim 
that defect or disability “is a practice of power wherein the category can be expanded or 
contracted” (263). As the first three chapters of this dissertation have shown, anti-toxics social 
movements and the poisoned subjects who speak out of and for those movements have a stake in 
defining the category of disability. In the ur narrative of the DES daughter, infertility is framed 
as a disability in a move that links heteronormative performances of femininity to able-
bodiedness. Michael Pollan makes a similar move in regards to masculinity when discussing 
chemical residues on food. In Tomatoland, disability emerges out of the intersections of 
production and reproduction; “birth defects” are levied as a claim about unfair labor practices 
and consumer safety.32  
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 Reading Lee and Wong’s Male Pregnancy Project alongside other toxic life narratives 
concerned with reproduction puts environmentalism’s long-standing entanglement with eugenics 
under scrutiny by imagining a program of “better breeding” that disrupts both white supremacist 
ideologies and gender dimorphism. Stern has shown that anti-Chinese sentiment in the United 
States historically manifested in representations of Chinese men as physically and sexually unfit; 
in the late nineteenth century, “West Coast nativists graphically portrayed Chinese men as 
effeminate, enervated, and spotted with suppurating pustules or ugly lesions” (20). POP! 
repurposes this imagery. Protuberant sores are replaced by a pregnant belly, linking Chinese 
male sexuality to medical advancement, rather than disease.33 The figure of the pregnant man 
may itself run counter to the contradictory eugenic logics of circumscribed fecundity. Michael 
Davidson identifies a shift in representations of pregnant men during the modernist era toward 
male pregnancy as “a biofuturist potentiality” (127). “At a moment in which racial science and 
eugenics presented brave new worlds purged of defective, degenerate bodies, and in which 
sexological discourse made visible (and pathological) a new set of practices and subjects,” the 
displacement of pregnancy outside of the female body served to both crip and queer reproduction 
(ibid.). Speculatively linking POP! with POPs likewise crips and queers toxic discourse.34  
 I have been bracketing the multiple chemical sensitivity movement in this discussion of 
environmentalism and eugenics, because those narratives are not by and large interested in 
reproduction. While it may be less obvious, however, some of the same concerns that animate 
eugenics also shape the way MCSers narrate their illness experiences. Like all performances of 
poisoned subjectivity, the MCS anthologies I read in chapter 2 are invested in strategically 
recapacitating the disabled body. Zwillinger, Johnson, and their testimonial subjects seek social 
and legal recognition for MCSers as people with disabilities—as “true victims,” to use one 
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MCSer’s phrase (Linda Baker in Johnson 158). When they assert their right to access SSDI and 
the workplace and housing accommodations promised by the ADA, these narrators make a 
specific kind of claim about their relationship to the state. If, as some scholars argue, disability 
can be defined under late capitalism as the inability to work, then claims on workplace 
accommodation in particular function paradoxically to define MCSers as disabled so that they 
may be hailed as legitimate citizen-workers. In claiming recognition for MCSers as disabled 
subjects of the nation-state, these narratives challenge eugenicist notions of fitness, disability, 
and value.   
 Still, both Johnson and Zwillinger make biopolitical arguments in favor of 
accommodations for citizen-workers disabled by chemical exposure. Acknowledging the 
legitimacy of MCS diagnoses and incorporating MCSers into existing structures of 
accommodation, argues Zwillinger, will “keep the MCS worker working” (10). Alison Johnson 
makes a similar claim that “America’s leaders must realize that their refusal to take toxic 
exposures seriously is in the long run a costly mistake that engenders not only potentially large 
legal settlements but also creates a group of citizens whose health is so impaired that they will 
need public assistance to get through life” (106). MCSers’ ability to be reintegrated into the 
sphere of “productivity” stands as a sign of the nation’s well-being. This same relationship 
between the individual and the national body has undergirded eugenic movements in the United 
States as they have pushed for forced sterilization, immigration restrictions, and the 
institutionalization of those deemed unfit.  
 I am in no way suggesting that these EHMs or the people they represent support these 
kinds of practices, although I may appear to be painting with a broad brush. Historians of 
eugenics suggest a capacious understanding of the concept that recognizes continuity across 
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practices that at on the surface might seem to be distinct. This has significant consequences for 
environmental studies. Examining US environmentalism’s eugenic legacies, ecocritic Sarah 
Jaquette Ray concludes that “a historical perspective reveals the dangers in making the body a 
primary site of environmentalist practice” (3). Environmental critics and historians have 
untangled the significant connections between eugenics and environmentalism emerging out of 
the Progressive Era, and recent work in the field is beginning to show how contemporary 
environmental movements continue to rhyme with eugenics as it assumes new guises. Once we 
recognize eugenics as a set of interlocking ideologies and technologies that support “better 
breeding” in service of a more productive nation, we can see that toxic discourse itself is 
animated in part by eugenicist anxieties.  
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Notes to Chapter 4: 
 
1 Throughout this chapter, I use “POP!” to refer to the website as an autobiographical 
performance. “Male Pregnancy Project” is the title of the art project as a whole, and I try to use 
this name when referring to the conceptual framework behind the website.  
2 As of this writing, the pregnancy journal is not live. After several months of visiting the 
website and being unable to access the video archive, I have recently been able to access the 
videos via hyperlink from the homepage for the first time.     
3 The project is featured on the Museum of Hoaxes website (Boese); is deemed a hoax by the 
website Hoax or Fact (“World’s First”); and the Urban Legends page of about.com calls it an 
“elaborate Internet hoax,” a “put-on” and “an elaborately constructed farce” (Emery). The 
popular urban legends website Snopes calls POP!’s claims of a human male pregnancy “false” 
but also describes the project as “an exercise in speculative fantasy” (“A Womb of His Own”). 
Wikipedia’s “Male pregnancy” page cites the project as “a hoax site featuring a fictitious male 
pregnancy.” 
4 Some natural processes, such as volcanic eruption, are known to produce POPs; however, 
almost all POPs are human-made. POPs are most commonly identified with the so-called “dirty 
dozen” chemicals (aldrin, chlordane, DDT, dieldrin, endrin, heptachlor, hexachlorobenzene, 
mirex, polychlorinated biphenyls, polychlorinated dibenzo-p-dioxins, polychlorinated 
dibenzofurans, and toxaphene) targeted for phase-out in the 2004 United Nations treaty known as 
the Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants. Convention signatories “are 
required to reduce the risks to human health and the environment” through “measures (legal 
and/or administrative) to eliminate or heavily restrict the production and use of POP pesticides 
and PCBs, and to minimise the unintentional production and release of POPs.” The treaty also 
makes provision to target new chemicals for phase-out, and in 2009, the Stockholm Convention 
was updated to include nine additional POPs (alpha hexachlorocyclohexane; beta 
hexachlorocyclohexane; chlordecone; hexabromobiphenyl; hexabromodiphenyl ether and 
heptabromodiphenyl ether; lindane; pentachlorobenzene; perfluorooctane sulfonic acid, its salts, 
and perfluorooctane sulfonyl fluoride; technical endosulfan and its related isomers; and 
tetrabromodiphenyl ether and pentabromodiphenyl ether). However, it is important to understand 
that POPs are not limited to those chemicals targeted by the treaty, and some chemicals that are 
covered under Stockholm are subject to exemptions in certain contexts. These include use of 
DDT for malaria prevention, use of lindane for head lice control, and continued use of 
endosulfan for integrated crop pest control (United Nations Industrial Development Organization 
np). 
5 I draw this explanation of persistent organic pollutants primarily from Sandra Steingraber’s 
layperson-friendly discussion in her memoir Having Faith. 
6 See note 4 above. 
7 The EU has taken stricter measures, going beyond the requirements of the Stockholm 
Convention. The European Commission has entirely banned the production, sale, and use of the 
10 intentionally-produced POPs regulated by the UN (European Commission 2). 
8 This raises the question of what counts as a “real” hormone. I take Steingraber to be 
distinguishing here between both endogenous and exogenous hormones on the one hand—that is, 
both hormones produced by the body and hormones introduced from outside the body—and 
exogenous chemicals that are similar enough in chemical structure that they are capable of 
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binding to cells’ receptor proteins but are not intentionally introduced for this purpose. For 
example, the insulin shots that diabetics may take are a hormone introduced from outside the 
body, and human bodies respond in the same ways to this exogenous insulin as they do to the 
insulin produced within the body. By contrast, environmental EDCs are chemically distinct from 
the estrogens, androgens, and thyroid hormones they mimic. DES reveals how tricky it is to 
maintain a distinction between “real” hormones and hormone mimics. Known as a “synthetic 
estrogen,” the chemical structure of DES differed slightly from natural hormones; in effect, DES 
was a mimic that produced “estrogenic activity,” but not necessarily at the same rate and with the 
same timing as endogenous estrogens (Langston 32). In this case, a “real” hormone might simply 
be a hormone that does what it is expected to do, or what it typically does, and nothing more.  
9 In her studies of seafood advisories, the social geographer Becky Mansfield has shown that 
developmental risk is often assumed at all stages in the research process. That is, even studies 
that are methodologically prior to risk assessment (where risk assessment represents, more often 
than not, the weighing of benefits against harms) prescribe special caution for premenopausal 
women. As Mansfield explains, “this consistency across the research shows that, at least in the 
first decade of this century, it is not the case that finding toxins leads to a study of health effects, 
which leads to risk assessment and policy interventions. Rather, the prior fact of risk 
assessment…reverberates through the research required to generate the evidence to make such 
risk assessment necessary and policy interventions meaningful” (973). In other words, EDC 
research is subject to a phenomenon known as “problem closure,” which occurs when the 
definition of a problem is taken as a given from the outset of inquiry into that problem (Hajer 22; 
Guthman, Weighing In 15). Studies of endocrine disruptors begin with the assumption that these 
chemicals produce disastrous changes to human reproductive function and behavior. This 
assumption forecloses on other ways of understanding EDC proliferation as a problem.  
10 One challenge in discussing the EDC discourse and meta-discourse is inconsistent and often 
imprecise terminology. For example, Mortimer-Sandilands seems to group intersex and 
transgender people under the label “queer,” POP! refers to both transgender women and male-
identified drag performers as “transvestites” (“Mr. Lee Mingwei”), and Greg Garrard conflates 
the meanings of transgender and intersex (“Nature Cures” 505). While some people may identify 
across these categories, the terms intersex and transgender are not interchangeable, nor can they 
be uncritically lumped under the term “queer.” I do my best to make these distinctions clear 
while drawing on sources that may not do so.  
11 Some critics will surely disagree with my interpretation of the project as a commentary on the 
enfreakment of non-normative reproduction and pregnant men in particular. Sherry Velasco, for 
example, compares Lee and Wong’s project to tabloid representations of pregnant men (17). 
Irina Aristarkhova takes seriously the project’s attempts to think differently about embodiment 
and relationality but nevertheless concludes that Male Pregnancy Project is “not entirely 
different from the long history of mock male pregnancies that spectacularise the phenomenon” 
(26). While I do not want to dismiss these kinds of concerns, my own view is more in line with 
Sayantani Dasgupta’s argument that “POP! is a subaltern ‘takeover’ of discourse around gender 
(and gestation) performance, embodiment in medicine, and viewership in cyberspace” (45). In 
the context of anti-toxics rhetoric, POP! has the potential to contribute substantively as 
critique—to disrupt the discourse of endocrine disruption, as it were.   
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12 Like Lee and Wong, Aristarkhova uses the sex-specific identifier “human male.” I have tried 
to use gender-neutral language throughout this chapter, recognizing the complicated 
relationships between sex, gender, and reproductive capacities.  
13 A recent essay by Sayantani Dasgupta also treats POP! as an autobiographical performance. 
For Dasgupta, this performance is rooted in fantasy, opening up possibilities for collaborative 
engagement between the audience and the artists, whose identities “comingle” as viewers 
imagine themselves sharing Mr. Lee’s “cyberpregnancy” (46). 
14 Smith and Watson delineate five “metrics of authenticity” (a term they borrow from Hua Hsu) 
that produce and measure the truth-effects of human rights witnessing. While POP! does not 
situate itself within human rights contexts, we can see some of these same metrics at work in the 
project as a form of biomedical testimony. The site’s video, journal, and biomedical monitoring 
give a sense of “‘you-are-there’ immediacy”; biomedical terminology and imagery invoke an 
existing discourse that renders the project and Mr. Lee legible; and these apparatuses 
simultaneously work to contextualize the site’s documentary work as “different from the readers’ 
frame of reference” (Smith and Watson, “Witness” 593–594). Whereas accounts of human rights 
violations emphasize a sense of communal suffering, in which the witness has a “duty to narrate 
a collective story” that takes on the “normative shape of victim experience and identity” (ibid. 
594), POP! seems to depart from these conventions in highlighting Mr. Lee’s singularity as “the 
first” pregnant man. One way of understanding the work of this dissertation would be to say that 
it tracks overlapping metrics of authenticity for witnessing to different forms of environmental 
chemical exposure, seeking to replace—or at least supplement—the rubric of authenticity with 
one of justice. From this vantage point, POP!’s departure from any one metric of authenticity 
does not necessarily signal hoaxing but rather opens up avenues for moving beyond the “ethics 
of verification” that so often functions as a form of violence against those who witness from 
marginalized subject positions (ibid.). 
15 Autobiographical truth has historically been determined along axes of power and privilege, 
silencing female, indigenous, queer, and other potentially dissident voices (Gilmore, 
Autobiographics). If “autobiography” is a distinct formation of the Enlightenment period that 
privileges the self-interested individual, many scholars of life writing prefer the adjectival form 
“autobiographical” to signal a “shift from genre to discourse” (Smith and Watson, Reading 3). 
16 Lejeune makes clear that a violation of the autobiographical pact—when the author asserts an 
identicalness between themself and the protagonist that is not borne out in the real world—does 
not render a text fictional. The lie is itself “an ‘autobiographical’ category” (17). For Lejeune, 
then, POP! would seem to represent an autobiographical hoax. Timothy Dow Adams, on the 
other hand, takes a more generous view of autobiographical lies. He argues that “autobiography 
is the story of an attempt to reconcile one’s life with one’s self and is not, therefore, meant to be 
taken as historically accurate but as metaphorically authentic” (ix). For Dow Adams, “narrative 
truth and personal myth are more telling than literal fidelity; the autobiographer’s reasons for 
telling lies are more important than absolute accuracy” (x–xi). 
17 In a museum installation of Male Pregnancy Project in the early 2000s, Lee and Wong were 
explicitly presented as co-parents of Mr. Lee’s fetus (Ingram-Waters 12).  
18 Auto/biography is G. Thomas Couser’s term for life narratives produced through collaboration 
(Vulnerable Subjects). See chapter 1 for a more thorough discussion of auto/biography and the 
vulnerabilities inherent to life writing with and for another.  
19 On those linkages, see Robert McRuer, Alison Kafer. 
  211 
                                                                                                                                                       
20 The interview, like virtually every element of POP!, is a creation of the artists as part of Male 
Pregnancy Project. The name of the interviewer, Janice Versalius, coyly references the project 
itself. Janice is a variant of the name Jane, which is a feminization of John and, like that name, 
means “god is gracious.” It also suggests the Roman god of transitions, Janus, who is often 
represented with two faces. Versalius is a variant of Vesalius, the Latinized name of Andries van 
Wezel. Vesalius’s 1543 De humani corporis fabrica (On the Fabric of the Human Body) 
revolutionized Western ideas about human anatomy. The name Janice Versalius thus suggests 
the meeting of modern science and the divine. Note that both names are double variants (John-
Jane-Janice and van Wezel-Vesalius-Versalius). More than a crude suggestion of Mr. Lee’s 
variant pregnancy, the name of the observing interviewer is a reminder that difference and 
change are a deeply embedded part of human culture, including cultures of both science and 
testimony.  
21 While some people do identify with the term, transvestite is not an umbrella category and is 
not the way that many or most trans* people self-identify. Rather, transgender “incorporates the 
broadest possible range of gender nonconformity” (Enke 18). While transgender is by no means 
a universal term, A. Finn Enke lists “transsexuals, transvestites, cross-dressers, female and male 
impersonators, persons with intersex conditions, butches, studs, femmes, fem queens, drag 
queens, drag kinds, feminine-identified men, masculine-identified women, MTF, FTM, trannies, 
gender variants, genderqueers, boi dykes, trans men, trans guys, trans women, bigender, two 
spirit, intergender, neutrois, pan gender, third gender, gender fluid” as identities that may be 
encompassed by the collective term (18–19). See note 10. 
22 Alternatively, some readers might consider POP! an appropriation of the stories of male-
identified people who experience pregnancy in the real world. Read this way, the project enacts a 
kind of testimonial violence. Certainly, when the project is seen as a “hoax,” this contributes to 
the mythologizing of pregnant men as impossibly freakish, an urban legend. In his interview with 
Janice Versalius, Mr. Lee implicitly rejects the idea that he is putting on transgender drag.  
23 Victoria Pitts argues that spectacularly modified bodies “are disruptive…because they remain 
partly unintelligible while also speaking the common language of consumption, flexibility, and 
technological invention/intervention” (198). 
24 Sandra Steingraber defines toxic trespass as “the unwanted incursion of someone else’s 
chemicals into one’s body” (Living Downstream 278).  
25 For a sampling of the literature on the connections between eugenics and environmental 
movements, see Gosine, Haraway, Ordover, Ray, Stern.  
26 See Alexandra Stern’s chapter on the eugenicist influence on California’s parks in her 
excellent Eugenic Nation (115–149). 
27 Grant’s ideas about a master race influenced German anthropologist Hans F.K. Günther, 
whose work directly shaped the racial theories and policies of the Nazis. Grant also helped to 
write the Johnson-Reed Immigration Restriction Act of 1924, which instituted an immigration 
quota system based on national origin, and served as vice president of the Immigration 
Restriction League for fifteen years. 
28 Edwin Black documents Goethe’s profound and public appreciation of Nazi policies of racial 
hygiene. In a 1934 letter to fellow California eugenics proponent E. S. Gosney, Goethe wrote,  
 You will be interested to know that your work has played a powerful part in shaping the 
opinions of the group of intellectuals who are behind Hitler in this epoch-making 
program. Everywhere I sensed that their opinions have been tremendously stimulated by 
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American thought, and particularly by the work of the Human Betterment Foundation. I 
want you, my dear friend, to carry this thought with you for the rest of your life, that you 
have really jolted into action a great government of 60 million people. (qtd in Black 277) 
Gosney had founded the Human Betterment Foundation in 1926 to promote eugenic sterilization 
in California.  
29 Also see Gosine and Ordover for discussions on the links between scientific racism and the 
surveillance of racialized reproduction and queer sex.  
30 For example, neo-agrarian thinker Wendell Berry not only valorizes traditional gender roles as 
both a spiritual and an environmental good but also evinces a deep skepticism of hormonal forms 
of birth control in The Unsettling of America. The Sierra Club is the publisher of this and other 
of Berry’s books.   
31 Drawing on Lee Edelman’s argument about the rise of the Child as the “perpetual horizon of 
every acknowledged politics” in No Future—an argument indebted to Berlant’s theory of 
infantile citizenship, discussed in chapter 1 (Edelman 3)—Michael Davidson outlines what he 
calls a “crip futurity” that highlights the linking of gender, ability, and sexuality that I have been 
tracking across this dissertation. Davidson writes that “the nonreproductive body that medical 
science would consign to the dustbin is always, potentially, the body we wouldn’t want our 
daughter to bear, the body we wouldn’t want to keep on life support, the body that, could it 
speak, would want not to be born” (126). Male pregnancy captures these relationships, Davidson 
argues, because “even to speak about male pregnancy is implicitly to describe a close 
relationship between disability and sexuality” (141).  
32 There is an interesting moment in Tomatoland when Estabrook quotes extensively from a 
deposition given by an executive of Ag-Mart, the corporation in whose tomato fields Francisca 
Herrera and the other mothers of the Tower Cabins babies born with significant congenital 
anomalies worked. Asked about his company’s policy allowing pregnant women to continue 
picking conventionally-grown (and so pesticide-laden) fruit, he says, “We do not have any rules 
to keep anybody from working with it there. We do not discriminate against people for being 
pregnant” (69). The exchange raises crucial questions about the relationship between labor and 
reproduction and the role of institutions—either industry or the state—in regulating that 
relationship. While the reader is clearly meant to side against the corporation here, as the narrator 
implicitly does, this position presumes an individualist, rights-based approach to the issue. It pits 
the right to work against the right to avoid potentially harmful exposures. An environmental 
justice framework instead suggests the need for structural changes (ie. regulation of dangerous 
pesticides) that would allow pregnant workers to work and avoid exposure at the same time.  
33 Lee Mingwei was born in Taiwan and immigrated to the United States. According to his 
professional website, he currently lives and works in both New York and California. Virgil 
Wong identifies as Chinese-American. Thomas Beatie, the most famous real-life pregnant man 
in contemporary US culture, is also Asian-American, born to a white mother and a half-Korean, 
half-Filipino father.  
34 “Crip” has been reclaimed by some disability activists and scholars not only as a noun but as a 
verb. “Crip” in this context “expose[s] the arbitrary delineation between normal and defective 
and the negative social ramifications of attempts to homogenize humanity” (Sandahl 37). 
Cripping, like queering, transforms the “material uses to which queer/disabled existence has been 
put by a system of compulsory able bodiedness” (McRuer 32). 
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Coda 
Eco-Normativity and Epistemic Justice 
 
 Across the previous chapters, I have tracked the production of an ur narrative of 
environmental chemical exposure. Autobiographical narrators draw on recognizable tropes and 
story structures to witness to their embodied experiences with toxic exposure in ways that can be 
recognized as legitimate. My orientation toward the toxic discourse mobilized by life narrators 
within contemporary embodied health movements can best be described as ambivalent. Life 
narratives have helped these movements increase public awareness and win political gains, but 
the repeated telling of familiar stories of toxic harm also limits the kinds of narratives that can be 
told. The narrative structures of toxic discourse as it is mobilized through autobiographical 
modes impact how some bodies and some stories become legible, and some illegible, as 
belonging to legitimately “poisoned subjects.”  
 Implicit in my analysis has been a sense that toxic discourse compels a certain kind of 
poisoned subjectivity. Scholars like Éric Darier and Timothy Luke have drawn on the work of 
Foucault to make sense of environmental movements as a form of “environmental 
governmentality” or “green governmentality.” Contemporary environmentalism exerts a 
disciplinary force, they argue, engaging and extending existing regimes of biopolitics and 
biosecurity to encompass all forms of life in what Darier calls “ecopolitics” (23). Ecopolitics 
exhibit all the hallmarks of neoliberalization. They individualize environmental harms and 
subject environmental risk assessment to market logics. For example, even as they appear to 
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challenge regimes of consumer capitalism, environmental movements compel subjects to 
perform environmental citizenship through green consumerism (Luke, Ecocritique 115–136), an 
argument I explored in relation to alternative food movements in chapter 3.  
 Personal testimony is a primary site of ecopolitics that links care of nature to care of the 
self (Bowerbank 173). Its investment in autobiographical modes marks toxic discourse as a 
technology of the self that continually “readjusts” individuals, producing flexible and responsive 
ecological subjects (Luke, Ecocritique). Ecological subjectivity is constituted over and against 
those who cannot achieve eco-normative imperatives (Di Chiro 202), producing what Sarah 
Jaquette Ray calls ecological others. Poisoned subjectivity, which depends for its coherence on 
normative conceptions of gender and ability, reclaims ecological subjectivity for some victims of 
toxic exposure. In the process, it makes ecological others out of some of the most marginalized 
subjects, including people with mental illness, undocumented workers, and transgender and 
gender nonconforming people. Some of these communities have long been theorizing 
transcorporeal encounters between chemicals and human bodies. Their continued 
marginalization within the toxic discourse perpetuates a testimonial injustice against these 
ecological others as well as an overall loss for the epistemic system. 
 Toxic discourses, like toxins themselves, continue to proliferate in contemporary US 
culture. Personal anecdote has been a crucial tool for the anti-vaccine movement, which purports 
to link vaccines to autism. The highest profile stories are those of celebrities—most notably 
actress Jenny McCarthy and, more recently, singer Toni Braxton —who use their access to news 
and other media platforms to levy charges that their children developed autism as a result of 
routine childhood vaccinations.1 These types of auto/biographical narratives mark the meeting of 
the autobiographical politics of being Somebody and being some body.2 They appeal to readers’ 
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voyeuristic interest in the lives of celebrities while also offering insight into and shaping public 
understanding of experiences with impairment and disability. The anti-vaccine movement builds 
on the work of intersecting women’s health and environmentalist movements, including DES, to 
challenge expert knowledge about the body and reconfigure health technologies as toxic risks. 
Witnesses who speak out about what they see as a form of dangerous toxic exposure may 
experience the same types of gendered attacks described by DES daughters and MCSers. 
McCarthy’s critics, for example, chastise her not only for spreading misinformation but also for 
using Botox and modeling for Playboy. One needn’t give credence to McCarthy’s claims in 
order to recognize these types of statements as perpetrating a testimonial injustice that relies on a 
longstanding mind/body binary to devalue women as givers of knowledge.  
 Published life narratives are also beginning to emerge from the growing anti-fracking 
(hydraulic fracturing) movement. At least two such narratives treat fracking as a threat to the 
hetero-nuclear family. As its title suggests, Stephanie Hamel’s memoir Gas Drilling and the 
Fracking of a Marriage explores the pressures put on Stephanie’s relationship with her husband 
after they receive a lucrative offer to drill for shale gas discovered under the family’s summer 
home. Sandra Steingraber offers fracking as one of a litany of environmental threats to her 
children’s health in a chapter called “Bicycles on Main Street (and High-Volume Hydraulic 
Fracturing)” in her environmentalist child-rearing manifesto Raising Elijah. While educating 
readers about toxic proliferation and its structural causes, Steingraber offers her own family as a 
lifestyle model for other families attempting to manage the toxic risks posed by fracking and 
other technologies.  
 Like other anti-toxics social movements, anti-vaccine and anti-fracking activism inhabit 
contested domains. Each produces and is driven by anxieties that supplement scientific 
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knowledge with persuasive allegation. These cases highlight the difficulty of adjudicating what 
are by nature the murky truth claims of toxic discourse in ways that facilitate both environmental 
and testimonial justice. They also testify to the centrality of conceptions of health within 
environmentalist movements beyond those considered in these pages. While health may seem 
like an “uncomplicated way to link the destiny of the writing subject and her personal relations to 
that of the environment besieged by modernity” (Garrard, “Nature Cures” 494), health as a rubric 
for thinking across human-environmental relations comes freighted with eugenicist legacies and 
moralistic imperatives to self-improvement.3  
 Environmentalism has long been “invested in the fit body” (Ray 17), and these 
investments have not evaporated as environmental activism and criticism increasingly recognize 
the porousness of human bodies. If anything, conceptions of toxic trespass, transcorporeality, and 
actor networks have only reaffirmed the body as a threshold between discourse and materiality, 
fiction and biomedicine, testimony and science. A fulcrum between the human and the 
environmental, the porous body bears the weight of the physical and ideological pressures of 
environmental change.   
 The project of this dissertation has been to work within the schema of toxic discourse that 
has influenced environmental criticism for more than a decade to better understand how 
recognizable tropes of toxicity police the boundaries of autobiographical subjectivity at 
particular sites of toxic contest. I have argued that the poisoned subject created through the 
production of multiform toxic life narratives at the turn of the millennium is defined by physical 
and sexual disablement that threatens her or his reproductive and productive capacity. As 
poisoned subjects wield personal testimony to gain recognition and redress, they negotiate 
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conflicts between toxic injury and normate desire, while exploring the meanings of toxic 
proliferation for bodies and identities. I hope I have shown, despite claims to the contrary, that  
there is nothing uncomplicated about the relationship between the subject of life writing and 
conceptions of illness, disease, and death. Unpacking the ways that environmental discourses 
function in relation to these projects is one way that literary critics can leverage our expertise in 
service of a shared project of environmental and testimonial justice.   
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Notes to Coda: 
 
1 McCarthy has given many public interviews on her belief that a link exists between vaccines 
and autism and has used her role as co-host of the popular television show The View to 
promulgate this idea. She has also written several books on the subject, including a memoir, 
Louder Than Words: A Mother’s Journey in Healing Autism. McCarthy’s former partner, actor 
Jim Carey, has expressed similar views in public appearances with McCarthy and alone, but he 
has not been widely identified with the anti-vaccine movement or criticized by the media in the 
same way that McCarthy has. Braxton raises the possibility that her son’s autism was caused by 
his MMR vaccine in her 2014 memoir, Unbreak My Heart (214). 
2 Following a 2002 review of Lucy Grealy’s Autobiography of a Face proclaiming that narrative 
a “nobody memoir” in contrast to the typical “somebody memoir” written by already 
recognizable figures like Hilary Clinton, Couser coined the term “some body memoir” to refer to 
life narratives “about what it’s like to have or to be, to live in or as, a particular body—indeed, a 
body that is usually odd or anomalous” (2). For Couser, the somebody/nobody distinction is 
tinged not only with ableism but also with misogyny.   
3 As Breyan Strickler explains, “[b]ecause the risk society is not fully contained by cultural or 
legal definitions, the discourse of risk and toxicity has the fluidity to embrace other related 
discourses, particularly those of health” (113–114). See also Bell, Hausman. 
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